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Abstract (Summary of Thesis) 
This thesis studies the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price 
reactions to events; earnings surprises, dividend changes, and credit rating changes. The first 
empirical chapter establishes that firm-specific investor sentiment is a key determinant of 
price adjustment in the context of an earnings surprise. This chapter demonstrates that the 
price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is not moderated by market-wide investor 
sentiment; and it is greater for firms announcing negative earnings surprises and firms facing 
uncertainty in valuation. Further, this chapter provides evidence of mispricing and return 
reversals over the days following earnings surprises. The second empirical chapter 
investigates the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to 
dividend changes. This chapter establishes that bullish investor sentiment moderates the 
negative price impact of a decrease in dividends. It suggests that the moderating impact of 
bullish investor sentiment is most marked for hard to value and difficult to arbitrage firms. 
Furthermore, it highlights that the impact of bullish investor sentiment is temporary as it 
reverses in a short period following dividend change announcements. The third empirical 
chapter explores the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in stock price formation around 
credit rating changes. This chapter provides evidence that investor sentiment has a significant 
impact on stock price responses to rating downgrades. It shows that the price impact of 
investor sentiment is most pronounced for speculative-grade firms and firms experiencing 
direct rating downgrades. Moreover, it indicates that mispricing due to the impact of investor 
sentiment reverses over the post-announcement period. Overall, the findings of this thesis 
provide strong evidence that investor sentiment towards individual firms plays an important 
role in stock pricing around corporate events. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1.  Rational for the Study and Contributions to the Literature 
Behavioural finance is one of the most prominent areas of research in the field of 
finance, studying effects of financial agents’ behavioural biases on financial decisions and the 
subsequent effects in financial markets. Behavioural finance proposes that market 
participants are not always rational, have limits to their discipline, are influenced by their own 
biases, and may make errors that can lead to sub-optimal decisions. The study of behavioural 
finance has grown steadily over the past decades and now it is one of the important areas of 
research for understanding the asset pricing process in financial markets, especially in the 
stock market. One particular thread of behavioural finance research focuses on the role of 
investor sentiment in the stock market; the focus of this study. Investor sentiment as the 
overall attitude of investors towards the market or a firm, which is not always based on 
fundamentals, has a significant impact on the stock market through investors’ trading 
activities and stock price movements. Important contributions on the role of investor 
sentiment in the stock market are made by Black (1986) and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann (1990) who highlight the existence of irrational trading in the market. There is 
widespread acknowledgement that investor sentiment has a significant impact on the stock 
market (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006), Tetlock (2007), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), Da, 
Engelberg, and Gao (2011), Sprenger, Tumasjan, Sandner, and Welpe (2014), and Huang, 
Jiang, Tu, and Zhou (2015)) and stock price movements can be better explained by 
behavioural models that allow for the emotional biases of investors (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and Chau, Deesomsak, and Koutmos (2016)). These results are established using a 
variety of investor sentiment proxies including survey-based measures (Lemmon and 
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Portniaguina (2006)), market-based measures (Baker and Stein  (2004)), non-financial factors 
(Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)), specialized sources’ measures (Engelberg, Reed, and 
Ringgenberg (2012)), and online resources’ measures (Liew and Wang (2016)). Online 
resources are one of the most valuable sources of investor sentiment data as they provide 
real-time information regarding public mood towards the whole market or individual firms. 
The analysis of user-generated content on online platforms, especially social media platforms, 
validates the credibility of online resources’ investor sentiment proxies and shows promise 
for the prediction of stock prices (Sprenger et al. (2014), Danbolt, Siganos, and Vagenas-Nanos 
(2015), Liew and Wang (2016), and Renault (2017)). This study uses a firm-specific investor 
sentiment proxy measured based on the content of tweets posted on two microblogging 
forums, Twitter and StockTwits, to investigate the role of investor sentiment is the stock 
market. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of investor sentiment towards 
individual firms in stock price formation at the time new fundamental information is 
announced to the market. This research goes further than prior studies in terms of 
considering a firm-specific investor sentiment measure not a market-wide investor sentiment 
measure and exploring the price impact of investor sentiment on the announcement of three 
important firm-specific events; earnings surprises, dividend changes, and credit rating 
changes. The results of this study shed light on the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment 
on stock prices on the arrival of new earnings, dividend, and credit rating information. The 
literature establishes that stock prices respond significantly to earnings surprises (Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) and Skinner and Sloan (2002)), dividend changes (Pettit (1972) and Aharony 
and Swary (1980)), and negative credit rating changes (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and 
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Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992)). Despite the importance of these events in the stock 
market, there are only a few empirical studies on the price impact of investor sentiment 
around these events. To address this gap in the literature, this thesis empirically investigates 
the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in the stock pricing process on the announcement 
of these events. The aim of this research is to bring together different strands of the literature 
and validate the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in stock price formation beyond the 
role of market-wide investor sentiment and fundamental information. 
The investor sentiment literature argues that investors’ behavioural biases are related 
to firms’ short-term performance, especially in the context of hard to value and difficult to 
arbitrage firms (Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Joseph, Wintoki, and Zhang (2011)). There is 
sentiment driven momentum embedded in the valuation of stocks in the market. When 
investor sentiment is bullish, stock price reactions are exaggerated for positive new 
information and when investor sentiment is bearish, responses are stronger for negative new 
information (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). The investor sentiment literature also 
addresses the fact that investor sentiment may cause temporary stock mispricing in the 
market. Errors in stock pricing due to the impact of investor sentiment are short-term and 
stock prices return to fundamental values in the near-term (Baker and Wurgler (2007), Da, 
Engelberg, and Gao (2015), and Danbolt et al. (2015)). 
The aim of this thesis is to empirically validate the predictions of the investor 
sentiment literature in the presence of an earnings announcement, a dividend change 
announcement, and a credit rating change announcement setting by using a measure of firm-
specific investor sentiment. This research asks important questions regarding the price impact 
of firm-specific investor sentiment around these three events; whether firm-specific investor 
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sentiment plays an important role in stock price formation around earnings surprises, 
dividend changes, and credit rating changes, if so, how the price impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment differs across firms and whether this impact is short-term, a temporary 
error in valuation that reverses over the days following the announcements. 
Chapter 3 addresses the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to earnings surprises. This analysis goes beyond the scope of Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy's (2012) study which establishes the impact of market-wide investor 
sentiment on the stock price sensitivity to earnings news. Using a sample of earnings surprises 
from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and firm-specific investor sentiment 
data from a specialised provider of sentiment data, PsychSignal, over the period 2011-2015, 
this chapter confirms the findings of the literature that firms with positive (negative) earnings 
outcomes experience significantly positive (negative) abnormal stock price performance (e.g., 
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) and Kinney, Burgstahler, and Martin (2002)). In addition, 
Chapter 3 finds strong empirical support for the price impact of investors’ emotional biases 
towards individual firms on the firms’ stock prices. Empirical results give evidence of a 
significant impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price reactions to earnings 
surprises beyond the impact of market-wide investor sentiment and fundamental earnings 
information, illustrating bullish (bearish) firm-specific investor sentiment leads to higher 
(lower) abnormal stock returns during earnings announcement periods. The findings establish 
that the price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is greater for negative earnings 
surprise firms than positive earnings surprise firms and this effect is most pronounced for 
hard to value firms; small firms and growth firms. Furthermore, evidence of short-term 
mispricing caused by firm-specific investor sentiment is identified in Chapter 3, showing post-
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announcement abnormal returns are lower (higher) for firms having bullish (bearish) firm-
specific investor sentiment.  
Chapter 4 builds on the understanding the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment 
on stock price reactions to dividend changes. Using a sample of dividend change 
announcements from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and firm-specific 
investor sentiment data from PsychSignal, over the period 2011-2016, this chapter confirms 
that the announcement of dividends provides the market with valuable information as stock 
prices react significantly to the announcement which is consistent with evidence provided by 
Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Woolridge (1982). Importantly, Chapter 4 
provides new evidence on the relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and 
abnormal stock returns around dividend change announcements. The results of empirical 
analysis suggest that bullish investor sentiment plays a significant role in stock price 
adjustment on the announcement of a dividend cut, showing bullish investor sentiment 
moderates the negative price impact of a decrease in dividends and leads to higher abnormal 
returns on the announcement. Furthermore, the results indicate that the moderating impact 
of bullish investor sentiment is most marked for hard to value and difficult to arbitrage firms; 
small firms, growth firms, and firms with a low level of institutional ownership. Moreover, 
empirical results give evidence of a temporary error in valuation due to the impact of investor 
sentiment around dividend change announcements. The results illustrate that mispricing due 
to the impact of bullish investor sentiment reverses over a short period following the 
announcements.  
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to credit rating changes. Using a sample of rating changes announced by Standard 
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& Poor’s (S&P) and firm-specific investor sentiment data from PsychSignal, over the period 
2011-2016, this chapter offers empirical confirmation to the results of prior studies that rating 
downgrades have a greater effect than rating upgrades on stock prices (e.g., Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), and Chung, Frost, and Kim (2012)), the stock price impact 
is greater for firms with low-rated debts compared to firms with high-rated debts (Goh and 
Ederington (1999) and Jorion and Zhang (2010)), and the price reaction is greater for direct 
rating changes than watch-preceded rating changes, which are rating changes that are 
preceded by addition to a watch list (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Chung et al. (2012)). 
Adding to these results, Chapter 5 finds strong empirical support for the impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating downgrades. Investor sentiment 
affects the stock price sensitivity to rating downgrades in a way that when investor sentiment 
is bullish, it moderates the stock price impact of a rating downgrade and when it is bearish, it 
amplifies the stock price impact of a rating downgrade. The results also establish the cross-
sectional differences in the price impact of investor sentiment around rating changes, 
showing the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating 
downgrades is more pronounced for speculative-grade firms and firms experiencing direct 
rating downgrades. Moreover, this chapter finds that the price impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment around rating downgrades is temporary as it reverses in a short period following 
the announcement of rating downgrades. 
Overall, the results of all three empirical chapters strongly validate the fact that firm-
specific investor sentiment is a key determinant of stock price movements around the firm-
specific events; earnings surprises, dividend changes, and credit rating changes. Contributions 
from the empirical chapters to the literature include offering additional insights into the price 
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predictive ability of firm-specific investor sentiment as well as understanding better the stock 
pricing process across firms on the announcement of firm-specific events. The results of all 
three empirical chapters validate the usefulness of the content of social media platforms, 
particularly Twitter and StockTwits, as a valuable source of data to measure firm-specific 
investor sentiment. The findings also highlight possible benefits of incorporating investor 
sentiment measures into investment analysis and trading models. It is possible for investors 
to take advantage of advanced technologies to analyse the content of online conversations, 
assign them a sentiment score, and use the score to predict better stock price movements. 
Investors could utilize sentiment information as a directional signal, a short-term forecasting 
factor, to improve their trading models. 
 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on the key 
areas of this study; investor sentiment, earnings announcements, dividend announcements, 
and credit rating announcements. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the effect of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on stock price reactions to the announcement of earnings surprises. 
Chapter 4 examines the stock price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on the 
announcement of dividend changes. Chapter 5 tests the effect of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on stock price responses to the announcement of credit rating changes. Each of 
these three empirical chapters is presented in a self-contained way. Finally, Chapter 6 
provides conclusions and final remarks.  
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter reviews key studies relating to four major areas of research. It highlights 
key findings related to the impact of investor sentiment on the stock market and stock price 
movements around corporate earnings surprises, dividend changes, and credit rating 
changes.1 Each empirical chapter in this thesis is related to the investor sentiment literature and 
the literature relevant to that specific study. 
This literature review is presented as follows: Section 2.1 provides an overview of the 
literature on the impact of investor sentiment on the stock market, Section 2.2 presents the 
literature related to stock price variation around earnings announcements, Section 2.3 
identifies the literature on stock price movements around dividend announcements, and 
Section 2.4 reviews the literature on stock price formation around credit rating 
announcements. 
 
2.1. Investor Sentiment 
There is an extensive body of literature on the impact of investor sentiment on the 
stock market. Investor sentiment refers to the overall attitude of investors towards a 
particular market or security that is not always based on fundamentals. It is the feeling or 
tone of the market that can be revealed through investors’ trading activities and price 
movements of securities traded in the market. In a broad sense, rising prices point to bullish 
                                                          
1 As the literature on the impact of investor sentiment on financial markets and the literature on stock price 
movements around firm-specific events is extensive, this chapter focuses only on the most closely related 
research to the main areas of this study.  
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investor sentiment and falling prices point to bearish investor sentiment. Investors’ emotions 
and beliefs about investment risk that are not justified necessary by fundamental values has 
been shown to have a significant effect on investors’ behaviour (Baker and Wurgler (2007)). 
It is established that investor sentiment plays an important role in the stock pricing process 
and behavioural models that allow for the emotional biases of investors better explain stock 
price variation and deviations from classical predictions (Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Chau 
et al. (2016)). Prior research has generally concluded that investor sentiment leads to 
mispricing in the market as investors may be more optimistic or pessimistic than warranted 
by fundamental information (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) and Danbolt et al. (2015)). 
Therefore, investor sentiment as an important factor needs to be considered in stock price 
analysis. 
The investor sentiment literature applies various approaches to measure investors’ 
behavioural patterns; survey-based sentiment measures like the University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index (Lemmon 
and Portniaguina (2006)), financial market-based measures like trading volume (Baker and 
Stein  (2004)), non-financial factors like weather conditions (Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)), 
textual sentiment data from specialized and online sources like newspaper articles and social 
media platforms (Tetlock (2007) and Sprenger et al. (2014)), and Internet search behaviour 
like Google search volume (Da et al. (2015)). Although, prior researchers use different proxies 
for investor sentiment, they agree on the significant impact of investor sentiment on the stock 
market (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Das and Chen (2007), Kaplanski and Levy 
(2010), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), Danbolt et al. (2015), Liew and Wang (2016), Li 
and Luo (2017), and Frijns, Vershoor, and Zwinkels (2017)).  
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To review the relevant literature relating to the impact of investor sentiment on the 
stock market, this study looks at five primary areas: (1) investor sentiment proxies (Section 
2.1.1), (2) the importance of online resources (Section 2.1.2), (3) investor sentiment and stock 
price formation (Section 2.1.3), (4) behavioural aspects of the stock pricing process (Section 
2.1.4), and (5) heterogeneity in the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices (Section 
2.1.5). 
  
2.1.1. Investor Sentiment Proxies 
One important challenge in investigating the role of investor sentiment in the stock 
market is that it is not easy to measure investor sentiment, whether for the whole market or 
individual firms. As investor sentiment is not directly measurable, it is essential to identify and 
quantify appropriate proxies. Researchers investigating the role of investor sentiment in the 
stock market apply different approaches, listed below, to measure investor sentiment proxies 
in their studies. Each of the following approaches has its own benefits and limitations but has 
been successful in establishing the significant influence of investors’ behavioural patterns on 
stock prices. 
A considerable amount of literature is published on the impact of survey-based 
investor sentiment measures on the market. Frequently used proxies include consumer 
confidence surveys such as the University of Michigan survey (Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), Seybert and Yang (2012), Chau et al. (2016), and 
Li and Luo (2017)), the Conference Board survey (Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Chau 
et al. (2016)), the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) survey (Brown and Cliff 
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(2004), Chau et al. (2016), and Frijns et al. (2017)), Investors Intelligence Survey Index (Lee, 
Jiang, and Indro (2002), Brown and Cliff (2004), Brown and Cliff (2005), and Chau et al. (2016)), 
and the Sentix (sentiment index) based on surveys collected by Sentix-Behavioral Indices 
(Schmeling (2007)). Survey-based investor sentiment measures provide valuable information 
for prediction of financial indicators, however they restrict daily or more frequent investor 
sentiment analysis, as they are often available only at weekly and monthly intervals. 
Additionally, there is always a doubt that respondents answer surveys’ questions carefully 
and truthfully.  
A number of studies apply market-based proxies of investor sentiment including 
closed-end fund discounts and net mutual fund redemptions (Neal and Wheatley (1998)), 
trading volume (Baker and Stein (2004)), the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(VIX) (Chau et al. (2016)), overnight returns (Aboody, Even-Tov, Lehavy, and Trueman (2018)), 
order flow imbalance (Chelley-Steeley, Lambertides, and Savva (2019)), and Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2006) composite sentiment index2 (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), Brown, 
Christensen, Elliott, and Mergenthaler (2012), Hribar and McInnis (2012), Chau et al. (2016), 
Baek (2016), Li and Luo (2017), and Chen, Chou, and Lin (2019)). Market-based investor 
sentiment proxies are often available at a relative high frequency, therefore they do not 
restrict daily or more frequent empirical analysis; however they are driven by many economic 
and financial factors in addition to investors’ mood, as a result no one can be sure that a 
particular market-based investor sentiment proxy is driven only by investors’ sentiment.  
                                                          
2 Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) investor sentiment index is based on six underlying market components; the closed-
end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity 
share in new issues, and the dividend premium. 
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Another strand of studies uses non-financial factors including weather conditions 
(Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)), sports results (Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007)), and 
aviation disasters (Kaplanski and Levy (2010)) as a sentiment proxy to confirm the impact of 
sentiment on the stock market. Although non-financial factors have a significant impact on 
investors’ behaviour, they should not be considered as a pure proxy for investor sentiment.  
A series of studies uses investor sentiment proxies based on textual sentiment data 
from specialized and online resources. These studies apply text mining and sentiment analysis 
algorithms to extract investor sentiment from sources such as newspaper articles and social 
media platforms. Investor sentiment proxies including media-expressed sentiment (Tetlock 
(2007), Engelberg et al. (2012), Garcia (2013), and Sinha (2016)), stock message board 
sentiment (Das and Chen (2007)), Facebook’s Gross National Happiness (GNH) Index (Danbolt 
et al. (2015)), and Twitter sentiment (Liew and Wang (2016)), among others, are used in this 
context. Newspaper articles and social media platforms are valuable sources of data to 
measure investor sentiment proxies. Proxies based on these sources, especially the content 
of social media platforms, can be measured at a relative high frequency, but measuring these 
proxies has its own challenges. Data collection and data analysis are relatively difficult for 
these sources of information and they often require specialist software, a dictionary of 
relevant phrases, deep machine learning, and data mining knowledge.  
A number of studies apply investor sentiment proxies based on Internet search 
behaviour. The data on Google searches is successfully used in the literature in order to 
extract investors’ mood (Da et al. (2011), Joseph et al. (2011), and Da et al. (2015)). This source 
of data, Internet search data, is a valuable and timely source of information about investor 
attention. 
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2.1.2. The Importance of Online Resources 
The need for new sources of information is highlighted by Goldstein and Yang (2015) 
who conclude that the information available to investors now is so complex that informed 
traders tend to specialize or have a comparative advantage in different types of financial 
information. To this end, major developments have taken place in recognition of online 
activities and in the interpretation of investor sentiment using textual analysis and 
computational linguistics in recent years, which seek to move the measurement issue away 
from survey-based and market-based investor sentiment measures and the published 
opinions of professional investors towards real-time online information sources. Several 
recent studies such as Da et al. (2011) and Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) indeed validate 
the view that investor sentiment proxies measured based on online activities and the content 
of social media platforms can explain stock price movements well.  
It can be argued that the content of social media platforms and online activities 
represent investors’ perception and attention, therefore can be successfully used to measure 
the level of investor sentiment in the market.3 Web users’ emotions and thoughts are quickly 
diffused and pooled via social networks, so their collective opinion can be considered as an 
indicator of real-time sentiment. Social networks make it possible for opinions and 
information to be formed and authored easily while this information can be rapidly and widely 
shared (Oh, Agrawal, and Rao (2013)). The real-time investor sentiment measures based on 
social media content are unique in the sense that unlike traditional news channels that 
                                                          
3 An early overview of the impact of Internet on investors and investor practices is provided by Barber and Odean 
(2001). 
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express large institutions or professional investors’ views, they possibly represent not only 
large institutions and investors’ views, but also small investors’ views as a group, therefore 
they present value-relevant information. 
The expansion of social networks and increasing communication of stock market news 
between market participants have drawn researchers’ attention to Internet-based investor 
sentiment proxies. The research on online search activities and the content of social media 
platforms establishes the importance of new information dissemination technologies for 
financial markets (e.g., Chen et al. (2014) and Da et al. (2015)). Chen et al. (2014) make the 
point that social media platforms have evolved significantly in the context of stock reports in 
recent years, providing a better channel through which users share information. Sprenger et 
al. (2014) argue that Twitter users are exposed to the most recent information for all stocks. 
Da et al. (2015) suggest that search-based sentiment measures are more timely than monthly 
macro surveys such as the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and more 
focused than typical market-based measures such as trading volume. Sun, Lachanski, and 
Fabozzi (2016) argue that the platforms Twitter and StockTwits contain information useful to 
asset managers and investors. Based on these arguments, it can be stated that online 
activities and the content of social media platforms are important resources to understand 
and predict stock price movements.  
 
2.1.3. Investor Sentiment and Stock Price Formation 
Numerous studies investigate the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices, with 
significant early theoretical contributions to the debate being made by Black (1986) and De 
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Long et al. (1990) followed by Neal and Wheatley (1998) and Hirshleifer (2001) who provide 
evidence that investor sentiment contains unique information for asset pricing which 
influences stock returns. Many studies empirically validate the view that investor sentiment, 
specifically market-wide investor sentiment, is a significant determinant of stock returns (e.g., 
Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006), and Huang et al. (2015)). The general 
consensus in the literature is that investors become overly optimistic (pessimistic) during 
periods of high (low) sentiment, making mistakes in stock price valuation, leading to 
overvaluation (undervaluation) that reverses over time. Lee et al. (2002) show that sentiment 
is a systematic risk that can be considered as a significant factor in explaining excess returns 
for stocks. Brown and Cliff (2005) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) confirm stock 
mispricing due to investor sentiment. Schmeling (2007) indicates that even the simplest 
trading strategies based on investor sentiment show clear tendencies towards being 
profitable after controlling for systematic risk. Chau et al. (2016) provide evidence that 
sentiment-induced trading is a significant determinant of stock price variation. Baek (2016) 
illustrates that under extreme market scenarios, sentiment changes and stock returns tend 
to move closely together. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct an investment sentiment index and illustrate that 
time-varying investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. Using this measure 
of investor sentiment, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) validate the relationship between 
investor sentiment and stock price responses to unexpected earnings announcements. They 
indicate that investors react more to earnings news that is compatible with prevailing investor 
sentiment. There is sentiment driven momentum embedded in the valuation of stocks; in 
bullish market periods the stock price reaction is exaggerated for earnings above expectations 
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and in bearish periods the response is stronger for earnings disappointments. Huang et al. 
(2015) use a variant of Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment model and find a strong negative 
relationship between high levels of investment sentiment and future stock market returns. 
A number of studies validate the effect of sentiment based on non-financial events 
and conditions on stock prices. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) illustrate that weather 
conditions are related to stock market returns. Edmans et al. (2007) find a strong relationship 
between sport results and stock market movements. Kaplanski and Levy (2010) reveal that 
aviation disasters negatively influence people’s sentiment and the events are followed by 
negative stock market returns, even for firms not affected by the events.  
A strand of research examines the impact of media-expressed sentiment on stock 
returns. Tetlock (2007) indicates that media pessimism predicts downward pressure on 
market prices. Engelberg (2008) illustrates that qualitative information embedded in news 
articles about firms’ earnings announcements has additional predictability for asset prices 
beyond the predictability embodied in the quantitative information. Tetlock, Saar-
Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) and Sinha (2016) confirm that content of news articles can 
predict stock returns. Garcia (2013) documents that news’ content helps predict stock 
returns, especially during recessions. 
Another strand of research investigates the impact of investor sentiment proxies 
extracted from Internet message boards, online searches, and social media platforms on stock 
price movements. The early research in this area often covers a small sample, examines a 
short period, and focuses solely on technology stocks (e.g., Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) 
and Das and Chen (2007)). The later research often utilizes a broader based sample with a 
longer sample period (e.g., Da et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2014)). Among the early studies, 
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Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) focus on messages posted on Raging Bull discussion forum 
and find that high levels of message activity are coincident with abnormal industry adjusted 
returns and higher trading volumes but do not predict industry adjusted returns or abnormal 
trading volumes. Antweiler and Frank (2004) investigate Dow Jones Industrial Average 
companies’ messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull message boards and find a 
statistically significant but economically small effect of sentiment on stock returns. Das and 
Chen (2007) focus on 24 out of the 35 stocks in the Morgan Stanley High-Tech Index (MSH) 
and find that sentiment affects the MSH index but has weaker links to individual stocks. 
Among the later studies, Chen et al. (2014) analyse the reports and comments on a quasi-
professional investor forum, Seeking Alpha, and find that sentiment has a statistically 
significant and economically meaningful impact on stock returns.4 Da et al. (2011), Joseph et 
al. (2011), and Da et al. (2015) indicate that online searches in Google can predict stock prices 
and returns. Sprenger et al. (2014) find an association between tweet sentiment and stock 
returns, message volume and trading volume, and disagreement and volatility. Danbolt et al. 
(2015) use Facebook’s Gross National Happiness Index as a measure of general investor 
sentiment and show that acquirers’ abnormal returns are positively related to market 
sentiment. Sun, Najand, and Shen (2016) show high frequency investor sentiment based on a 
collection of news and social media content can predict intraday stock returns at the market 
index level. Liew and Wang (2016) find that there is a contemporaneous relationship between 
Initial Public Offerings’ (IPO) tweet sentiment and returns on the first trading day and prior 
                                                          
4 Seeking Alpha is a popular social media platform for investors in the United States, however there is concern 
that Seeking Alpha’s articles do not necessarily represent traders mood since investors’ articles are generally 
reviewed by an editorial board and Seeking Alpha’s contributors receive compensation depending on the 
number of page views that their articles receive. Therefore, it can be argued that accepted articles which receive 
attention do not necessarily reflect what investors find important. Ultimately, market participants and their 
perception of stock value determine market prices. 
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days’ IPO sentiment can predict the first day returns. Siganos, Vagenas-Nanos, and 
Verwijmeren (2017) illustrate that a high divergence of sentiment based on Facebook’s 
positive and negative sentiment data is positively related to trading volume and stock price 
volatility. Renault (2017) analyses messages publishes on the platform StockTwits and finds 
that the first half-hour change in investor sentiment derived from messages predicts the last 
half-hour market returns.  
A number of studies look at temporary stock mispricing and errors in valuation caused 
by investor sentiment in the market. The main argument is that if investor sentiment leads to 
temporary mispricing, the following period stock returns should show signs of mean reversion 
as prices should return to fundamental values. The studies by Brown and Cliff (2005), Tetlock 
(2007), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), Da et al. (2015), and Danbolt et 
al. (2015) indeed validate the reversal effect. Consistent with the argument that the impact 
of investor sentiment should reverse over time, they show that future returns are negatively 
related to past investor sentiment. 
 
2.1.4. Behavioural Aspects of the Stock Pricing Process 
Prior studies establish the significant impact of investor sentiment on stock prices, 
which contradicts the prediction of classical finance theory. Classical finance theory, based on 
the rationality of investors and the assumptions of efficient markets, leaves no room for the 
role of investor sentiment in the stock pricing process. Competition among rational investors 
leads to an equilibrium in which prices will equal the rationally discounted value of expected 
cash flows. Furthermore, this theory argues that the demand of irrational investors has no 
 19 
 
significant impact on prices as it is offset by arbitrageurs. Behavioural finance challenges 
classical finance theory’s assumptions and suggests that investor sentiment has a significant 
impact on the stock market.5 
Research in behavioural finance explains that the impact of investor sentiment on 
stock prices is due to the effects of uninformed demand and limits to arbitrage (e.g., De Long 
et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)). 
Uninformed demand can be linked to conservatism, representativeness, and uncertainty 
(Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Miller (1977) 
argues that even when investors have the same basic information, the differences of opinion 
can be large and this can increase uninformed demand. Investors simply demand stocks that 
have a bundle of salient characteristics that is compatible with their prevailing sentiment. 
Uninformed demand due to shifts in investor sentiment, increases volatility and causes both 
systematic underreaction and overreaction in stock prices. Additionally, it is suggested that 
the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices can be explained by the effect of limits to 
arbitrage (De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). When the change in investor 
sentiment is unpredictable, trading against irrational investors’ trades becomes costly and 
risky for arbitrageurs. If investor sentiment becomes more extreme and as a result prices 
move further away from fundamental values, arbitrageurs become exposed to losses. If 
arbitrageurs are risk-averse or leveraged, they might reduce the size of positions they take. 
Consequently, they become unable to drive stock prices back to fundamental values. 
                                                          
5 The prediction of behavioural finance is consistent with the results of research in the field of psychology. It is 
suggested that sentiment has an effect on judgment and even a small change in sentiment may have an effect 
on neural activation and cognition, such as the ability of participants to plan, memorize, and think creatively 
(Mitchell and Phillips (2007)). 
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2.1.5. Heterogeneity in the Impact of Investor Sentiment on Stock Prices 
Consistent with the literature on behavioural aspects of the stock pricing process, 
numerous studies document the fact that the effect of investor sentiment on stock prices is 
not homogenous across stocks; it is more pronounced for stocks that are subject to greater 
uncertainty in valuation and limits to arbitrage (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006), Joseph et al. 
(2011), and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) indicate 
that stocks which are difficult to value or are difficult to arbitrage, small, young, high volatility, 
non-dividend-paying, distressed (low market-to-book), extreme growth (high market-to-
book), and unprofitable stocks, are more likely to be influenced by investor sentiment. Joseph 
et al. (2011) indicate that the sensitivity of stock returns to search intensity is related to the 
difficulty of a stock being arbitraged. Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) indicate that the effect of investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to unexpected earnings announcements is especially pronounced for small stocks, 
young stocks, high volatility stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, and stocks with extremely 
high and low market-to-book ratios. Da et al. (2015) concur with Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
that limits to arbitrage exacerbate the effect of investor sentiment on asset prices. 
Furthermore, Huang et al. (2015) confirm that stocks, which are speculative, are more 
sensitive to the impact of investor sentiment.  
Consistent with the predictions of models based on irrational trader sentiment, 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find that investor sentiment forecasts the returns of small 
stocks and stocks with low institutional ownership far more efficiently than large stocks and 
stocks with high institutional ownership. Danbolt et al. (2015) find that the impact of 
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sentiment on acquirers’ abnormal returns is more pronounced for deals with a high number 
of uninformed investors. Similarly, Siganos et al. (2017) illustrate that the relationships 
between sentiment and trading volume and stock price volatility are stronger when individual 
investors are more likely to trade. 
Consistent with the notion that small stocks face greater valuation uncertainty, 
Edmans et al. (2007) find that the loss effect of sports results on the stock markets is stronger 
for small stocks. Kaplanski and Levy (2010) illustrate that the negative impact of investor 
sentiment driven from aviation disasters on stock returns is greater for small and riskier stocks 
and for firms belonging to less stable industries. Moreover, Qadan and Aharon (2019) 
document that the small stock premium is predictable by using a set of lagged investor 
sentiment measures. They report that market participants appear to overvalue small stocks 
relative to large stocks during periods when their risk appetite, reflected by investor 
sentiment, is strong, and vice versa. 
 
2.2. Earnings Announcements 
Earnings announcements are known to be an important source of information for the 
fundamental valuation of firms. A considerable amount of literature can be found regarding 
the impact of earnings announcements on the stock market. This is not surprising based on 
the substantial effects these events have on firms’ stock prices. Numerous studies confirm 
the importance of earnings announcements in the stock market (e.g., Ball and Brown (1968), 
Bernard and Thomas (1989), Bartov et al. (2002), and Kasznik and McNichols (2002)). The 
consensus in the literature is that stock prices respond significantly to new earnings 
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information and stock prices continue to drift in the direction of earnings news for a period 
of time after earnings announcements. 
To review the relevant literature relating to the impact of earnings announcements 
on the stock market, this study looks at six primary areas: (1) earnings benchmarks (Section 
2.2.1), (2) earnings surprise models (Section 2.2.2), (3) meeting or beating analysts’ 
expectations (Section 2.2.3), (4) stock price reactions to earnings surprises (Section 2.2.4), (5) 
stock price reactions to earnings trends (Section 2.2.5), and (6) Post Earnings Announcement 
Drift (PEAD) (Section 2.2.6). 
 
2.2.1. Earnings Benchmarks 
Numerous studies investigating stock price responses to earnings announcements 
highlight the importance of three earnings benchmarks in the market; the earnings level (loss 
avoidance), earnings changes (earnings improvement), and analysts’ forecasts (meeting or 
beating the forecasts). These benchmarks as a set of standards are used for evaluating firms’ 
performance. Meeting the earnings benchmarks matters to investors, as a result they are 
important targets for managers in reporting earnings. It is recognised that firms try to avoid 
missing the benchmarks; zero earnings, prior period earnings, and analyst consensus 
forecasts (Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999)). Firms 
may even manage earnings and expectations to avoid missing their earnings benchmarks 
(Matsumoto (2002), Burgstahler and Eames (2006), and Das, Kim, and Patro (2011)). Such 
behaviour is not surprising as the reaction to missing an earnings benchmark is noted to be 
significantly worse in absolute terms than the favourable response for beating the benchmark 
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(Lopez and Rees (2002)). It is also documented that firms that consistently meet (or beat) an 
earnings benchmark receive a market premium in each year this occurs (Bartov et al. (2002), 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002), and Lopez and Rees (2002)). These findings are consistent with 
the evidence that negative outcomes cause individuals greater disutility than positive 
outcomes create utility (Kahneman and Tversky (2013)) and that multiple positive outcomes 
are valued more favourably than one positive outcome (Thaler (1999)). 
Managers seek to meet or beat the earnings benchmarks to build credibility with 
capital markets and to maintain or increase their firms' stock prices (Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005)). A number of studies suggest that the relative importance of the earnings 
benchmarks has changed over time in favour of meeting analysts’ expectations (Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2003), Brown and Caylor (2005), and Herrmann, Hope, Payne, and 
Thomas (2011)). This change may have happened due to increased accuracy and precision in 
analysts’ forecasts. It is suggested that investors place more weight on accurate and precise 
earnings forecasts (Fried and Givoly (1982), Imhoff and Lobo (1992), and Kinney et al. (2002)). 
Brown and Caylor (2005) explain that the focus on avoiding analysts’ expectations has 
increased over time because since the mid-1990s investors have rewarded (penalized) firms 
for reporting quarterly earnings meeting (missing) analysts' estimates more than they have 
done for meeting (missing) the other benchmarks. They provide several explanations for this 
change including increased media coverage given to analysts’ forecasts, more analyst 
following a firm, more firms covered by analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy 
and precision of analysts’ forecasts. In addition, Herrmann et al. (2011) look at investors’ 
reactions to meeting or missing the earnings benchmarks and find little evidence of 
incremental benchmark effects beyond meeting analysts’ forecasts. Herrmann et al. (2011) 
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specify that zero earnings and a zero change in earnings do not appear to be special points 
that elicit a differential response by investors. The findings of these studies confirm the 
growing importance to investors of meeting the analyst forecast benchmark relative to the 
profit and earnings growth benchmarks. 
 
2.2.2. Earnings Surprise Models 
Earnings surprises are an important measure, which specify whether a firm meets or 
misses earnings expectations. Different earnings surprise measures are used in the literature. 
Earnings surprises measured based on a time-series model, a random walk model, and 
analysts’ forecasts are often used in prior research. A number of studies provide support for 
the use of different earnings surprise models by highlighting the potential divergence of 
opinions among investors regarding expected earnings. For instance, Walther (1997), 
Bhattacharya (2001), and Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) highlight the fact that identifiable 
subsets of investors use different models to forecast future earnings. Ball and Bartov (1996) 
find that investors are aware of serial correlation in seasonally-differenced quarterly earnings 
but tend to underestimate the magnitude of the serial correlation. A finding which potentially 
suggests a subset of investors uses a time-series model to forecast future earnings. Livnat and 
Mendenhall (2006) document that analyst-based and time-series based earnings surprises 
lead to different stock return dynamics around future earnings announcements, a result that 
highlights differences between analysts’ forecasts and time-series forecasts. Lerman, Livnat, 
and Mendenhall (2007) show that considering earnings surprises estimated using both 
random walk and analysts’ forecasts models allows investors to magnify the returns from Post 
Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). Further, Zolotoy (2012) illustrates that the use of an 
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implied measure of earnings surprise, defined as the weighted average of random walk, time-
series, and analysts’ earnings surprises, substantially improves the profitability of PEAD-based 
investment strategies. In aggregate, the results of these studies suggest that earnings surprise 
models provide valuable information to investors and investors could benefit from 
considering multiple earnings surprise models. 
 
2.2.3. Meeting or Beating Analysts’ Expectations 
Managers may take actions to try to meet or beat analysts’ expectations and avoid 
negative earnings surprises. Managers have incentives to report earnings that exceed 
analysts’ forecasts as they elicit both a positive stock price response and benefits for 
managers. Earnings that miss forecasts can cause a negative stock price response with 
damaging consequences for managers and firms themselves. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
introduce managerial reputation, favourable compensation contracts, and building credibility 
with capital markets as incentives for managers to report earnings that meet or exceed 
analysts’ forecasts. A firm that misses analysts’ forecasts, even by a small margin, can face a 
negative price reaction (Skinner and Sloan (2002)) and a drop in stock prices can result in a 
reduction in the annual Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) bonus (Matsunaga and Park (2001)). 
Brown and Higgins (2001) highlight the increasing emphasis on stock price performance in the 
U.S. to explain the increase in U.S. managers’ tendency to manage earnings surprises over 
time.6 Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis (2009) suggest that benefits of meeting or 
                                                          
6 Brown and Higgins (2001) examine the effect of corporate governance and legal environments on the 
distribution of earnings surprises in the U.S. and 12 other countries including Australia, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
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exceeding analysts’ forecasts and the potential costs of missing the benchmark both provide 
incentives for managers to overstate earnings to meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts.  
Consistent with the above discussion, and the views of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), (Levitt (1998)), managers’ propensity to manage earnings 
surprises has increased over time as the distribution of earnings surprises has changed over 
the years (e.g., Brown (2001), Bartov et al. (2002), Matsumoto (2002), Dechow et al. (2003), 
and Brown (2003)). For instance, Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (1999) provides evidence of 
a temporal decline in the extent to which actual earnings fall short of analysts' expectations. 
Brown (2001) documents significant temporal shifts in reporting earnings surprises; a 
significant positive trend in reporting profits exceeding analysts’ estimates by a small amount 
and a significant negative trend in reporting losses falling short of analysts’ estimates by a 
large amount. Similarly, Brown (2003) provides evidence of a decrease in the tendency of 
managers to report earnings that fall slightly short of analysts’ estimates, small negative 
surprises. Further, An, Lee, and Zhang (2014) illustrate that a greater proportion of firms 
increase their expected rate of return on pension plan assets so that their reported earnings 
meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts than would be observed by chance.  
 
2.2.4. Stock Price Reactions to Earnings Surprises 
The literature on earnings surprises documents significant stock price movements 
around earnings announcements (e.g., Bartov et al. (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), 
Skinner and Sloan (2002), and Kinney et al. (2002)). These studies address the 
conceptualization of the earnings-return relationship and concur that firms with positive 
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(negative) earnings outcomes experience significantly positive (negative) abnormal stock 
price performance. For instance, Bartov et al. (2002) find that firms that meet or beat analysts’ 
earnings expectations enjoy a higher return than their peers that fail to do so. Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) document that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms 
meeting expectations, controlling for the information in the current year’s earnings. Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) find that the stock market reaction to negative earnings surprises tends to 
be large and asymmetric, particularly for growth stocks, suggesting a high cost of missing 
analysts' expectations. Kinney et al. (2002) show significant stock price declines associated 
with even small negative earnings surprises. DeFond and Park (2001) and Lopez and Rees 
(2002) also present evidence of positive market responses to meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. A number of studies document the fact that the stock price reaction to 
earnings surprises is asymmetric, with a stronger effect for positive earnings surprises 
compared to negative earnings surprises (Bartov et al. (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), 
and Lopez and Rees (2002)). However, when earnings surprises are measured on the basis of 
investors’ perceptions of these surprises, the differential reaction reverses; producing a 
stronger reaction to negative earnings surprises relative to positive earnings surprises, a result 
which is consistent with loss aversion theory (Pinello (2008)). 
 
2.2.5. Stock Price Reactions to Earnings Trends 
Earnings trends matter to investors. The market reacts to earnings trends as well as to 
earnings surprises. Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) and Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) 
illustrate that firms with consistently increasing earnings have significantly larger earnings 
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multiples and stronger stock returns.7 Additionally, it is documented that investors respond 
differently to earnings that are part of a string of consecutive earnings surprises. Investigating 
market reactions to earnings patterns illustrates that the stock market values consistent 
earnings patterns. Kasznik and McNichols (2002) and Frieder (2008) indicate that investors 
respond more strongly to earnings surprises that occur as part of a consistent series than to 
those that do not. A study by Koonce and Lipe (2010) examines how and why investors react 
to earnings trends and earnings performance relative to analysts’ forecasts when both 
measures are available over multiple periods. Koonce and Lipe (2010) show that investors rely 
on an earnings measure only when it is consistent over time. When both measures are 
consistent over time, investors use them in an additive fashion. They specify that investors 
believe that both measures provide information about a firm’s future prospects and 
management’s credibility. 
 
2.2.6. Post Earnings Announcements Drift 
Numerous studies investigate stock prices in the wake of earnings announcements 
and find that stock prices continue to drift in the direction of earnings news for a period of 
time after announcements; a phenomenon that is called Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
(PEAD) (e.g., Ball and Brown (1968), Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984), Freeman and Tse 
(1989), and Bernard and Thomas (1989)). For instance, Ball and Brown (1968) document 
evidence of return predictability for up to two months after annual earnings announcements. 
Foster et al. (1984) confirm the existence of 60 trading days of return predictability using 
                                                          
7 The preference for increasing earnings is consistent with research in psychology, which shows that people 
prefer increasing sequences of outcomes (Loewenstein and Prelec (1993)). 
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quarterly earnings announcements. Bernard and Thomas (1989) show that an implementable 
trading strategy based on PEAD, buying stocks in the highest decile of standardized 
unexpected earnings and shorting stocks in the lowest decile, generates an 18% annualized 
return during the quarter folowing earnings announcements. 
Several explanations for the PEAD anomaly are offered in the literature. Ball, Kothari, 
and Watts (1993) suggest the systematic misrepresentation of abnormal returns after 
earnings announcements as an explanation. They argue that systematic risk is positively 
related to earnings news, and therefore expected returns are likely mis-estimated following 
earnings surprises. Jacob, Lys, and Sabino (1999) and Kim and Kim (2003) suggest that PEAD 
might be due to methodological shortcomings such as calendar versus fiscal quarter 
classification and a specific earnings methodology used to estimate unexpected earnings. A 
number of studies link PEAD to cognitive biases attributed to investors. Barberis et al. (1998) 
explain PEAD in terms of conservative and representativeness biases, Liang (2003) suggests 
that PEAD arises from imperfect information-processing behaviour of investors, and Frazzini 
(2006) specifies a link between PEAD and the disposition effect. Bird, Choi, and Yeung (2014) 
suggest uncertainty and sentiment in the market as the reasons for PEAD. They document 
that PEAD is a reflection of the level of market uncertainty and sentiment at the time of the 
information release and during the subsequent post-announcement period. Finally, several 
studies suggest delayed responses to earnings information and limits to arbitrage as 
important factors driving the existence and persistence of PEAD. Ball and Bartov (1996) and 
Chung and Hrazdil (2011) present investors’ underreaction to earnings surprises as a common 
explanation of PEAD. PEAD continues to be observable as the result of frictions in the market 
that impede informed investors’ ability to arbitrage away the market underreaction to 
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earnings news. This explanation is extensively supported in the literature. Fama (1998) refers 
to the predictability of returns after earnings announcements as the “granddaddy of all 
underreaction events” and Bernard and Thomas (1990) argue that PEAD is due to a failure of 
stock prices to reflect fully the implications of current earnings for future earnings.  
Several studies examine factors that have an impact on investors’ reactions to 
earnings news and arbitrage activities and provide a basis for making implications about 
market efficiency, namely; investor sophistication (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 
(2000)), investor inattention (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)), arbitrage risk (Mendenhall 
(2004)), liquidity risk (Sadka (2006)), uncertainty (Zhang (2006)), transaction costs (Ng, 
Rusticus, and Verdi (2008)), and earnings management (Louis and Sun (2011)). With regard to 
the impact of investor sophistication and inattention, Bartov et al. (2000) document that the 
drift is smaller for firms with greater proportions of institutional investors. They suggest that 
sophisticated institutional investors are aware of this phenomenon and trade on it. Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis (2003) show that a smaller drift is observed for stocks covered by more 
experienced financial analysts who often employ more sophisticated models to project 
earnings. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) provide evidence that transient institutional 
investors, those actively trading to maximize short-term profits, trade to exploit PEAD and 
their arbitrage trades enhance the speed at which stock prices adjust to earnings information, 
however they trade less aggressively to exploit PEAD in firms with high transaction costs. 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) introduce investor 
inattention as a determinant of PEAD. They provide evidence that investors’ delayed 
responses to earnings news are caused by limited attention. Mendenhall (2004) reports that 
the drift is larger for stocks with a higher arbitrage risk as arbitrage risk impedes arbitrageurs 
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from trading on mispricing opportunities. In a study investigating the role of liquidity risk, 
Sadka (2006) decomposes firm-level liquidity into variable (typically associated with private 
information) and fixed price effects and documents that variations of the variable component 
of liquidity are priced within the context of PEAD returns. Sadka (2006) concludes that a 
significant part of PEAD returns can be viewed as compensation for unexpected variation in 
the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders. With regard to the impact of 
uncertainty, Brown and Han (2000) show that a smaller drift is observed for larger firms as 
the information environment for these firms is less opaque. Zhang (2006) also provides 
evidence that information uncertainty is positively related to the drift as investor uncertainty 
causes investors to underreact to earnings information. A number of studies investigate the 
effect of transaction costs. Bhushan (1994) shows that PEAD is positively related to direct and 
indirect costs of trading. Ng et al. (2008) and Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and Shivakumar 
(2009) also document that drift is most pronounced in highly illiquid stocks with high trading 
and market impact costs. Louis and Sun (2011) provide evidence in support of the impact of 
earnings management. They suggest that earnings management is a likely determinant of 
delayed market responses to earnings news, explaining PEAD is consistent with a situation 
that firms with large positive earnings and large positive earnings changes manage earnings 
downward while those with large negative earnings changes manage earnings upward. 
Overall, in all of the settings presented in these studies, investors’ underreaction to earnings 
information and limits to arbitrage appear to be significant determinants of PEAD. 
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2.3. Dividend Announcements 
Dividend payments are made to shareholders to reward them for providing equity 
finance. Dividend payments are also considered as an indicator of a firm’s success since only 
profitable firms are able to pay dividends with a degree of consistency. Firms’ dividend 
policies and their impact on the firms’ value have been long investigated by many researchers 
in an attempt to solve the “dividend puzzle” which is identified by Black (1976), however it 
remains a controversial subject as there is no generally accepted consensus in the literature. 
Explanations of dividend policies centre on information issues, agency problems, 
investors’ preferences, and tax effects. Since Miller and Modigliani (1961) established the 
irrelevance of dividend policies under perfect capital market conditions, a market without 
taxes, transaction costs, agency costs, and other imperfections,8 researchers have attempted 
to challenge their assumptions and provide evidence on the relevance of dividend policies to 
the value of firms. Financial markets are characterised by information asymmetry, distorting 
taxes, agency costs, and irrational investor behaviour. Therefore, it seems to be realistic to 
reject Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) assumptions and argue that dividend policies may have 
an impact on firms’ value. Numerous studies address the information content of dividends 
and the impact of agency problems, investors’ preferences, and tax rates on dividend policies 
and successfully establish significant stock price reactions to firms’ dividend decisions (e.g., 
Pettit (1972), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), and Tsai and Wu (2015)). 
To review the key findings related to dividend theories, this study looks at three key 
areas: (1) dividend irrelevance theory (Section 2.3.1), (2) dividend signalling theory (Section 
                                                          
8 Dividend irrelevance theory is built on the assumptions based on perfect capital markets. Please see Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) for further details regarding the assumptions. 
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2.3.2), and (3) other related hypotheses including dividends and agency problems, bird in the 
hand theory, and dividends and taxation (Section 2.3.3). 
 
2.3.1. Dividend Irrelevance Theory 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) offer the theory of dividend irrelevance and suggest that 
dividend payments are irrelevant for shareholders in a market without taxes, transaction 
costs, agency costs, and other imperfections. They argue that the real value of a firm is 
influenced by investment opportunities and earnings capability of assets and not by dividend 
policies. According to this theory, under perfect capital market conditions, dividend policies 
have no impact on firms’ stock prices. This theory is supported by a number of studies 
including Black and Scholes (1974), Hess (1982), and Miller and Scholes (1982). Black and 
Scholes (1974) report that neither high-yield nor low-yield dividend payout polices influence 
stock prices. Miller and Scholes (1982) find an insignificant relationship between dividend 
yield and expected stock returns. Numerous studies however reject Miller and Modigliani’s 
(1961) hypothesis. For example, Pettit (1972) provides empirical evidence that the 
announcement of dividend changes is used in assessing the value of stocks and Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979) find a significant positive relationship between expected stock 
returns and dividend yield. Dividend irrelevance theory is also rejected by a number of studies 
that survey firms’ managers involved in the determination of dividend policies. The findings 
of these studies indicate that the managers believe dividend policies are relevant to their 
firms’ value (Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985), Baker and Powell (1999), Baker, Powell, and 
Veit (2002), and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005)). In practice, the conditions of 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) hypothesis are not met. The prediction of the dividend 
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irrelevance theory is unrealistic in the presence of information asymmetry, agency problems, 
transaction costs, taxation, and irrational investors in the stock market. In fact, it can be 
argued that in the absence of perfect capital market conditions and investor rationality, it is 
possible that changes in dividends have a significant effect on stock prices.  
 
2.3.2. Dividend Signalling Theory 
One of the key assumptions of the dividend irrelevance theory is that information 
about firms is available to everyone. This assumption has been criticised widely due to the 
fact that asymmetries of information exist to some degree in financial markets. Firms’ 
managers often possess superior information about their firms relative to outsiders, 
therefore a change in dividends may convey valuable information to the market. In other 
words, changes in dividends may act as a signal of firms’ future prospects. 
Dividend signalling theory is based on market imperfection due to information 
asymmetry. In the presence of information asymmetry in the market, firms pay dividends to 
signal the state of affairs of the business, earnings growth, and future prospects of the firm. 
This theory argues that an announcement of an increase in dividend payout is an indication 
of positive future prospects while a decrease in dividend payout tends to portend negative 
future performance by the firm. A number of dividend signalling models are developed based 
on dividend signalling theory (Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and 
Rock (1985)). The central theme of all of these models is that firms’ managers have private 
information about future prospects of their firms and specify a dividend level to signal that 
information. Frankfurter and Wood (2002) confirm that the mitigation of information 
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asymmetry between managers and shareholders via unexpected changes in dividend policies 
is the cornerstone of dividend signalling models. 
There is an extensive literature on the use of dividends to signal information to 
investors. One strand of the literature examines the information content of dividends by 
investigating how stock prices respond to the announcement of dividend changes. The 
consensus in the literature is that stock prices move in the same direction as dividend 
changes; an increase (decrease) in dividends is associated with an increase (decrease) in stock 
prices. The literature concludes that dividend announcements provide the market with useful 
information about the future performance of firms. Pettit (1972) illustrates that stock prices 
react significantly to dividend announcements. Laub (1976), Pettit (1976), and Aharony and 
Swary (1980) suggest that dividends convey valuable information to the market beyond that 
provided by earnings. Charest (1978), Eades (1982), Woolridge (1982), and Denis, Denis, and 
Sarin (1994) provide evidence that abnormal stock returns are positively associated with 
dividend changes. Divecha and Morse (1983) illustrate that the announcement of a dividend 
increase is associated with an increase in stock prices. Yoon and Starks (1995) show that the 
stock price reaction to the announcement of large dividend changes is consistent with the 
prediction of the signalling hypothesis. 
Further studies investigate the impact of a major change in firms’ dividend policies 
such as dividend initiation or dividend omission on the market. Asquith and Mullins (1983) 
examine the effect of initial dividend payments and the initiation of dividends after a 10-year 
hiatus. They report positive excess stock returns on the announcement of a dividend 
payment. Similarly, Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986) documents an increase in firm 
value around the announcement of first-time dividends. Benesh, Keown, and Pinkerton 
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(1984) analyse the aggregate market response to announcements of substantial shift in firms’ 
dividend policies and illustrate that announcements of initial dividend payments, dividend 
omissions, and large decreases in dividends have a significant impact on stock prices. Healy 
and Palepu (1988) illustrate a positive relationship between dividend initiation (omission) 
announcements and subsequent earnings changes. They suggest that dividend initiations and 
omissions are interpreted as managers’ forecasts of future earnings changes. Michaely, 
Thaler, and Womack (1995) document a significant price impact of dividend omissions and 
initiations and Kaestner and Liu (1998) report a positive stock price response to dividend 
initiations and specially designated dividend payments. Finally, Ryan, Besley, and Lee (2000) 
document positive (negative) stock price reactions to dividend initiations (omissions).  
 A number of studies however argue that the information content of dividends can 
only be trivial. Watts (1973) suggests that the relationship between dividend changes and 
future earnings changes is weak. Gonedes (1978) argues that dividends do not reflect 
information beyond that reflected in income. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find only 
limited support for the notion that dividend changes have information content about firms’ 
future earnings. 
A further strand of research investigates the interaction effect of dividend and 
earnings announcements on stock prices. Firms may make earnings and dividend 
announcements within a few days of one another. Therefore, it is critical to understand the 
individual and joint effects of dividend and earnings announcements on stock prices. Kane, 
Lee, and Marcus (1984) examine stock returns surrounding contemporaneous earnings and 
dividend announcements and show that abnormal returns corresponding to any earnings or 
dividend announcements depend upon the value of the other announcement. Their results 
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suggest a corroborative relationship between earnings and dividend announcements. Eddy 
and Seifert (1992) investigate stock price reactions to contemporaneous and non-
contemporaneous dividend and earnings announcements and illustrate that the reaction to 
joint announcements is significantly greater than the reaction to one announcement. Their 
results indicate that there is information content from two signals being given at the same 
time and that the two announcements are not perfect substitutes. Considering these findings, 
it can be argued that when dividend and earnings announcements occur simultaneously, 
stock price reactions are not solely attributable to the dividend announcement. A number of 
studies on this subject eliminate the confounding effect of earnings announcements by 
excluding dividend announcements that are made within a specified number of days of 
earnings announcements. For example, Aharony and Swary (1980) isolate dividend effects 
from those of earnings by investigating only dividend and earnings announcements conveyed 
to the public on different dates. Tsai and Wu (2015) exclude dividend announcements that 
are made within three days of earnings announcements from their sample. 
 
2.3.3. Other Related Hypotheses 
2.3.3.1. Dividends and Agency Problems 
A number of studies investigate the impact of agency problems on firms’ dividend 
policies. This strand of literature argues that there are conflicts of interest between firms’ 
stakeholders, as a result dividend policies can have an impact on firms’ assets, firms’ value, 
and benefits of different stakeholders of firms.  
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The first conflict of interest addressed in the literature is between firms’ shareholders 
and firms’ managers. The agency problem between these two groups may have an impact on 
firms’ dividend policies. For instance, Rozeff (1982) provides empirical evidence that agency 
costs are significant determinants of dividend policies. Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) 
document the impact of insider ownership on firms’ dividend policies by indicating high 
insider ownership firms choose lower levels of dividends. Additionally, dividend payments can 
be used as an effective mechanism to reduce the conflict of interests between shareholders 
and managers. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) illustrate that firms’ managers use dividend 
policies in addition to decisions on the firms’ debt level and their common stock ownership 
to control agency costs. Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) suggest that firms’ managers adjust 
dividend payouts in response to the structure of agency and transaction costs. 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis argues that payments of dividends prevent 
managers from empire building and wasting resources in poor investment projects, therefore 
reduce agency costs and benefit firms’ security holders. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
illustrate that stock returns associated with large dividend change announcements are 
greater for overinvesting firms.9 Denis et al. (1994) however provide only limited support for 
this hypothesis. They argue that the overinvestment argument is not the predominant 
explanation for the incremental information content of dividend change announcements. 
Furthermore, Yoon and Starks (1995) document that dividend increase (decrease) firms 
experience a subsequent significant increase (decrease) in capital expenditures; a finding 
which is inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. Moreover, Lie (2000) finds that 
                                                          
9 This evidence is consistent with the notion that if manages are overinvesting, increases (decreases) in dividends 
reduce (enhance) the overinvestment and increase (decrease) the market value of firms. 
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regular dividend increases, which are usually small dividends increases, are not related to 
agency issues and do not affect the overinvestment problem.  
The second conflict of interest addressed in the literature is between firms’ 
shareholders and bondholders. A number of studies investigate the reaction in the bond 
market to dividend announcements and compare that with the reaction in the stock market 
to investigate whether the payment of dividends is a transfer of wealth from bondholders to 
stockholders. The wealth transfer hypothesis suggests that the payment of dividends is a 
transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders as it reduces the amount of cash 
available for future debt servicing, therefore it only benefits stockholders. While Dhillon and 
Johnson (1994) provide support for the wealth transfer hypothesis by illustrating that bond 
prices move in the opposite direction to stock prices in response to large dividend changes, 
Woolridge (1983), Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984), and Tsai and Wu (2015) find a positive 
relationship between bond returns and unexpected dividend changes. Their findings specify 
that the information content of dividends and the free cash flow effect dominate the wealth 
transfer effect in the bond market. 
 
2.3.3.2. Bird in the Hand Theory 
Another theory related to dividend policies and the impact of dividend 
announcements on stock prices is the bird in the hand theory. This theory argues that 
investors prefer dividends to potential capital gains due to the certainty of a current dividend 
payment compared to the uncertainty of future capital gains. This theory challenges the 
dividend irrelevance theory’s argument that investors are indifferent to whether their returns 
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arise from dividends or capital gains and suggests that investors prefer dividend payments 
now rather than capital gains later. It argues that dividend payments reduce the uncertainty 
associated with future cash flows, and therefore increase firms’ value. This theory is 
supported by Lintner (1962) and Gordon (1963), however Friend and Puckett (1964) and 
Diamond (1967) suggest that there is little basis for the notion that investors have a general 
preference for a dollar of dividend over a dollar of retained earnings. This theory is also 
criticised by Bhattacharya (1979) who argues that the theory’s argument that dividends are 
superior to capital gains is fallacious. Bhattacharya (1979) argues that the riskiness of a firm’s 
cash flows affects the firm’s dividend payments but not the other way around. The author 
suggests that increases in dividends do not reduce the risk of the firm and as a result do not 
increase the firm’s value. In addition, Baker et al. (2002) by surveying a group of firms’ 
managers conclude that the managers give no support to bird in the hand theory. Their results 
show that the managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and agree 
that dividend changes affect firms’ value, however they give the strongest support to 
signalling theory, weak to little support for the tax preference and agency cost explanations 
and no support to the bird in the hand explanation. 
 
2.3.3.3. Dividends and Taxation 
A number of studies focus on the impact of taxation on dividend policies. Two 
hypotheses are offered in this subject; the tax preference hypothesis and the clientele effect 
hypothesis. Based on the tax preference hypothesis, investors select firms whose dividend 
policies suit their tax preferences (Elton and Gruber (1970) and Miller and Scholes (1978)). 
This argument implies that tax rates on dividends and capital gains have an impact on 
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investors’ preference to receive dividends and ultimately, they have an impact on firms’ 
value.10 Although Black and Scholes (1974) provide evidence inconsistent with the tax effect 
argument, it is supported by a number of studies including Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979), Callaghan and Barry (2003), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005). 
The clientele effect hypothesis suggests that pre-existing dividend clientele (existing 
shareholders) has an impact on firms’ dividend policies. This hypothesis also predicts that 
dividends can be used to attract or retain a group of shareholders. Elton and Gruber (1970) 
document a relationship between firms’ dividend policies and their shareholders’ tax 
brackets. Scholz (1992) illustrates that dividend clienteles appear to form based on investors’ 
tax characteristics. The author shows that investors are sensitive to tax rates when choosing 
portfolio dividend yields. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978) however find weak 
evidence in support of the clientele effect. Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1999) provide 
additional support for the hypothesis by documenting a significant increase in institutional 
ownership of firms that initiate a dividend. Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) find that 
institutional investors are attracted to dividend paying firms due to their relative tax 
advantage over individual investors. 
 
2.4. Credit Rating Announcements 
Credit rating agencies have provided information upon which financial transactions 
are based for more than a century and despite periodic bouts of criticism credit ratings are 
still the first reference point for many investors, risk managers, and other financial agents. 
                                                          
10 Tax rates on capital gains are generally lower than dividends which are taxed as income. 
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Credit rating agencies play a significant economic role in financial markets and their 
assessments on firms’ credit quality have a significant impact on investment policies and 
financial decisions of a large group of investors in markets and firms themselves (Boot, 
Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) and Tang (2009)). Credit ratings agencies’ assessment can 
have a significant impact on firms’ access to credit markets, costs of debt financing, their 
investment activities, and their operating performance (Tang (2009) and Driss, Massoud, and 
Roberts (2016)). The main credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch 
provide assessments of the credit worthiness of firms around the globe; from their long-term 
credit ratings to their medium-term reviews and short-term watch lists. 
A considerable amount of literature can be found regarding the impact of credit rating 
changes on the stock market. To review the literature, this study looks at three key areas: (1) 
stock price responses to rating changes (Section 2.4.1), (2) the price impact of rating changes 
for low-rated and high-rated firms (Section 2.4.2), and (3) stock price responses to 
unanticipated and anticipated rating changes (Section 2.4.3). 
 
2.4.1. Stock Price Responses to Rating Changes 
The link between credit rating changes and stock prices is well established in the 
literature and there is a consensus that the stock price response is asymmetric and conditional 
on the event type, with rating downgrades having a greater impact than rating upgrades on 
stock prices of firms (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Hand et al. (1992)). 
Numerous studies document a significant negative stock price reaction to rating 
downgrades (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), Ederington and Goh (1998), 
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Goh and Ederington (1999), Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005), Bannier and Hirsch (2010), Jorion and 
Zhang (2010), and Chung et al. (2012)). There are however exceptions to this generally 
accepted reaction in the stock market. Goh and Ederington (1993) reveal that stocks only react 
negatively to downgrades associated with a deterioration of firms’ financial prospects. There 
is no significant reaction to downgrades for other reasons like those attributed to a 
reorganization or an increase in financial leverage. Additionally, Norden and Weber (2004) 
find no abnormal stock performance on days of downgrades in a combined analysis of 
different rating events within and across rating agencies. With regard to long-run stock 
returns following rating changes, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) provide evidence of an 
underreaction to the announcement of rating downgrades. They document significant 
negative abnormal returns following rating downgrades, especially in the first-year post-
downgrade period.11 
In contrast to downgrades, prior studies rarely observe a significant stock price 
reaction to rating upgrades (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), Ederington 
and Goh (1998), Goh and Ederington (1999), Norden and Weber (2004), Bannier and Hirsch 
(2010), and Chung et al. (2012)). However, Jorion et al. (2005) find a significant positive 
abnormal stock reaction to positive rating changes after SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure 
became effective October 23, 2000. 
Ederington and Goh (1998) explain that the differential response to rating changes 
arises because firms voluntarily communicate good news, but not bad news, to the market or 
the rating agencies expand more resources in detecting deteriorations in credit quality than 
                                                          
11 They find no reliable abnormal returns following rating upgrades. 
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improvements. Based on this explanation, it can be argued that downgrades represent 
information not yet known by the market whereas upgrades confirm information that has 
already been available. Upgrades are more likely to be predicted by investors and therefore 
fail to elicit stock price reactions. Jorion and Zhang (2007) offer another explanation. They 
introduce the distribution of the prior rating level as the reason for the differential effect of 
rating changes on stock prices. They argue that the distribution of prior credit ratings is not 
identical for downgrades and upgrades and downgrades often involve a much bigger change 
in credit rating than upgrades, which is correlated with the prior rating. Hence, there is an 
overall stronger stock price effect for downgrades. The asymmetric nature of stock price 
responses to rating changes is explained by He, Wang, and Wei (2011) based on information 
asymmetry. He et al. (2011) argue that as suggested by the discretionary disclosure 
hypothesis, good and bad news are revealed in different ways, consequently rating upgrades 
and downgrades have different effects on stocks.12 They explain that good news is released 
quickly; it gives rise to an increase in disclosure and therefore a decrease in information 
asymmetry. In contrast, bad news is released slowly; giving rise to reduced disclosure and 
greater information asymmetry.  
 
2.4.2. The Price Impact of Rating Changes for Low-Rated and High-Rated Firms 
Some studies investigate the differential impact of rating changes on firms with low-
rated and high-rated debts and concludes that the stock price response to rating changes is 
                                                          
12 The discretionary disclosure hypothesis suggests that managers have some degree of discretion over the 
disclosure of information and they prefer to announce good news immediately while allowing bad news to 
dribble out slowly.   
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stronger for low-rated firms relative to high-rated firms (Goh and Ederington (1999) and 
Jorion and Zhang (2010)). This conclusion is not surprising due to greater uncertainty and risk 
associated with low-rated firms. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) illustrate that the stock price 
reaction is stronger to downgrades that move bonds from investment-grade categories to 
speculative-grade categories than to downgrades in general. Closely related, Goh and 
Ederington (1999) indicate that the stock price reaction is stronger for downgrades to and 
within speculative-grade categories than to those within investment-grade categories. 
Additionally, they illustrate that the stock price reacts more negatively to downgrades at the 
lower end of the rating scale. Jorion and Zhang (2010) find a greater stock price impact for 
rating downgrades of firms initially rated as speculative-grade. Moreover, they provide 
evidence that the stock price effect for bond rating upgrades is significant for speculative-
grade firms. With regard to long-run abnormal stock returns, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
reveal that the underperformance of downgrades, the long-run negative abnormal returns 
following rating downgrades, is more pronounced for firms with speculative-grade debt and 
small firms.  
An examination by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009) to clarify the 
relationship between credit risk and stock returns shows that the credit risk effect is 
concentrated in the lowest-rated firms around rating downgrades. Avramov et al. (2009) 
illustrate that the differential return between high-rated firms and low-rated firms derives 
from financial distress affecting the lowest-rated firms in the period three months before and 
three months after rating downgrades. They indicate that low-rated firms experience price 
declines, negative returns, a sharp deterioration of their fundamentals, and strong 
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institutional selling around rating downgrades.13 Furthermore, they show that prices of low-
rated firms fail to incorporate the possibility of large losses around rating downgrades. They 
explain that low-rated firms’ mispricing is generated by retail investors and persists due to 
arbitrageurs’ failure to fully exploit this mispricing because of high illiquidity and short selling 
constraints. In another study in support of the stronger negative impact of rating downgrades 
on low-rated firms, Henry, Kisgen, and Wu (2015) demonstrate that short interest increases 
more prior to downgrades of firms rated at the lowest investment-grade rating, BBB-. They 
also indicate that abnormal short selling is higher prior to downgrades across rating categories 
compared to downgrades within a rating category.  
In support of the differential price impact of rating changes across firms, it can be 
argued that the greater stock price reaction to rating changes among low-rated firms than 
among high-rated firms is likely because high-rated firms are usually more closely followed by 
market participants than low-rated firms; thereby, rating changes of these firms could be 
predicted with a high level of confidence. Rating changes of high-rated firms might have little 
additional information content or might be only a confirmation of well-known information in 
the market. Furthermore, low-rated firms have a higher risk of default and face major 
uncertainties in the market. Therefore, it can be expected that their rating changes arise a 
stronger reaction in the market. 
 
                                                          
13 They find no difference in returns across credit risk groups during periods of stable or improving credit 
conditions. 
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2.4.3. Stock Price Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Rating Changes 
The effect of credit review announcements on the stock market and the differential  
effect of watch-preceded rating changes relative to direct rating changes on stock prices have 
long been considered in the literature, from early tentative consideration in Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986) and Hand et al. (1992) up to more recent studies such as the theoretical work 
of Boot et al. (2006) and the empirical work of Chung et al. (2012).14 The findings clarify the 
relative information content of credit reviews as a signal of changes in firms’ credit quality 
and the way that announcements of reviews alter the stock price reaction to subsequent 
rating changes.15 Prior studies indeed validate that credit reviews convey valuable 
information to the market and direct rating changes and watch-preceded rating changes 
result in different stock price reactions. 
Boot et al. (2006) argue that credit ratings have a real impact on the market through 
the monitoring role of rating agencies, which is most apparent in their credit watch 
procedures and the role that rating agencies play in the investment decision of institutional 
investors. Chan, Faff, Hill, and Scheule (2011) suggest that credit rating agencies provide 
information to the market both at the conclusion of watch procedures and outside the watch 
procedures. This suggests that rating agencies are always at an informational advantage 
relative to investors. Chan et al. (2011) highlight that resources the agencies expend on 
monitoring credit quality make it efficient for investors to rely on their assessments.  
                                                          
14 A direct rating change is a rating change that is not preceded by an addition to a watch list. It is therefore an 
unanticipated or a surprise rating change. 
15 S&P’s CreditWatch, Moody’s Watchlist, and Fitch’s RatingAlert contain lists of ratings under review. 
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Wansley and Clauretie (1985) propose that credit watch announcements are 
informational events in the stock market as credit watch placements reduce the rating lag in 
the market. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) provide evidence of abnormal stock returns for 
credit watch additions; a negative abnormal performance for potential downgrades and some 
positive abnormal performance for potential upgrades. Moreover, they show that watch-
preceded rating downgrades provide less information to the market compared to rating 
changes not preceded by a formal review process. In the same vein, Followill and Martell 
(1997) illustrate that announcements of review for potential downgrades have a significant 
negative impact on stock prices and downgrades that are preceded by announcements of 
review for potential downgrades provide little new information to the market and have a 
negligible price impact. Norden and Weber (2004) also illustrate that the stock market 
exhibits significantly negative abnormal returns on days of reviews for downgrades. 
Additionally, they indicate that the magnitude of abnormal performance in the stock market 
is influenced by the level of the old rating and previous rating events. Jorion and Zhang (2010) 
also report a significant negative stock market response to negative credit watch placements. 
Bannier and Hirsch (2010) take a different approach and investigate the role of rating agencies 
in financial markets by testing the stock price reaction to rating changes over the pre- and 
post-credit watch review periods. They show that the information content of downgrades 
increased significantly after the credit watch introduction and that stocks react more strongly 
to direct rating downgrades compared to watch-preceded rating downgrades. 
A number of studies in this area present a contradictory view. Purda (2007) reports 
that there is no significant difference in the stock price reaction to unanticipated versus 
anticipated rating changes. Chung et al. (2012) confirm that credit watch announcements are 
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significant informational events in the market but they do not confirm the different impact of 
watch-preceded rating changes relative to direct rating changes. Chung et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that negative and positive credit watch reviews are associated with statistically 
significant negative and positive abnormal stock returns, however, they find the same results 
for the stock market reaction to rating downgrades and upgrades regardless of the watch 
actions.16 Overall, these results suggest that although credit watch additions are significant 
informational events in the market, they do not completely pre-empt the information found 
in rating changes. 
 
2.5. Summing-Up 
This chapter reviews prior studies on the impact of investor sentiment on the stock 
market and stock price variation on the announcement of earnings, dividends, and credit 
rating changes. Based on this review, a significant gap in the literature regarding the role of 
investor sentiment in the stock pricing process around these firm-specific events is identified. 
It has been well established that investor sentiment is a significant determinant of stock price 
changes, however, the impact of investor sentiment, especially firm-specific investor 
sentiment, around these firm-specific events has not been investigated sufficiently. The 
purpose of this thesis is to answer some of the unanswered questions related to this gap in 
the literature. The remaining empirical chapters of this thesis present three event studies to 
examine the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to an 
earnings surprise announcement, a dividend change announcement, and a credit rating 
                                                          
16 They find that rating downgrades are associated with significant negative abnormal stock returns, but 
abnormal stock returns associated with rating upgrades are not significantly different from zero.  
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change announcement. This research sheds light on the relationship between firm-specific 
investor sentiment and stock prices on the announcement of these events.  
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3. Earnings Surprises and Stock Price Reactions: The Impact of Investor Sentiment 
3.1. Introduction 
The announcement of corporate earnings has a significant impact on the stock market. 
The importance of earnings announcement events, particularly earnings surprises, is well 
established in the literature. Prior research finds significant stock price movements around 
earnings announcements (e.g., Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002)). These 
studies assume that rational investors efficiently impound accounting information into stock 
prices and arbitrageurs offset the actions of irrational investors. However, behavioural 
finance challenges these assumptions and argues that behavioural aspects are related to 
firms’ short-term performance, particularly in the context of hard to value and difficult to 
arbitrage firms (Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Joseph et al. (2011)). Indeed, numerous studies 
validate the arguments of behavioural finance and illustrate that stock price variation could 
be better explained by using behavioural models that allow for investors’ emotional biases 
(e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Chau et al. (2016)). The literature shows that investor 
sentiment contains unique information for asset pricing and is a significant determinant of 
stock price variation (Da et al. (2015) and Huang et al. (2015)). Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 
(2012) validate the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices around announcements of 
unexpected earnings using a market-wide investor sentiment proxy.17 They indicate that 
investors react more to earnings news that is compatible with prevailing investor sentiment. 
They find that there is sentiment driven momentum embedded in the valuation of stocks; in 
bullish market periods the stock price reaction is exaggerated for earnings above expectations 
                                                          
17 Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) use Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) investor sentiment index.  
 52 
 
and in bearish market periods the stock price response is stronger for earnings 
disappointments.  
This study takes a new approach to identify the role of investor sentiment in the stock 
market around earnings events. The objective of this chapter is to extend the findings of the 
literature by considering the role of investor sentiment towards individual firms in the stock 
pricing process in response to the announcement of earnings surprises. Studies such as 
Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Renault (2017) demonstrate that Internet stock messages and 
social media platforms contain information or sentiment which influences stock price 
formation. However, until now, little attention has been given to the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment expressed on social media platforms towards firms stocks’ values around 
firm-specific events. A common thread in investor sentiment studies is the acknowledgment 
that the effect of investor sentiment on price formation is not homogenous across stocks. 
Therefore, it is important to establish a more focussed and direct measure of investor 
sentiment in order to consider its impact on stock prices. This study seeks to close the gap in 
the literature by identifying the role of firm-specific investor sentiment, extracted from social 
media platforms, in stock price formation on the announcement of earnings surprises. The 
purpose of this chapter is to empirically examine the predictions of behavioural finance 
theory in an earnings announcement setting by using a measure of firm-specific investor 
sentiment. Undertaking an event study of this nature helps to isolate the effect of investor 
sentiment from fundamental information conveyed by earnings surprises as it is incorporated 
into the stock price of the reporting firms. 
This chapter investigates four hypotheses. First, it investigates the impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment on individual firms’ stock prices which goes beyond the impact of 
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market-wide investor sentiment around earnings surprises. Prior studies mainly focus on the 
price impact of market-wide investor sentiment on the stock market (e.g., Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), and Chau et al. (2016)). Building 
on prior studies’ findings, this research examines the hypothesis that firm-specific investor 
sentiment should have a significant impact on stock price reactions to earnings surprises 
beyond the impact of market-wide investor sentiment. In order to do this, a measure of firm-
specific investor sentiment is employed to disentangle the impact of micro-sentiment (firm-
specific) from macro-sentiment (market-wide) and to quantify its impact on abnormal stock 
returns. This hypothesis addresses the questions whether firm-specific investor sentiment 
plays a significant role in the stock pricing process around earnings surprises, and if so, 
whether the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is altered by the impact of market-
wide investor sentiment.   
Second, this chapter investigates whether the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on abnormal stock returns is different for negative and positive earnings surprise 
firms. To answer this question, this research examines the hypothesis that firm-specific 
investor sentiment should affect the stock price sensitivity to negative and positive earnings 
surprises differently, with a stronger effect for negative earnings surprises that positive 
earnings surprises. This hypothesis is related to the prediction from prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky (2013) and Barberis (2013)), where investors’ value functions are 
asymmetrical and more prone to loss aversion. Based on prospect theory’s predictions a 
greater impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to negative 
earnings surprises is expected.  
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Third, this chapter tests whether the price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment 
differs systematically across firms. There is evidence in the literature that the price effect of 
investor sentiment is more pronounced for hard to value firms and difficult to arbitrage firms 
(Baker and Wurgler (2006), Joseph et al. (2011), and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). 
Building on this result, this study examines the hypothesis that the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on stock price reactions to earnings surprises should be more pronounced 
for firms that face grater valuation uncertainties and limits to arbitrage.  
Finally, this research examines whether the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment 
on stock price reactions to earnings surprises is the result of a short-term market overreaction 
or underreaction which causes temporary mispricing and errors in valuation. Studies by 
Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Da et al. (2015), and Danbolt et al. (2015) 
show that investor sentiment leads to temporary mispricing in the stock market, in which case 
future returns are negatively related to past investor sentiment. This study examines 
sentiment driven mispricing and subsequent return reversals around earnings surprises by 
investigating the hypothesis that the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price 
reactions to earnings surprises should reverse over the post-announcement period. To 
examine this hypothesis, the relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and post-
announcement abnormal returns is investigated. 
Using a broad sample of corporate earnings announcements where actual earnings 
diverge from investment analysts’ forecasts and a measure of investor sentiment based on 
firm-specific content from Twitter and StockTwits, over the period 2011-2015, this study finds 
that firm-specific investor sentiment has a significant impact on the stock price of firms that 
announce earnings surprises. The findings show that firm-specific investor sentiment 
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influences stock price movements beyond the impact of earnings surprises; bullish and 
bearish firm-specific investor sentiment modifies stock price reactions to new earnings 
information. The impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is also found to be more 
important than the influence of prevailing market-wide investor sentiment. The results 
illustrate that the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment is not moderated by market-wide 
investor sentiment either when using Baker and Wurgler's (2006) sentiment index or 
alternative market-wide sentiment indices based on content from Twitter and StockTwits. 
The results also indicate that the price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is greater 
for firms having negative earnings surprises compared to firms experiencing positive earnings 
surprises. Furthermore, the results show that the price impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment is stronger for firms that face a greater level of uncertainty in valuation; small firms 
and growth firms. Finally, the findings confirm temporary mispricing due to the effect of firm-
specific investor sentiment. The results of empirical analysis indicate that the impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment on stock price reactions to earnings surprises reverses over the 
post-announcement period.  
This study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, it establishes 
a clear relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and stock price movements 
around earnings surprises. This result contributes to the understanding of the stock pricing 
process around earnings announcements, beyond the impact of new earnings information 
documented by Bartov et al. (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Kinney et al. (2002), and 
Lopez and Rees (2002), among others, and the impact of market-wide investor sentiment as 
established by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012). In addition, the results of this study 
extend the work on the different effects of investor sentiment across firms by Baker and 
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Wurgler (2006), Edmans et al. (2007), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), and Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012), among others, finding firm-specific investor sentiment has a 
greater impact on stock prices of small and growth firms. Finally, this research expands the 
work on temporary mispricing due to the impact of investor sentiment by providing evidence 
of return reversals during the post-earnings announcement period similar to that found by 
Tetlock (2007), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), and Da et al. (2015). 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the sample 
and data. Section 3.3 explains the methodology and models. Section 3.4 discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. Sample and Data 
The sample consists of earnings surprises announced by companies listed on the NYSE 
and NASDAQ markets between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2015 and is obtained from 
the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. The start date of the sample is 
driven by the availability of the data for the investor sentiment variables used in the empirical 
analysis.18 The primary requirement of the sample is that the data on earnings surprises from 
I/B/E/S can be matched with a sample of firms covered by PsychSignal, a commercial provider 
of firm-specific sentiment data to investors and traders based on textual analysis of content 
posted on Twitter and StockTwits.19 The sample consists of 14,423 observations over the 
period 2011-2015. 
                                                          
18 This is due to availability of the sentiment data from PsychSignal. 
19 I use the daily data feed from PsychSignal which is based on social media feeds for the days prior to the 
earnings announcements. See Appendix B for information about PsychSignal data. 
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Market-wide investor sentiment data which includes Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) 
sentiment index and PsychSignal mood indices is collected from Jeffery Wurgler’s website and 
PsychSignal respectively. Stock price, trading volume, and index return data is obtained from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is from Compustat. Stock 
style classifications are from Morningstar, and institutional ownership records are from 
Thomson Reuters. 
 
3.2.1. Investor Sentiment Measures 
The main variables of interest in this study are measures of investor sentiment. The 
data on investor sentiment towards individual firms is collected from PsychSignal. PsychSignal 
is a leading provider of real-time sentiment data covering more than 10,000 individual 
securities including all stocks in the NASDAQ100 and S&P500 indices. PsychSignal sentiment 
data is based on the linguistic processing of millions of firm-related messages posted on 
Twitter and StockTwits. PsychSignal produces firm-specific measures of bullish intensity and 
bearish intensity, representing the strength of optimism and pessimism revealed in the tweets 
about the firms. These two measures are combined to generate a net measure of firm-specific 
investor sentiment. Following Antweiler and Frank (2004), the cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment index (CSI) is calculated as: 
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) = ∑ 𝐿𝑛
(1+𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡)
(1+𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡)
−1
𝑡=−2                                                                                                         (3.1) 
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Firm i’s Sentiment Index (SI) on day t is defined as the natural logarithm of (1 + Bullish 
Intensityi,t) divided by (1 + Bearish Intensityi,t). The Cumulative Sentiment Index (CSI(-2,-1)) is 
the sum of the sentiment index over a two-day window, from two days before until one day 
before the earnings announcement date. When investor sentiment about a firm is bullish 
(bearish), CSI(-2,-1) has a positive (negative) value.  
The other main measure of investor sentiment is Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) monthly 
market-wide sentiment index (B&W). This market-wide investor sentiment measure has been 
used as a proxy for investor sentiment in a number of studies including Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012), Brown et al. (2012), Huang et al. (2015), and Chau et al. (2016). Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2006) investor sentiment index is based on six underlying market components; the 
closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day 
returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. This index is 
available up to the end of September 2015 on Jeffery Wurgler’s website. Holt-Winters non-
seasonal smoothing model is used to forecast the index for the months October, November, 
and December 2015. The index is estimated for these three months based on the value of the 
index over the period January 2011 to September 2015. Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) 
sentiment index is controlled for the month of the earnings announcement in this study.  
 
3.2.2. Earnings Surprise Measures 
The primary measure of earnings surprises is quarterly Standardised Unexpected 
Earnings (SUE) based on I/B/E/S data. The earnings surprise variable is the difference between 
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actual earnings and the average of I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts at the time of the earnings 
announcement, adjusted for the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts: 
𝑆𝑈𝐸 =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆−𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆
𝜎(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆)
                                                                                                                                           (3.2) 
 
A positive (negative) earnings surprise consists of an actual earnings announcement 
that is higher (lower) than expectations. 
Three other measures of earnings surprises are defined based on the value of SUE. An 
indicator variable of earning surprises NEG is created that is equal to 1 if firms reporting 
negative unexpected earnings, and 0 otherwise.20 Additionally, the earnings surprises are split 
into negative and positive surprises and the variables SUENEG and SUEPOS are created. 
SUENEG (SUEPOS) is equal to the absolute value (value) of SUE for firms having negative 
(positive) unexpected earnings, and 0 otherwise. The different price impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment for firms reporting negative and positive earnings surprises is examined 
by using both indicator and continuous variables.  
 
3.2.3. Stock Return Measure 
For the measurement of the dependent variable, a three-day event window is utilised 
and market model Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are estimated by subtracting the 
expected stock return (E(Ri,t)) from the actual stock return (Ri,t). The expected return (E(Ri,t)) 
                                                          
20 NEG is equal to 1 for firms having negative unexpected earnings and 0 for firms having positive unexpected 
earnings.  
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is calculated as (αi + βiRm,t) using the market model parameters estimated over the period 
between 300 and 46 days prior to the earnings announcement. The CRSP value-weighted 
index return is the market return (Rm,t). It should be highlighted that βi is a parameter that 
measures the sensitivity of Ri,t to the market index. Cumulative abnormal returns for the day 
of the earnings announcement and the two subsequent days are measured as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
+2
𝑡=0 )                                                                                                               (3.3) 
  
It should be noted that the firm-specific sentiment variable (CSI) measures investor 
sentiment over the window (-2,-1) and the abnormal stock return variable (CAR) measures 
abnormal stock returns over the window (0,+2). This design is apposite because it helps to 
examine the short-term causal relation between firm-specific investor sentiment and 
announcement period abnormal returns and mitigate the reverse causality issue. 
 
3.2.4. Other Variables 
Three proxies for uncertainty in valuation and limits to arbitrage are used to examine 
whether the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns is more 
pronounced for firms that are hard to value or difficult to arbitrage. Following Baker and 
Wurgler (2006), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), and Lam and Wei (2011), size, stock 
style, and the level of institutional ownership are used as proxies for hard to value and difficult 
to arbitrage firms. Size is a proxy for uncertainty as larger firms tend to have more earnings 
transparency due to higher levels of public awareness and disclosure relative to smaller firms. 
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Stock style is another proxy for uncertainty in valuation as growth firms are generally 
considered more difficult to analyse than value firms. Morningstar Style Box classification that 
is based on market capitalisation and a range of growth and valuation measures is used to 
group firms into small and large firms and growth and value firms. Firms’ size and style in the 
month prior to the earnings announcement are controlled in this study. The third proxy is the 
number of institutional shareholders. This variable is a proxy for the level of shareholders’ 
sophistication, and as such, it can reflect the risk of arbitrage (Ali, Hwang, and Trombley 
(2003)). High institutional ownership implies easier stock borrowing and more arbitrage 
opportunities. This proxy is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of institutional 
shareholders holding a firm’s shares at the year-end prior to the earnings announcement. This 
variable is used to split the sample into two sub-samples of firms with low and high levels of 
institutional ownership. If the number of institutional shareholders of a firm is lower (higher) 
than the median, then the firm is in the sub-sample of firms with a low (high) level of 
institutional ownership. 
This research also controls for a number of firm characteristic variables including loss 
(LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), 
stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), cumulative abnormal stock trading volume (CAV(-32,-3)),21 
and Abnormal Short Interest (ASI). Including these firm characteristic variables, allows the 
study to test the independence of the results from the impact of these variables on stock 
returns. A detailed definition of all variables is presented in Appendix A. 
 
                                                          
21 The CAV(-32,-3) variable is normalized by dividing the values by the variable’s standard deviation. 
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3.2.5. Sample Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the overall sample and further partitions the 
sample by the sign of earnings surprises, market capitalisation, style, listing exchange, sector, 
and announcement year. The sample contains 14,423 earnings surprises over the period 
2011-2015. Only a small proportion of the sample (612 observations, 4.24% of the sample) is 
drawn from the year 2011 as Twitter and StockTwits had not gained critical mass as a vehicle 
for comments on firms. The greatest number of observations comes from 2014 (4,622 
observations), which represents 32.05% of the sample. Overall, 63.37% of the earnings 
announcements in the sample represent positive news (9,140 observations), whereas the 
remaining 36.63% of the earnings announcements represent negative news (5,283 
observations). According to the Morningstar Style Box classification, the number of small firms 
in the sample is more than twice that of large firms (6,576 observations compared to 2,869 
observations), while the numbers of growth and value firms are about the same (4,411 growth 
firms and 3,680 value firms).22 Firms listed on NYSE account for 59.66% of the sample (8,605 
observations) and firms listed on NASDAQ account for 40.34% of the sample (5,818 
observations). Breaking down the sample based on Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) indicates that the greatest number of observations is from the information technology 
sector; 20.62% of the sample, while only 1.41% of the sample are from the communication 
services sector. 
Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics for the key variables. All non-binary variables, 
apart from SIZE and INSTOWNER that are log transformed, are winsorized at 1% and 99% of  
 
                                                          
22 The Morningstar Style Box classification data is not available for 2,928 observations in my sample. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics by Earnings Surprises, Market Cap, Stock Style, Stock Exchange, Sector, and 
Announcement Year 
This table presents summary statistics by earnings surprises, market cap, stock style, market, sector, and announcement 
year. Positive (negative) standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) consist of actual earnings that are higher (lower) than the 
average of the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) analyst forecasts. Market cap and stock style are based on 
the Morningstar Style Box classification. Stock exchange is the market that stocks are traded on. Sector is classified based on 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) and announcement year is earnings announcement calendar year. See 
Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
over the period 2011-2015. 
  No of Obs Percent     No of Obs Percent 
              
No of Obs 14,423 100.00%  Sector   
    Energy 1,269 8.80% 
Positive & Negative SUE    Materials 823 5.71% 
SUE>0 9,140 63.37%  Industrials 1,688 11.70% 
SUE<0 5,283 36.63%  Consumer Discretionary 2,346 16.27% 
    Consumer Staples 612 4.24% 
Market Cap    Health Care 1,889 13.10% 
Large 2,869 19.89%  Financials 2,233 15.48% 
Mid 2,050 14.21%  Information Technology 2,974 20.62% 
Small 6,576 45.59%  Communication Services 204 1.41% 
    Utilities 385 2.67% 
Stock Style       
Value 3,680 25.51%     
Core 3,404 23.60%  Announcement Year   
Growth 4,411 30.58%  2011 612 4.24% 
    2012 1,907 13.22% 
Stock Exchange    2013 3,060 21.22% 
NYSE 8,605 59.66%  2014 4,622 32.05% 
NASDAQ 5,818 40.34%  2015 4,222 29.27% 
              
 
their respective distributions to mitigate the impact of outliers. The variable LEVERAGE is 
winsorized only at 99% of its distribution. Table 3.2 offers initial indications that the stock 
price reaction is more marked for negative earnings surprises and that firm-specific and 
market-wide investor sentiment measures capture different aspects and levels of investor 
sentiment in the market. The stock price response to earnings surprises, the mean of the 
variable CAR(0,+2), is close to zero which implies that although there are significantly more 
positive earnings surprises than negative earnings surprises in the sample, the price reaction 
is more pronounced for negative earnings surprises. The mean of SUE is a positive 0.9913, 
which indicates that on average earnings announcements have been better than expected by  
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics: Key Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the key variables in this study; cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), cumulative 
firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)), standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment 
index (B&W), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), stock price 
momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), cumulative abnormal stock trading volume (CAV(-32,-3)), abnormal short interest (ASI), and the 
number of institutional shareholders (INSTOWNER). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific 
investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. 
Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price, trading volume, and index return data 
comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. Institutional 
ownership records come from Thomson Reuters. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over 
the period 2011-2015.  
Variable No of Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
CAR(0,+2) 14,423 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0845 -0.2662 0.2488 
CSI(-2,-1) 14,423 0.5935 0.6043 0.8847 -1.4872 2.4749 
SUE 14,423 0.9913 0.6667 3.6807 -10.8136 16.5344 
B&W 14,423 -0.0129 -0.0263 0.0972 -0.2072 0.2909 
LOSS 14,423 0.2070 0.0000 0.4052 0.0000 1.0000 
BM 14,418 0.4819 0.3899 0.3988 -0.3813 1.9598 
SIZE 14,418 7.5559 7.5175 1.7314 2.0819 12.8383 
LEVERAGE 14,344 0.2539 0.2291 0.2197 0.0000 0.8784 
ROA 14,416 -0.0084 0.0296 0.1820 -0.9204 0.2822 
CAR(-202,-3) 13,505 -0.0406 -0.0312 0.4727 -1.5488 1.5330 
CAV(-32,-3) 14,374 0.5228 -0.6983 15.3825 -120.5106 104.5484 
ASI 14,385 0.0010 0.0002 0.0128 -0.0431 0.0531 
INSTOWNER 12,785 4.9350 4.9488 0.9662 0.0000 7.4390 
              
 
security analysts. The mean of CSI(-2,-1) is a positive 0.5935, which illustrates that the average 
sentiment of the tweets about the firms in the sample has been bullish. B&W, however, has a 
negative mean close to zero (the average of B&W is -0.0129), which shows that during the 
sample period overall market mood has been marginally negative. The opposing signs 
between CSI(-2,-1) and B&W can be considered as the first indication that these two sentiment 
variables capture different aspects and levels of investor sentiment. A comparison of CSI(-2,-1) 
and B&W’s standard deviations also highlights the differences between these two variables. 
CSI(-2,-1) has a standard deviation of 0.8847 and B&W has a standard deviation of 0.0972, which 
indicates that firm-specific sentiment is more volatile than market sentiment. This is to be 
expected as the heterogeneity in investor sentiment for the CSI(-2,-1) is larger due to the firm-
level focus.  
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The correlation matrix is presented in Table 3.3. There is a positive correlation 
between CAR(0,+2) and CSI(-2,-1), suggesting positive (negative) abnormal stock returns are 
associated with bullish (bearish) firm-specific investor sentiment. In addition, CAR(0,+2) is 
positively correlated with SUE, suggesting that abnormal stock returns are higher (lower) for 
firms experiencing positive (negative) earnings surprises. Importantly, the positive correlation 
between CSI(-2,-1) and SUE is only 0.1234, which indicates that the firm-specific investor 
sentiment variable is not affected by multicollinearity with earnings surprises. This suggests 
that firm-specific investor sentiment is not a mere reflection of the information about the 
firms’ actual earnings, signed news flow, but it captures different elements of noise trading 
that are beyond the fundamental hard information that is included in the actual earnings. 
From this preliminary description of the univariate statistics, it seems that the measure of 
firm-specific investor sentiment captures an element of soft information which is not 
captured by the earnings surprise alone. This should be examined through a multivariate 
regression analysis, where abnormal stock returns are conditioned on both CSI(-2,-1) and SUE. 
Multicollinearity tests are conducted to ensure that the variables are not highly correlated 
with each other. The results of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests show that there is no 
multicollinearity problem as VIF values are substantially lower than 10. 
 
3.3. Methodology 
This section represents the methodology and regression models used to investigate 
the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in the stock pricing process on the announcement 
of earnings surprises. A standard event study methodology is followed to examine whether 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlations of the variables; cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)), standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), 
cumulative abnormal stock trading volume (CAV(-32,-3)), abnormal short interest (ASI), and the number of institutional shareholders (INSTOWNER). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the 
variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price, trading volume, and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. Institutional 
ownership records come from Thomson Reuters. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015.  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
(1) CAR(0,+2) 1.0000             
(2) CSI(-2,-1) 0.1244 1.0000            
(3) SUE 0.2797 0.1234 1.0000           
(4) B&W 0.0066 -0.0215 0.0045 1.0000          
(5) LOSS -0.0981 -0.0470 -0.2244 0.0008 1.0000         
(6) BM 0.0162 0.0173 -0.0563 0.0243 -0.0259 1.0000        
(7) SIZE 0.0241 -0.0444 0.0706 -0.0154 -0.4137 -0.1553 1.0000       
(8) LEVERAGE 0.0159 0.0244 -0.0946 -0.0069 -0.1067 -0.0252 0.1301 1.0000      
(9) ROA 0.0313 0.0000 0.0759 -0.0032 -0.6057 0.0513 0.4401 0.0799 1.0000     
(10) CAR(-202,-3) -0.0194 0.0700 0.0351 -0.0495 -0.0091 0.0494 -0.0392 -0.0026 -0.0767 1.0000    
(11) CAV(-32,-3) -0.0264 0.0053 -0.0235 -0.0230 0.0581 -0.0324 -0.0712 -0.0150 -0.1246 0.1420 1.0000   
(12) ASI -0.0233 -0.0248 -0.0042 -0.0305 0.0381 -0.0417 -0.0323 -0.0366 -0.0388 -0.0293 0.2368 1.0000  
(13) INSTOWNER 0.0263 -0.0610 0.0751 -0.0282 -0.4037 -0.0650 0.8693 0.1255 0.4254 -0.0367 -0.0921 -0.0578 1.0000 
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investor sentiment is a predictor of abnormal stock returns at the time of earnings 
announcements. 
  
3.3.1. Firm-Specific and Market-Wide Investor Sentiment 
In order to investigate the role of firm-specific and market-wide investor sentiment in 
stock price movements around earnings surprise announcements, OLS regression models for 
both investor sentiment variables are estimated. The models test the individual and joint 
effects of firm-specific and market-wide investor sentiment. First, regression models using 
only firm-specific and market-wide investor sentiment variables are considered. The models 
take the following forms: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜀                                                    (3.4) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵&𝑊 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜀                                                                (3.5) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CSIi,(-2,-1): Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, 
B&W: Baker and Wurgler’s Investor Sentiment Index. 
 
Models 3.4 and 3.5 are re-run including the variable SUE to test whether the 
coefficients of the investor sentiment variables remain the same in the presence of the 
earnings surprise variable. 
Further, regression models incorporating both investor sentiment variables and 
additional control variables that may have an impact on firms’ abnormal returns around 
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earnings announcements are estimated. The regression model incorporating the full list of 
variables takes the following form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐵&𝑊 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝐵&𝑊 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) +  𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑖,(−32,−3) +
 𝛽12𝐴𝑆𝐼 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                             (3.6) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CSIi,(-2,-1): Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, 
SUE: Standardized Unexpected Earnings, B&W: Baker and Wurgler’s Investor Sentiment Index, LOSS: Firm Loss, 
BM: Book-to-Market Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, ROA: Return on Assets, CARi,(-202,-3): Long 
Run Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CAVi,(-32,-3): Cumulative Abnormal Volume, ASI: Abnormal Short Interest. 
 
The dependent variable in all regression models is the three-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR(0,+2)) which measures the sensitivity of stock prices to firm-specific investor 
sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)), quarterly earnings surprises (SUE), and market-wide investor sentiment 
(B&W). As CAR is measured in a short event window around announcements of earnings 
surprises, the outcome of the regression analysis illustrates the stock price reaction that 
occurs with the arrival of the new earnings information and the impact of investor sentiment 
in the run up to the release of the new information. 
Models 3.4 and 3.5 examine the individual effect of investor sentiment measures. 
Model 3.6 investigates the individual and joint effects of firm-specific and market-wide 
investor sentiment variables. This regression model has several benefits; inclusion of both 
micro and macro measures of investor sentiment and an interaction variable between them 
(CSI(-2,-1)*B&W) allows careful examination of the role of micro and macro investor sentiment 
in the price formation process. It provides a test of whether the effect of firm-specific investor 
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sentiment is moderated, reinforced, or unaffected by market-wide investor sentiment. As 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W) represents the broad market mood, it 
might overlap with the firm-specific mood and affects it. The effect of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on investors’ reactions to earnings announcements might therefore be attributed 
to the prevailing sentiment at the aggregate market level. Furthermore, the model includes a 
set of control variables; loss, book-to-market ratio, size, leverage, return on assets, stock price 
momentum, abnormal stock trading volume, and abnormal short interest prior to earnings 
announcements. These variables may have an impact on abnormal stock returns around 
earnings surprise. Adding these control variables into the regression model makes it possible 
to test the independence of the effect of investor sentiment variables from their effects. All 
regression models in this study include year and sector fixed effects to control for the broad 
characteristics that may have an impact on the relationship between the main variables. 
Additionally, in all regression models, standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm 
clustering are used.  
 
3.3.2. Negative and Positive Earnings Surprises 
In order to examine the asymmetric reaction of stock prices to earnings 
announcements a graphical representation of CAR movements around the day of the 
announcement for four firm sub-samples is provided. The sample is broken down into four 
segments that reflect prevailing investor sentiment ahead of the announcements (positive 
and negative) and the direction of earnings surprises (positive and negative), and CAR for each 
sub-sample is presented from day -10 through day +10, where day 0 is the day of the earnings 
announcement. The comparison of the CAR plots illustrates whether stock price responses to 
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earnings announcements are conditional on the direction of earnings surprises and investor 
sentiment. 
Regression analysis is then applied to test the possibility that the impact of investor 
sentiment on abnormal stock returns is different for negative earnings surprise firms and 
positive earnings surprise firms. A range of regression models, listed below, are estimated: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺 +
+𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                   (3.7) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐵&𝑊 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                      (3.8) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                         (3.9) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽7𝐵&𝑊 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽12𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖              (3.10) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CSIi,(-2,-1): Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, 
NEG: Negative Standardized Unexpected Earnings Indicator Variable, SUENEG: Negative Standardized 
Unexpected Earnings, SUEPOS: Positive Standardized Unexpected Earnings, B&W: Baker and Wurgler’s Investor 
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Sentiment Index, LOSS: Firm Loss, BM: Book-to-Market Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, ROA: 
Return on Assets, CARi,(-202,-3): Long Run Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
 
The dependent variable in all regression models is the three-day cumulative abnormal 
stock returns (CAR(0,+2)). This variable is applied to analyse stock price movements at the 
arrival of the new earnings information and the impact of accumulated short-term investor 
sentiment just prior to the release of the earnings information. 
Models 3.7 and 3.8 include the indicator variable NEG representing earnings surprises 
and the firm-specific investor sentiment variable CSI(-2,-1) to examine the role of these 
variables in stock price formation. In order to examine whether the impact of investor 
sentiment on stock price responses to earnings surprises is more pronounced for negative 
earnings surprises compared to positive earnings surprises, the regression models include an 
interaction variable between CSI(-2,-1) and NEG (CSI(-2,-1)*NEG). The coefficient of this variable 
illustrates whether the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns 
is different between negative and positive earnings surprises and whether firm-specific 
investor sentiment moderates or reinforces the sensitivity of stock prices to negative earnings 
surprises. In addition to the earnings surprise and investor sentiment variables, Model 3.8 
includes variables to control for the impact of firm characteristics.  
Similar specifications are applied in Models 3.9 and 3.10 but with the inclusion of the 
continuous variables SUENEG and SUEPOS and the indicator variable NEG. The coefficients of 
the earnings surprise variables specify different effects of negative and positive earnings news 
in the market. In order to examine whether the stock price sensitivity to negative and positive 
earnings news varies with investor sentiment, the regression models include the interaction 
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variables CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG and CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS. Model 3.10 extends Model 3.9 to include the 
control variables outlined for firm characteristics explained previously. 
 
3.3.3. Hard to Value and Difficult to Arbitrage Firms 
The empirical analysis is continued by considering two special cases where investor 
sentiment may be expected to have a greater influence on stock prices, namely the stocks of 
firms which face uncertainty in valuation and the stocks of firms with limits to arbitrage. In 
order to test this, three proxies size, stock style, and the level of institutional ownership are 
used to split the sample into sub-samples of small and large firms, growth and value firms, 
and firms with low and high levels of institutional ownerships. Models 3.8 and 3.10 are 
estimated for each sub-sample. The main variables of interest are the investor sentiment 
variables. It is expected to find highly significant coefficients for these variables in the sub-
samples of small firms, growth firms, and firms with a low level of institutional ownership and 
less significant or insignificant coefficients for the sentiment variables in the sub-samples of 
large firms, value firms, and firms with a high level of institutional ownership. 
 
3.3.4. Return Reversals 
Regression analysis is conducted to examine whether the relationship between firm-
specific investor sentiment and announcement period abnormal returns is the result of a 
short-term market overreaction or underreaction which causes temporary mispricing and 
errors in valuation, in which case it is expected that in the following period stock returns show 
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signs of mean reversion, as prices return to fundamental values. To this end, the relationship 
of firm-specific investor sentiment to post-announcement abnormal returns over the 
windows (+3,+4), (+3,+6), and (+3,+10), where day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement, 
is examined. The regression models including CAR(+3,+4) as the dependent variable take the 
following forms and similar models are run for CAR(+3,+6), and CAR(+3,+10): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(+3,+4) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺 +  𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) +
𝛽5𝐵&𝑊 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                      (3.11) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(+3,+4) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) ∗ 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2)+𝛽8𝐵&𝑊 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑀 +
𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽14𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                   (3.12) 
 
where; CARi,(+3,+4): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CSIi,(-2,-1): Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, 
NEG: Negative Standardized Unexpected Earnings Indicator Variable, SUENEG: Negative Standardized 
Unexpected Earnings, SUEPOS: Positive Standardized Unexpected Earnings, CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns, B&W: Baker and Wurgler’s Investor Sentiment Index, LOSS: Firm Loss, BM: Book-to-Market Ratio, SIZE: 
Firm Size, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, ROA: Return on Assets, CARi,(-202,-3): Long Run Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns. 
 
Models 3.11 and 3.12 are re-estimated by using cumulative abnormal stock returns 
over the windows (+3,+6) and (+3,+10) as the dependent variables. In addition to the control 
variables used earlier in this study, the variable CAR(0,+2) is included in these regression models 
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in order to control for the effect of announcement period abnormal returns on post-
announcement abnormal returns. In these regression models, the predictive ability of the CSI(-
2,-1) variables is examined by using one-tailed statistics as behavioural finance theory proposes 
an opposite relationship between investor sentiment, as evidenced by mispricing, and future 
stock returns.23 It is expected that during the post-announcement period, stock prices return 
to fundamental values and a change in the direction of stock prices occurs. Therefore, a 
significant negative relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and post-
announcement abnormal returns is anticipated.  
 
3.4. Empirical Findings 
This section presents the results of the multivariate analysis undertaken to identify 
the effect of investor sentiment on stock price reactions to the announcement of earnings 
surprises.  
 
3.4.1. The Effects of Firm-Specific and Market-Wide Investor Sentiment 
Regression analysis is undertaken to examine whether firm-specific investor 
sentiment plays a significant role in stock price formation around earnings surprises and 
whether its impact is moderated, reinforced, or unaffected by the impact of market-wide 
investor sentiment. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
In Table 3.4 CAR(0,+2) is regressed on two investor sentiment variables CSI(-2,-1) and B&W. The  
                                                          
23 For further details about the use of one-tailed statistics, see Inoue and Kilian (2005) and Huang et al. (2015). 
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Table 3.4 
The Effects of Firm-Specific and Market-Wide Investor Sentiment  
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, comparing the effects of firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) and 
market-wide Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W) on announcement period abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)). The 
dependent variable in all regressions is CAR(0,+2). One other variable included in the analysis is standardized unexpected 
earnings (SUE). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from 
PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. Earnings data is from the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015. All regressions 
control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2)   Variable (3) (4) 
       
CSI(-2,-1) 0.0122*** 0.0088***  B&W 0.0116 0.0109 
 (15.02) (11.03)   (1.23) (1.22) 
SUE  0.0062***  SUE  0.0065*** 
  (24.89)    (25.81) 
CONSTANT -0.0152*** -0.0140***  CONSTANT -0.0120*** -0.0123*** 
 (-3.79) (-3.66)   (-2.75) (-2.97) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes  Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes  Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 14423 14423  No of Obs 14423 14423 
Adjusted R2 0.0177 0.0883  Adjusted R
2 0.0017 0.0803 
              
 
results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that firm-specific investor sentiment has a strong 
influence on announcement period abnormal returns. The coefficient of CSI(-2,-1) is positive 
and significant at the 1% level after controlling for year and sector fixed effects. A result which 
confirms the expectation, a significant impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on abnormal 
stock returns. The results in columns (3) and (4) suggest that the impact of market-wide investor 
sentiment (B&W) on abnormal stock returns is statistically insignificant. A result which 
contradicts the expectation regarding the impact of market-wide investor sentiment on 
abnormal stock returns. Additionally, the coefficients of SUE are in line with the expectation 
that a positive earnings surprise corresponds to an increase in announcement abnormal 
returns and vice versa. In general, the results of Table 3.4 provide support for the hypothesis 
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that firm-level investor sentiment plays a significant role in the stock pricing process around 
an earnings announcement. 
In Table 3.5 the effect of investor sentiment is examined in more detail, while 
controlling for additional firm-specific variables. The coefficient of CSI(-2,-1) is positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) in all columns. The highly significant coefficients of 
CSI(-2,-1) demonstrate that after controlling for B&W, SUE, and other firm characteristic 
variables firm-specific investor sentiment contributes significantly to the market’s short-term 
assessment of a stock’s value. The results also show that B&W (macro sentiment) has no 
effect on announcement period abnormal returns as the coefficient of B&W is statistically 
insignificant in all columns. Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction variable CSI(-2,-
1)*B&W, which tests the joint effect of the investor sentiment variables, is insignificant in 
columns (2)-(6), implying the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in the valuation of 
earnings is independent from that of market-wide investor sentiment. Consistent with 
previous results the coefficient of the variable SUE is positive and significant (at the 1% level) 
in all columns. The impact of many of the control variables is in line with prior studies. LOSS 
is negative and significant (at the 1% level) in line with Hayn (1995), BM is positive and 
significant (at the 1% level) (DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015) and Savor and Wilson 
(2016)). SIZE has no significant impact in the models. LEVERAGE is positive and significant (at 
the 1% level) (Savor and Wilson (2016)), and profitability, as measured by ROA, is negative 
and significant (at the 10% level). 
Regression models in columns (3)-(6) include different proxies for stock price 
momentum and information leakage prior to earnings announcements in order to make sure  
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Table 3.5 
The Individual and Joint Effects of Firm-Specific and Market-Wide Investor Sentiment  
This table presents the results of OLS regressions investigating the individual and joint effects of firm-specific investor 
sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) and market-wide Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W) on announcement period 
abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)). The dependent variable in all regressions is CAR(0,+2). Other variables included in the analysis 
are standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return 
on assets (ROA), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), cumulative abnormal stock trading volume (CAV(-32,-3)), and abnormal 
short interest (ASI). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes 
from PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. Earnings data is from the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price, trading volume, and index return data comes from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The sample includes stocks that are traded 
on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CSI(-2,-1) 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0085*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0085*** 
 (11.05) (11.05) (10.48) (10.90) (10.88) (10.45) 
SUE 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0064*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0064*** 
 (24.88) (24.88) (23.72) (23.22) (23.26) (23.71) 
B&W 0.0116 0.0115 0.0066 0.0095 0.0099 0.0060 
 (1.29) (1.28) (0.71) (1.05) (1.10) (0.65) 
CSI(-2,-1)*B&W  0.0054 0.0026 0.0039 0.0041 0.0028 
  (0.70) (0.33) (0.50) (0.53) (0.34) 
LOSS   -0.0089*** -0.0093*** -0.0090*** -0.0089*** 
   (-3.00) (-3.24) (-3.17) (-3.00) 
BM   0.0085*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0083*** 
   (3.87) (3.73) (3.74) (3.78) 
SIZE   0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
   (0.84) (0.46) (0.44) (0.74) 
LEVERAGE   0.0144*** 0.0146*** 0.0147*** 0.0142*** 
   (4.14) (4.39) (4.44) (4.11) 
ROA   -0.0113* -0.0123* -0.0108* -0.0114*   
   (-1.69) (-1.94) (-1.73) (-1.70) 
CAR(-202,-3)   -0.0069***   -0.0070*** 
   (-3.40)   (-3.42) 
CAV(-32,-3)    -0.0016**  -0.0000 
    (-1.98)  (-0.04) 
ASI     -0.1108 -0.1362*   
     (-1.60) (-1.84) 
CONSTANT -0.0113*** -0.0111*** -0.0227*** -0.0196*** -0.0200*** -0.0217*** 
 (-2.72) (-2.64) (-3.58) (-3.25) (-3.29) (-3.43) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 14423 14423 13427 14283 14294 13407 
Adjusted R2 0.0883 0.0883 0.0975 0.0920 0.0918 0.0979 
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 that the effect of CSI(-2,-1) on abnormal returns is not conflated by such considerations 
(Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992), Schwert (1996), and Henry et al. (2015)). In column (3) 
momentum, as measured by CAR(-202,-3), is negative and significant at the 1% level. In column 
(4) the coefficient of cumulative abnormal trading volume (CAV(-32,-3)) is negative and 
significant at the 5% level, and in column (5) the coefficient of abnormal short interest (ASI) 
is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level. The effects of all three variables are 
considered together in column (6) which shows a significant impact for CAR(-202,-3) (at the 1% 
level) and ASI ( at the 10% level) on CAR(0,+2).  
In summary, the empirical analysis of this section illustrates that even in the presence 
of a large number of control variables, the regression results reveal a strong relationship 
between firm-specific investor sentiment and abnormal returns during the earnings 
announcement period, a relationship that is not affected by market-wide investor sentiment. 
 
3.4.2. Investor Sentiment and Negative and Positive Earnings Surprises 
Before examining the effect of investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns for 
negative and positive earnings surprises by conducting regression analysis, I first consider the 
general condition for firms announcing earnings surprises. Figure 3.1 gives a graphical 
overview of the run up to an earnings surprise and the response to the earnings surprise for 
four firm sub-samples over a window of 10 trading days either side of the announcement. The 
four sub-samples of firms are: (1) the portfolio of firms with positive earnings surprises and 
positive firm-specific investor sentiment (6,732 observations), (2) the portfolio of firms with 
positive earnings surprises and negative firm-specific investor sentiment (1,945 observations), 
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Figure 3.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Earnings Surprises and Investor Sentiment 
  
(3) the portfolio of firms with negative earnings surprises and positive firm-specific investor 
sentiment (3,077 observations), and (4) the portfolio of firms with negative earnings surprises 
and negative firm-specific investor sentiment (1,563 observations). These four sub-samples 
cover 92.33% of the total sample. Two additional sub-sample of firms: the portfolio of firms 
with positive earnings surprises and zero firm-specific investor sentiment (463 observations) 
and the portfolio of firms with negative earnings surprises and zero firm-specific investor 
sentiment (643 observations) are not reported for the purpose of clarity. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the relationship between earnings surprises and firm-specific 
investor sentiment is not always linear. Some firms with positive earnings surprises have 
prevailing investor sentiment which is negative and vice versa. Additionally, it shows that 
there are a variety of responses to earnings surprises and that the major price adjustment 
generally takes place by the end of the first day after the earnings announcement. On the first 
day after the announcement, firms with positive earnings surprises and positive investor 
sentiment experience a positive CAR approximately equal to +2.0%, firms with positive 
earnings surprises and negative investor sentiment experience a negative CAR equal to -0.5%, 
firms with negative earnings surprises and positive investor sentiment experience a negative 
CAR equal to -3.0%, and firms with negative earnings surprises and negative investor 
sentiment experience a negative CAR equal to -5.5%. This suggests that when the direction of 
earnings surprises and investor sentiment is opposed to each other a moderation in the price 
response can be observed. The result of Figure 3.1 is consistent with the low correlation 
coefficient between SUE and CSI(-2,-1) (0.1234). The comparison of the CAR plots also suggests 
that both earnings surprises and firm-specific investor sentiment need to be considered when 
stock price movements around earnings announcements are examined.  
Table 3.6 represents the results of regression analysis on the conditional price impact 
of firm-specific investor sentiment around earnings surprises. Panel A provides the results of 
Models 3.7 and 3.8. The coefficient of the interaction variable CSI(-2,-1)*NEG is positive and 
significant at the 1% level in both models, a result which indicates that the price impact of 
firm-specific investor sentiment is more pronounced for firms that announce negative 
earnings surprises than firms that announce positive earnings surprises. Consistent with the 
results of the previous section, firm-specific investor sentiment has a significant positive  
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Table 3.6 
The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Negative and Positive Earnings Surprises 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) and negative and positive earnings surprises (NEG, SUENEG, and SUEPOS). Other variables 
included in the analysis are Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), 
size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)). See Appendix A for 
detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler 
sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). 
Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken 
from Compustat. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015. All 
regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable     
Panel A (1) (2) 
   
CSI(-2,-1) [a] 0.0061*** 0.0059*** 
 (5.93) (5.62) 
NEG -0.0474*** -0.0473*** 
 (-26.08) (-24.58) 
CSI(-2,-1)*NEG [b] 0.0053*** 0.0050*** 
 (3.29) (3.03) 
B&W  0.0145 
  (1.56) 
LOSS  -0.0120*** 
  (-4.17) 
BM  0.0075*** 
  (3.46) 
SIZE  -0.0002 
  (-0.53) 
LEVERAGE  0.0121*** 
  (3.49) 
ROA  -0.0140**  
  (-2.07) 
CAR(-202,-3)  -0.0066*** 
  (-3.25) 
CONSTANT 0.0090** 0.0012 
 (2.39) (0.19) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 14423 13427 
Adjusted R2 0.0799 0.0884 
   
Test [a+b]=0 58.85 50.24 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 3.6 – Continued 
Variable     
Panel B (1) (2) 
   
CSI(-2,-1) [a] 0.0075*** 0.0072*** 
 (9.41) (8.82) 
SUENEG -0.0047*** -0.0045*** 
 (-8.66) (-7.67) 
SUEPOS 0.0040*** 0.0043*** 
 (12.00) (12.60) 
NEG -0.0239*** -0.0246*** 
 (-12.57) (-12.76) 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG [b] 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 
 (3.26) (2.99) 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS [c] -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (-1.05) (-1.28) 
B&W  0.0110 
  (1.20) 
LOSS  -0.0063**  
  (-2.13) 
BM  0.0083*** 
  (3.78) 
SIZE  -0.0001 
  (-0.29) 
LEVERAGE  0.0152*** 
  (4.39) 
ROA  -0.0091 
  (-1.34) 
CAR(-202,-3)  -0.0069*** 
  (-3.42) 
CONSTANT 0.0068* -0.0037 
 (1.83) (-0.60) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 14423 13427 
Adjusted R2 0.1013 0.1107 
   
Test [a+b]=0 49.54 42.98 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
   
Test [a+c]=0 47.17 41.77 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
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impact on abnormal stock returns around earnings announcements as the coefficient of the 
variable CSI(-2,-1) is positive and significant at the 1% level when measured separately. The 
results of the Wald tests provided at the bottom of the table also confirm the significant effect 
of firm-specific investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns around earnings surprises. The 
one-tailed p-value of the Wald test for the combined effect of investor sentiment for negative 
and positive earnings surprises is highly significant in both models. It confirms that the 
coefficients of the variables CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1)*NEG are jointly different from zero at the 1% 
level. The coefficient of the variable NEG is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
announcement period abnormal returns are lower for firms experiencing negative earnings 
surprises than firms experiencing positive earnings surprise. Regarding the impact of other 
variables, LOSS, BM, LEVERAGE, and CAR(-202,-3) are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
ROA is significant at the 5% level.  
Panel B provides the results of Models 3.9 and 3.10. These models examine the stock 
price sensitivity to negative and positive earnings surprises separately by incorporating the 
variables SUENEG, SUEPOS, and NEG. The models include the continuous variables SUENEG 
and SUEPOS to have different coefficients for unexpected earnings, conditional on the sign of 
earnings surprises. They also include the indicator variable NEG to account for the different 
impact of negative earnings news in the market. The previous results regarding the impact of 
firm-specific investor sentiment and standardized unexpected earnings continue to hold; 
firm-specific investor sentiment has a positive impact on announcement period abnormal 
returns and a negative (positive) earnings surprise coincides with a decrease (increase) in 
announcement period abnormal returns. The coefficients of the variable CSI(-2,-1) is positive 
and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient of the variable SUENEG (SUEPOS) is negative 
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(positive) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results also confirm the different 
impact of negative earnings news in the market as the variable NEG has a significant negative 
coefficient at the 1% level. More importantly, the results show that firm-specific investor 
sentiment has a greater impact on the stock price sensitivity to negative earnings surprises. 
The coefficient of the interaction variable CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG is positive and significant at the 
1% level in both models while the coefficient of the interaction variable CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS is 
insignificant. The results of the Wald tests also confirm the findings based on the coefficients 
of the variables in the regression models. The coefficients of the variable CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-
1)*SUENEG and CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS are jointly significant and different from zero, at 
the 1% level. Regarding the other variables, LOSS, BM, LEVERAGE, and CAR(-202,-3) have 
significant effects on announcement period abnormal returns.  
In summary, the results presented in both panels of Table 3.6 confirm the significant 
impact of investor sentiment on stock price responses to negative and positive earnings 
surprises. Bullish (bearish) investor sentiment leads to higher (lower) abnormal stock returns 
on the announcement of earnings surprises. The results also confirm that the impact of 
investor sentiment on stock price reactions to earnings surprises is more pronounced for 
negative earnings surprises compared to positive earnings surprises.  
 
3.4.3. Investor Sentiment and Hard to Value and Difficult to Arbitrage Firms 
Regression analysis is undertaken to investigate whether the price impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment is more marked for firms that are subject to greater uncertainty 
in valuation and firms that are difficult to arbitrage. Models 3.8 and 3.10 are estimated for six  
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Table 3.7 
 Heterogeneity in the Impact of Investor Sentiment 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) for difficult/easy to value firms and high/low limits to arbitrage firms. Size, stock style, and 
institutional ownership are the proxies for hard to value and difficult to arbitrage firms. Size and stock style are classified based 
on the Morningstar Style Box classification. Small and growth firms are considered as hard to value firms. Institutional 
ownership is classified based on the variable’s median. Firms with the number of institutional shareholders below (above) the 
median are recognized as firms with a low (high) level of institutional ownership. Firms with a low level of institutional 
ownership are considered as difficult to arbitrage firms. Other variables included in the analysis are negative and positive 
earnings surprises (NEG, SUENEG, and SUEPOS), Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W), loss (LOSS), book-to-
market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)). See 
Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal and Baker 
and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is 
taken from Compustat. Institutional ownership records come from Thomson Reuters. The sample includes stocks that are 
traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Size Stock Style Institutional Ownership 
  Small Large Growth Value Low High 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CSI(-2,-1) [a] 0.0050*** 0.0044*** 0.0109*** 0.0013 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 
 (2.76) (3.42) (5.51) (0.70) (2.66) (4.17) 
NEG -0.0592*** -0.0299*** -0.0499*** -0.0461*** -0.0566*** -0.0386*** 
 (-19.16) (-11.90) (-14.11) (-14.78) (-16.57) (-16.78) 
CSI(-2,-1)*NEG [b] 0.0070*** 0.0031 0.0033 0.0074*** 0.0072** 0.0039**  
 (2.63) (1.37) (1.03) (2.81) (2.54) (2.07) 
B&W 0.0286* -0.0211 0.0584*** -0.0060 0.0321* 0.0032 
 (1.87) (-1.60) (3.28) (-0.35) (1.93) (0.29) 
LOSS -0.0167*** -0.0046 -0.0100* -0.0139** -0.0185*** 0.0012 
 (-4.26) (-0.72) (-1.87) (-2.56) (-4.43) (0.30) 
BM 0.0086** 0.0052 -0.0028 0.0097*** 0.0095** 0.0075**  
 (2.53) (1.47) (-0.46) (2.62) (2.48) (2.50) 
SIZE -0.0003 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0019** -0.0005 0.0005 
 (-0.19) (0.75) (0.28) (-2.35) (-0.35) (0.83) 
LEVERAGE 0.0136** 0.0045 0.0111* 0.0115* 0.0158*** 0.0098*   
 (2.43) (0.78) (1.74) (1.82) (2.67) (1.94) 
ROA -0.0216** -0.0115 -0.0226* 0.0041 -0.0254*** -0.0057 
 (-2.24) (-0.45) (-1.70) (0.24) (-2.73) (-0.37) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0095*** -0.0072 -0.0043 -0.0116*** -0.0077*** -0.0064*   
 (-3.36) (-1.46) (-1.19) (-2.79) (-3.02) (-1.71) 
CONSTANT -0.0049 0.0014 -0.0214* 0.0190 -0.0059 -0.0026 
 (-0.38) (0.11) (-1.71) (1.60) (-0.41) (-0.29) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 6377 2840 4263 3624 5670 6287 
Adjusted R2 0.1100 0.0781 0.0860 0.0972 0.1000 0.0766 
       
Test [a+b]=0 21.65 15.66 27.32 9.62 19.10 25.03 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
       
Test High[a+b]=Low[a+b] 3.00 2.85 1.56 
p-value 0.0417 0.0457 0.1061 
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Table 3.7 – Continued 
Variable Size Stock Style Institutional Ownership 
  Small Large Growth Value Low High 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CSI(-2,-1) [a] 0.0073*** 0.0052*** 0.0115*** 0.0039*** 0.0075*** 0.0064*** 
 (5.35) (4.92) (7.11) (2.83) (5.04) (6.54) 
SUENEG -0.0052*** -0.0009 -0.0063*** -0.0023*** -0.0052*** -0.0041*** 
 (-6.42) (-1.07) (-5.33) (-2.70) (-5.85) (-5.28) 
SUEPOS 0.0044*** 0.0029*** 0.0054*** 0.0030*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 
 (8.45) (5.42) (8.72) (4.94) (7.36) (10.73) 
NEG -0.0321*** -0.0195*** -0.0227*** -0.0296*** -0.0302*** -0.0186*** 
 (-10.31) (-6.87) (-6.33) (-9.00) (-8.94) (-8.10) 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG [b] 0.0020*** 0.0015** 0.0026*** 0.0017** 0.0011 0.0026*** 
 (2.72) (2.15) (2.68) (2.09) (1.43) (3.56) 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS [c] 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 
 (0.16) (-1.10) (0.03) (0.24) (-0.21) (-1.23) 
B&W 0.0255* -0.0251* 0.0537*** -0.0078 0.0273* 0.0011 
 (1.69) (-1.90) (3.08) (-0.45) (1.67) (0.10) 
LOSS -0.0099** -0.0028 -0.0053 -0.0095* -0.0120*** 0.0059 
 (-2.48) (-0.42) (-0.99) (-1.72) (-2.77) (1.48) 
BM 0.0098*** 0.0045 0.0007 0.0098*** 0.0103*** 0.0075**  
 (2.84) (1.27) (0.11) (2.59) (2.69) (2.51) 
SIZE -0.0002 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0018** -0.0005 0.0007 
 (-0.19) (1.06) (0.36) (-2.23) (-0.42) (1.12) 
LEVERAGE 0.0169*** 0.0046 0.0161*** 0.0130** 0.0181*** 0.0121**  
 (2.99) (0.80) (2.59) (2.05) (3.04) (2.45) 
ROA -0.0155 -0.0176 -0.0187 0.0057 -0.0187** -0.0032 
 (-1.61) (-0.70) (-1.40) (0.33) (-2.04) (-0.21) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0096*** -0.0073 -0.0051 -0.0117*** -0.0078*** -0.0071*   
 (-3.41) (-1.48) (-1.42) (-2.85) (-3.10) (-1.91) 
CONSTANT -0.0116 -0.0002 -0.0266** 0.0146 -0.0105 -0.0070 
 (-0.90) (-0.01) (-2.23) (1.25) (-0.75) (-0.80) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 6377 2840 4263 3624 5670 6287 
Adjusted R2 0.1324 0.0940 0.1174 0.1074 0.1193 0.1064 
       
Test [a+b]=0 19.52 13.17 27.90 6.47 14.72 24.77 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
       
Test [a+c]=0 14.39 14.83 25.58 4.04 12.90 23.99 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 
       
Test High[a+b]=Low[a+b] 1.59 11.93 0.03 
p-value 0.1037 0.0003 0.4276 
       
Test High[a+c]=Low[a+c] 2.03 9.53 0.51 
p-value 0.0771 0.0010 0.2386 
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sub-samples; small and large firms, growth and value firms, and firms with low and high levels 
of institutional ownership. The results are presented in Table 3.7. Panel A presents the results 
of the first multivariate regression model for the sub-groups of firms. The coefficient of the 
variable CSI(-2,-1) is statistically significant in all columns except column (4), the sub-group for 
value firms. The coefficient of the interaction variable CSI(-2,-1)*NEG is statistically significant 
for small, value, and low and high levels of institutional ownership sub-samples. The 
estimated coefficients of the variables CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1)*NEG, along with the results of the 
Wald tests presented at the bottom of the table, suggest that  for negative earnings surprises 
the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is greater for the first group of each proxy; small 
firms, growth firms, and firms with a low level of institutional ownership relative to the 
corresponding sub-samples; large firms, value firms, and firms with a high level of institutional 
ownership.24 For positive earnings surprises the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is 
greater for small firms and growth firms relative to large firms and value firms. The Wald test 
statistics confirm that the coefficients of the variables are jointly different from zero at the 
1% level in all columns. The Wald test statistics for the differences in the effect of investor 
sentiment across the related sub-samples are significant at the 5% level for the size and stock 
style sub-samples and is marginally significant at the 10% level for the institutional ownership 
sub-samples. Based on these outcomes, it can be argued that the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on stock price reactions to earnings surprises is more pronounced for 
small and growth firms compared to large and value firms. Consistent with previous findings, 
abnormal stock returns are negatively related to negative earnings surprises as the coefficient 
                                                          
24 For negative earnings surprises, the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment is represented by the 
coefficients of the variables CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1)*NEG. For positive earnings surprises, the coefficient of the 
variable CSI(-2,-1) is interpreted as the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment since the variable NEG equals to 
zero for positive earnings surprises. 
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of the NEG variable is negative and significant at the 1% level in all columns when measured 
separately. 
Panel B presents the results of the second regression model for the six sub-samples. 
The coefficient of the CSI(-2,-1) variable is positive and statistically significant in all columns. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG is positive and significant in columns 
(1) and (2), small and large firms, columns (3) and (4), growth and value firms, and column 
(6), firms with a high level of institutional ownership. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS is insignificant in all columns. The results of the Wald tests provided 
at the bottom of the table indicate that the coefficients of the sentiment variables for 
negative and positive earnings surprises are jointly significant and different from zero, at the 
1% level, in all columns. In addition, the Wald test statistics for the differences between the 
coefficients of the sentiment variables across sub-samples are significant for the size sub-
samples (at the 10% level) and the stock style sub-samples (at the 1% level).25 The statistics 
for the differences between the coefficients across the institutional ownership sub-samples 
are not significant. Considering these outcomes, it can be suggested that firm-specific investor 
sentiment plays an important role in stock price movements around earnings surprises, it has 
a greater impact on stock prices of firms announcing negative earnings surprises, and its 
impact on stock price movements around earnings surprises is most pronounced for small 
firms and growth firms. SUENEG is statistically significant in all columns except column (2), 
the sub-group for large firms. The coefficients of the variables SUEPOS and NEG are significant 
in all columns. CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG is statistically significant in all columns except column (5), the 
sub-group of firms with low institutional ownership. These results suggest that abnormal 
                                                          
25 For the size sub-samples, the first statistic is marginally significant at the 10% level. 
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stock returns are negatively (positively) related to negative (positive) earnings surprises, 
negative earnings surprises lead to a greater impact on abnormal returns, and their effects 
are moderated (amplified) by positive (negative) firm-specific investor sentiment. 
In summary, the results of the regression analysis in Table 3.7 confirm the previous 
results regarding the effects of firm-specific investor sentiment and earnings surprises on 
announcement period abnormal returns. More importantly, the results establish that the 
impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to earnings surprises is 
most marked for hard to value firms; small and growth firms.  
 
3.4.4. Investor Sentiment and Return Reversals 
In the prior analysis, a strong positive relationship between firm-specific investor 
sentiment and abnormal stock returns on the announcement of earnings surprises is 
documented. This section examines whether this relationship is the result of a short-term 
market overreaction or underreaction which causes temporary mispricing and errors in stock 
valuation. Regression analysis is employed in order to examine the relationship of firm-
specific investor sentiment to post-announcement abnormal returns. Models 3.11 and 3.12 
are estimated using CAR over the windows (+3,+4), (+3,+6), (+3,+10) as dependent variables 
in order to investigate the possibility of return reversals occurring. The results of this analysis 
are provided in Table 3.8. The results indicate that the initial impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment starts to reverse over the post-announcement period, although the magnitude and 
significance of the corrections are smaller than the initial actions, a finding which is similar to  
 
 90 
 
Table 3.8 
Post-Earnings Surprise Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of post-announcement abnormal returns (CAR(+3,+4), CAR(+3,+6), and 
CAR(+3,+10)) on cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)). Other variables included in the analysis are negative and 
positive earnings surprises (NEG, SUENEG, and SUEPOS), announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), 
return on assets (ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. 
Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery 
Wurgler’s website. Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price and index return 
data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The sample 
includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015. All regressions control for year and 
sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The p-values are reported in parentheses. For the variables CSI(-2,-1), 
CSI(-2,-1)*NEG, CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG, and CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS, one-tailed p-values are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable  CAR(+3,+4) CAR(+3,+6) CAR(+3,+10) 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
    
CSI(-2,-1) [a] -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0009* 
 (0.2031) (0.1062) (0.0808) 
NEG 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0008 
 (0.9773) (0.1710) (0.5169) 
CSI(-2,-1)*NEG [b] -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (0.2608) (0.2752) (0.3883) 
CAR(0,+2) -0.0020 -0.0047 0.0062 
 (0.6309) (0.4279) (0.4179) 
B&W 0.0134*** 0.0198*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0035) 
LOSS -0.0028*** -0.0021 -0.0030 
 (0.0081) (0.1667) (0.1240) 
BM 0.0028*** 0.0048*** 0.0093*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.3707) (0.7206) (0.9744) 
LEVERAGE 0.0009 0.0023 0.0042*   
 (0.5236) (0.2146) (0.0885) 
ROA -0.0058** -0.0092** -0.0166*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0219) (0.0021) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0036*** -0.0061*** -0.0090*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CONSTANT -0.0087*** -0.0072** -0.0123**  
 (0.0008) (0.0462) (0.0110) 
    
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 13426 13424 13418 
Adjusted R2 0.0066 0.0127 0.0166 
    
Test [a+b]=0 1.27 2.17 1.78 
p-value 0.1402 0.0570 0.0847 
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Table 3.8 – Continued 
Variable  CAR(+3,+4) CAR(+3,+6) CAR(+3,+10) 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) 
    
CSI(-2,-1) [a] -0.0005* -0.0008** -0.0010**   
 (0.0561) (0.0208) (0.0326) 
SUENEG -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.2016) (0.3695) (0.8993) 
SUEPOS 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.2096) (0.4276) (0.8247) 
NEG 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0010 
 (0.3733) (0.4644) (0.4556) 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG [b] 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0003 
 (0.5532) (0.4522) (0.2031) 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS [c] 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.5709) (0.7135) (0.6951) 
CAR(0,+2) -0.0030 -0.0056 0.0063 
 (0.4680) (0.3487) (0.4063) 
B&W 0.0133*** 0.0197*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037) 
LOSS -0.0025** -0.0018 -0.0030 
 (0.0191) (0.2320) (0.1275) 
BM 0.0028*** 0.0048*** 0.0093*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.3958) (0.7387) (0.9339) 
LEVERAGE 0.0010 0.0024 0.0042*   
 (0.4625) (0.1905) (0.0898) 
ROA -0.0055* -0.0089** -0.0168*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0260) (0.0021) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0036*** -0.0061*** -0.0090*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CONSTANT -0.0092*** -0.0078** -0.0129*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0284) (0.0072) 
    
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 13426 13424 13418 
Adjusted R2 0.0067 0.0127 0.0165 
    
Test [a+b]=0 1.32 2.08 1.94 
p-value 0.1337 0.0626 0.0718 
    
Test [a+c]=0 1.29 2.44 1.88 
p-value 0.1373 0.0438 0.0766 
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Da et al. (2015) and Danbolt et al. (2015). In Panel A, the coefficient of the variable CSI(-2,-1) is 
negative and significant in column (3) (at the 10% level). In Panel B, the coefficient of the CSI(-
2,-1) variable is negative and statistically significant in all columns (at the 10% level in column 
(1) and at the 5% level in columns (2) and (3)). The estimated coefficients suggest that firm-
specific investor sentiment can be used successfully to predict future abnormal returns in the 
form of return reversals. The Wald test statistics on joint significance of the sentiment 
variables are also significant in columns (2) and (3) in both panels, confirming that future 
returns are negatively related to past investor sentiment. Overall, the results of this analysis 
are consistent with what it is expected if the investors’ reaction to earnings surprises is 
associated with short-term mispricing; when investor sentiment is high, abnormal returns 
during the announcement period are higher and abnormal returns during the post-
announcement period are lower. 
 
3.4.5. Robustness Tests 
Robustness tests are undertaken in order to examine whether the main findings 
regarding the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns remain 
unaltered when different measures, including alternative measures of market-wide investor 
sentiment and earnings surprises, are employed.  
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3.4.5.1. Daily Market-Wide Investor Sentiment 
In the main analysis, Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) monthly sentiment index is used as a 
proxy for market-wide investor sentiment. In this section the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on announcement period abnormal returns is analysed whilst controlling for the 
effect of daily market-wide investor sentiment by using PsychSignal’s daily mood indices for 
the NASDAQ100 and the S&P500. This also addresses the timeliness concerns of Da et al. 
(2015). PsychSignal’s market-wide mood indices are real-time aggregate sentiment indices 
which measure commentators’ sentiment on the NASDAQ100 and S&P500 stock market 
indices. PsychSignal’s mood indices are controlled over a two-day window, from two days 
before until one day before the earnings announcement date in the same manner as firm-
specific investor sentiment. 
The results presented in Appendix C, using daily proxies of market-wide investor 
sentiment, are similar to the results in the main body of the analysis, a finding which suggests 
that the outcomes are not influenced by the choice of market-wide investor sentiment 
proxies or timeliness. In all columns, the coefficient of CSI(-2,-1) is positive and significant at the 
1% level after controlling for the effects of other variables. With regard to the coefficients of 
market-wide investor sentiment variables, the coefficient of CSIndx(-2,-1), which represents 
NADSAQ100 sentiment, is positive and statistically significant in all columns but the 
coefficient of CSIspx(-2,-1), which represents S&P500 sentiment, is only significant in columns (3) 
and (6) (at the 10% level). In addition, the coefficient of the interaction variables CSI(-2,-
1)*CSIndx(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1)*CSIspx(-2,-1) is insignificant in all columns. From these results, it can be 
inferred that the effects of daily market-wide investor sentiment indices on abnormal stock 
returns are different; the sentiment element for the NASDAQ100 seems to be more important 
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than the sentiment element for the S&P500. The differences between firms comprising the 
NASDAQ100 and the S&P500 may well be the source of the different results for these two 
market proxies. The NASDAQ100 is comprised of the 100 largest non-financial stocks on 
NASDAQ and is heavily weighted towards growth stocks which are more difficult to value as 
established in Table 3.7. 
Overall, the results of the robustness tests suggest that the effect of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on announcement period abnormal returns is not conflated by the inclusion 
of daily proxies for market-wide investor sentiment and highlight once more the importance 
of firm-specific information in explaining the relationship between investor sentiment and 
abnormal returns. 
 
3.4.5.2. Seasonal Random Walk Model Earnings Surprises 
In the main body of the analysis earnings surprises are measured against I/B/E/S 
analysts’ forecasts while in this section a seasonal random walk model is employed. The 
seasonal random walk standardized unexpected earnings (RW SUE) variable is defined as the 
difference between actual earnings and actual earnings lagged four quarters, scaled by the 
stock price at the end of the quarter. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Appendix D. When the regression models 
presented in Table 3.5 are re-estimated using the RW SUE variable, the coefficient of the 
variable CSI(-2,-1) remains the same; it is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in 
all regression models. This analysis implies that the significant relationship between firm-
specific investor sentiment and abnormal stock returns in the presence of earnings surprises 
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continues to hold when earnings surprises are estimated with a seasonal random walk model, 
and that the method of estimating earnings surprises does not affect the robustness of this 
relationship.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence in support of the impact of investor sentiment on stock 
prices. In particular, it provides important insights into the relationship between firm-specific 
investor sentiment, extracted from the content of tweets posted on Twitter and StockTwits, 
and stock prices in the context of a significant corporate event, an earnings surprise. This 
research goes beyond the general consideration of market-wide investor sentiment to a 
consideration of firm-specific investor sentiment and its role in price formation. It 
simultaneously considers both firm-specific investor sentiment and market-wide investor 
sentiment and highlights their differing influences. This study makes contributions to the 
existing literature in several areas. It establishes a relationship between firm-specific investor 
sentiment and stock price movements around earnings announcements. The results of the 
empirical analysis illustrate that bullish (bearish) firm-specific investor sentiment leads to 
higher (lower) abnormal stock returns on the announcement of earnings surprises. The results 
show that the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns is not 
moderated by the effect of market-wide investor sentiment. In addition, the results suggest 
that the price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment around earnings announcements is 
greater for negative earnings surprises than positive earnings surprises. The findings also 
illustrate that the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price reactions to 
earnings surprises is stronger for hard to value firms; small firms and growth firms. Finally, 
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consistent with behavioural finance theory, the empirical analysis provides evidence of 
sentiment driven short-term mispricing and subsequent return reversals around earnings 
announcements. The findings of this study, which strongly confirm the role of investor 
sentiment in the stock pricing process around earnings announcements, have important 
economic implications in the world of high frequency algorithmic trading where investors are 
looking for new inputs into their investment analysis and trading models. 
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Appendices for Chapter 3 
Appendix A. Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
  
CAR(0,+2) Cumulative abnormal returns over the 3-day event window (0,+2), where day 0 is the earnings announcement date. 
Abnormal returns are estimated by subtracting the expected stock return from the actual stock return. The expected 
returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over the period between 300 and 46 days prior 
to the earnings announcement. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return.  
 
CSI(-2,-1) Cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment index over a two-day window from 2 days before the earnings 
announcement date until 1 day before the date of the announcement, where sentiment index (SI) is measured as the 
natural logarithm of (1+bullish intensity)/(1+bearish intensity). 
 
SUE Standardized unexpected earnings is measured as the difference between I/B/E/S actual earnings and the average of 
estimates at the release of earnings, divided by the standard deviation of forecasts.  
 
NEG An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms having negative unexpected earnings in the fiscal quarter and 0 otherwise. 
 
SUENEG Negative standardized unexpected earnings equal to the absolute value of SUE for firms having negative unexpected 
earnings in the fiscal quarter and 0 otherwise. 
 
SUEPOS Positive standardized unexpected earnings equal to the value of SUE for firms having positive unexpected earnings in 
the fiscal quarter and 0 otherwise. 
 
CSI(-2,-1)*NEG An interaction variable between the firm-specific investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)) and the earnings surprise 
indicator variable (NEG). Both variables are defined above. 
 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUENEG An interaction variable between the firm-specific investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)) and the negative standardized 
unexpected earnings variable (SUENEG). Both variables are defined above. 
 
CSI(-2,-1)*SUEPOS An interaction variable between the firm-specific investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)) and the positive standardized 
unexpected earnings variable (SUEPOS). Both variables are defined above. 
 
B&W Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index of investor sentiment (market-wide) for the month of the earnings announcement. 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index is available up to the end of September 2015 from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. Holt-
Winters non-seasonal smoothing method is used to forecast the index for October, November, and December 2015 
(based on the value of the index over the period from January 2011 to September 2015). 
 
CSI(-2,-1)*B&W An interaction variable between the firm-specific investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)) and market-wide Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2006) index of investor sentiment (B&W). Both variables are defined above. 
 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms reporting negative earnings in the fiscal quarter. 
 
BM The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity in the year prior to the earnings announcement. 
 
SIZE The natural logarithm of share price times shares outstanding in the year prior to the earnings announcement. 
 
LEVERAGE The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets in the year prior to the earnings 
announcement. 
 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets in the year prior to the earnings announcement. 
 
CAR(-202,-3) Cumulative abnormal returns relative to value-weighted market returns over the (-202,-3) day interval prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
 
CAV(-32,-3) Cumulative abnormal volume relative to value-weighted market volume over the (-32,-3) day interval prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
 
ASI Abnormal short interest is measured as the difference between short interest prior to the earnings announcement 
and the average of short interest over the past three months. Short interest is calculated as total short interest divided 
by shares outstanding.  
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Variable Definition 
  
Small/Large Firms Market cap classification based on Morningstar Style Box in the month prior to the earnings announcement.  
 
Growth/Value 
Firms 
 
Stock style classification based on Morningstar Style Box in the month prior to the earnings announcement.  
 
 
INSTOWNER The natural logarithm of the number of institutional shareholders holding a firm’s shares at the year-end prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
CSIndx(-2,-1) Cumulative market-wide mood index measuring sentiment on the NASDAQ100 stock market index over the two-day 
window from 2 days before the earnings announcement date until 1 day before the date of the announcement. 
 
CSIspx(-2,-1) Cumulative market-wide mood index measuring sentiment on the S&P500 stock market index over the two-day 
window from 2 days before the earnings announcement date until 1 day before the date of the announcement. 
 
CSI(-2,-1)*CSIndx(-2,-1) An interaction variable between the firm-specific investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)) and the market-wide 
NASDAQ100 sentiment variable (CSIndx(-2,-1)). Both variables are defined in this table. 
 
CSI(-2,-1)*CSIspx(-2,-1) An interaction variable between the firm-specific investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)) and the market-wide S&P500 
sentiment variable (CSIspx(-2,-1)). Both variables are defined in this table. 
 
RW SUE Seasonal random walk model standardized unexpected earnings is the difference between actual earnings and actual 
earnings lagged four quarters, scaled by stock price at the end of the quarter. 
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Appendix B. PsychSignal Textual Sentiment Measures 
I use a commercial organization, PsychSignal, as the source of firm-specific investor 
sentiment and daily market-wide sentiment index data, which is based on stock related 
messages that are extracted from Twitter and StockTwits. PsychSignal is a leading provider of 
real-time sentiment data covering more than 10,000 individual securities including all stocks 
in the NASDAQ100 and S&P500.26 
PsychSignal has created a highly specialized Natural Language Processing (NLP) 
engine, which analyses millions of tweets every day in order to quantify the public mood 
about the universe of stocks it covers. The NLP engine uses a sophisticated linguistic based 
approach to sentiment mining that is able to correctly extract, interpret, and score online 
conversations in the context of stock related comments. PsychSignal has developed its NLP 
engine based on the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) application (a recent evolution, 
LIWC2015 (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, and Francis (2015)). PsychSignal’s NLP engine uses LIWC 
textual analysis methods to determine the degree to which any text contains positive or 
negative emotions, self-references, causal words, and other language dimensions.27 The NLP 
engine processes the language used for stocks and securities’ names the same way a 
professional trader would do as it uses an enormous lexicon of n-grams evaluated, scored, 
and filtered by hundreds of trading professionals. It is programmed in such a way as to locate 
the subtle yet specific language nuances used by professionals on trading floors instead of 
                                                          
26 The definitions and descriptions in this Appendix are based on documents and information provided by 
PsychSignal. For further details see https://psychsignal.com/. 
27 For further details about the LIWC application refer to “The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and 
Computerized Text Analysis Methods” (Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010)) and “The Development and 
Psychometric Properties of LIWC2015” (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, and Blackburn (2015)).  
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trying to guess sentiment by using the language of the general public or even a financial 
dictionary. PsychSignal’s specialized NLP engine, along with its smart filtering and 
quantification algorithms, allows it to recognize, categorize, and specifically quantify the 
meaning behind each word communicated in the nuanced language used on Twitter and 
StockTwits. As a result, it is claimed that PsychSignal’s system can correctly score messages 
like “$MSFT is ripping right now”, “it’s a dead cat bounce on NFLX” or “loading the boat with 
SPY”. The NLP engine’s potential for the codification and extraction of the psychological 
meaning of words, along with PsychSignal’s access to the full firehose data feeds like Twitter 
and StockTwits, gives it a critical advantage over other companies in this field enabling it to 
give its subscribers the most granular financial sentiment faster and more accurately than 
other sources.  
Every day PsychSignal rolls up 24 hours of data and releases mood data at 
approximately 12:01 AM EST. Its technology works as follows: it ingests social media 
firehoses, categorizes conversations by security, analyses mood,28 aggregates mood scores 
for each security based upon the total volume and mood intensity, and outputs trading 
signals. In fact, PsychSignal provides trading signals before the opening of stock markets on a 
daily basis. The outputs clarify how the public sentiment surrounding stocks and securities is 
trending so that PsychSignal users are able to predict market moves in advance. This allows 
them to execute reliable algorithmic trading strategies which incorporate a real-time view 
into the public psychology about stocks and markets. 
                                                          
28 PsychSignal’s NLP engine detects the online community’s mood, bullishness and bearishness, and also scores 
the mood intensity.  
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I use both PsychSignal’s firm-specific mood data and PsychSignal’s market-wide mood 
data in this study. PsychSignal market-wide mood indices are real-time aggregate sentiment 
indices which measure commentators’ sentiment on the NASDAQ100 and S&P500 stock 
market indices. The stock mood data is numerical raw data containing symbol, timestamp 
(UTC), bullish-intensity, bearish-intensity, bull-minus-bear, bull-scored-messages, bear-
scored-messages, bull-bear-msg-ratio, and total-scanned-messages. The volume measures 
and sentiment analytics are defined as: 
Bull-scored-messages: total count of bullish sentiment messages scored by PsychSignal’s 
algorithm. 
Bear-scored-messages: total count of bearish sentiment messages scored by PsychSignal’s 
algorithm. 
Bullish-intensity: score for each message’s language for the strength of the bullishness that is 
contained in the messages on a 0-4 scale. A high score indicates a high bullish investor 
sentiment and vice versa. 
Bearish-intensity: score for each message’s language for the strength of the bearishness that 
is contained in the messages on a 0-4 scale. A high score indicates a high bearish investor 
sentiment and vice versa. 
Total-scanned-messages: number of messages coming through PsychSignal’s feeds and are 
related to a stock symbol regardless of whether the PsychSignal sentiment engine can score 
them for bullish or bearish intensity.  
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The total message count includes natural messages, which do not contain bullish or 
bearish emotion, and are therefore not active components of the sentiment measures. 
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Appendix C. Daily Market-Wide Investor Sentiment  
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) and cumulative market-wide investor sentiment (CSIndx(-2,-1) and CSIspx(-2,-1)). Other variables 
included in the analysis are standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), cumulative abnormal stock trading volume 
(CAV(-32,-3)), and abnormal short interest (ASI). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor 
sentiment and market-wide investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price, trading volume, and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
over the period 2011-2015. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CSI(-2,-1) 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.0085*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0084*** 
 (10.98) (11.02) (10.42) (10.87) (10.84) (10.38) 
SUE 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0064*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0064*** 
 (24.86) (24.86) (23.70) (23.22) (23.26) (23.70) 
CSIndx(-2,-1) 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0012* 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0012*   
 (2.59) (2.61) (1.75) (2.49) (2.46) (1.72) 
CSIspx(-2,-1) 0.0009 0.0009 0.0014* 0.0008 0.0009 0.0014*   
 (1.26) (1.23) (1.82) (1.07) (1.15) (1.87) 
CSI(-2,-1)*CSIndx(-2,-1)  0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 
  (0.74) (0.73) (0.59) (0.67) (0.76) 
CSI(-2,-1)*CSIspx(-2,-1)  0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 
  (0.60) (0.47) (0.70) (0.61) (0.42) 
LOSS   -0.0087*** -0.0090*** -0.0087*** -0.0087*** 
   (-2.94) (-3.14) (-3.07) (-2.93) 
BM   0.0085*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0083*** 
   (3.87) (3.73) (3.74) (3.78) 
SIZE   0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
   (0.63) (0.19) (0.18) (0.53) 
LEVERAGE   0.0144*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0142*** 
   (4.15) (4.42) (4.46) (4.12) 
ROA   -0.0112* -0.0121* -0.0106* -0.0114*   
   (-1.67) (-1.91) (-1.69) (-1.69) 
CAR(-202,-3)   -0.0069***   -0.0070*** 
   (-3.44)   (-3.45) 
CAV(-32,-3)    -0.0017**  -0.0001 
    (-2.07)  (-0.10) 
ASI     -0.1122 -0.1367*   
     (-1.62) (-1.84) 
CONSTANT -0.0086** -0.0087** -0.0205*** -0.0166*** -0.0169*** -0.0197*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.29) (-3.35) (-2.85) (-2.89) (-3.21) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 14423 14423 13427 14283 14294 13407 
Adjusted R2 0.0890 0.0890 0.0981 0.0926 0.0924 0.0986 
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Appendix D. Seasonal Random Walk Model Earnings Surprises 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) and earnings surprises measured by a seasonal random walk model (RW SUE). Other variables 
included in the analysis are Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index (B&W), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), cumulative abnormal stock trading 
volume (CAV(-32,-3)), and abnormal short interest (ASI). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific 
investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal and Baker and Wurgler sentiment data is from Jeffery Wurgler’s website. 
Earnings data is from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Stock price, trading volume, and index return data 
comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The sample includes 
stocks that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ over the period 2011-2015. All regressions control for year and sector fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CSI(-2,-1) 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0114*** 
 (12.15) (12.16) (12.08) (11.73) (11.70) (12.03) 
RW SUE 0.4314*** 0.4312*** 0.4027*** 0.3724*** 0.3775*** 0.4051*** 
 (8.38) (8.38) (7.65) (7.18) (7.26) (7.68) 
B&W 0.0160 0.0159 0.0103 0.0143 0.0142 0.0083 
 (1.52) (1.50) (0.97) (1.35) (1.33) (0.77) 
CSI(-2,-1)*B&W  0.0035 0.0015 0.0028 0.0032 0.0019 
  (0.38) (0.17) (0.30) (0.35) (0.20) 
LOSS   -0.0194*** -0.0188*** -0.0185*** -0.0194*** 
   (-5.58) (-5.43) (-5.35) (-5.57) 
BM   0.0091*** 0.0083*** 0.0084*** 0.0088*** 
   (3.42) (3.13) (3.15) (3.29) 
SIZE   0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0009*   
   (1.80) (1.70) (1.67) (1.67) 
LEVERAGE   0.0054 0.0048 0.0049 0.0051 
   (1.31) (1.20) (1.22) (1.25) 
ROA   -0.0117 -0.0110 -0.0091 -0.0117 
   (-1.41) (-1.34) (-1.13) (-1.40) 
CAR(-202,-3)   -0.0099***   -0.0100*** 
   (-3.97)   (-3.95) 
CAV(-32,-3)    -0.0018*  -0.0007 
    (-1.76)  (-0.64) 
ASI     -0.1699** -0.1796**  
     (-2.09) (-2.15) 
CONSTANT -0.0077 -0.0075 -0.0201*** -0.0176** -0.0180** -0.0183**  
 (-1.54) (-1.49) (-2.68) (-2.37) (-2.42) (-2.45) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 10014 10014 9926 9956 9948 9915 
Adjusted R2 0.0272 0.0271 0.0366 0.0340 0.0346 0.0374 
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4. Dividend Changes and Stock Price Reactions: The Impact of Investor Sentiment 
4.1. Introduction 
The announcement of dividend changes has a significant impact on stock prices. 
Dividend signalling theory states that firms’ managers are more informed about their firms’ 
performance relative to outside stakeholders, therefore a change in dividends may be 
considered by outsiders as a signal of a firm’s future prospects (Bhattacharya (1979), John 
and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985)). The importance of the information content 
of dividends and the use of dividends as a means to signal information to investors has long 
been investigated in the literature. The general consensus is that announcements of dividends 
provide the market with useful information about future prospects of firms and as a result 
stock prices move in the same direction as dividend changes; an increase (decrease) in 
dividends is associated with an increase (decrease) in stock prices (e.g., Pettit (1972), Aharony 
and Swary (1980), and Woolridge (1982)).  
Alternative, although not mutually exclusive, hypotheses to dividend signalling theory, 
are bird in the hand theory (Friend and Puckett (1964)), the free cash flow hypothesis (Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989)), and the wealth transfer hypothesis (Dhillon and Johnson (1994)). 
Bird in the hand theory suggests that investors prefer dividends to potential capital gains due 
to the certainty of dividend payments compared to the uncertainty of future capital gains. 
The free cash flow hypothesis predicts that payments of dividends prevent firms’ managers 
from empire building and wasting resources in poor investment opportunities, and therefore 
benefit firms’ stockholders. The wealth transfer hypothesis argues that the distribution of 
dividends is a transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders because it reduces a firm’s 
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cash flow, which could potentially service debt, therefore it benefits stockholders. According 
to the predictions of these hypotheses, stock prices should react positively (negatively) to the 
announcement of dividend increases (decreases). 
The objective of this chapter is to extend the findings of the dividend literature by 
considering the role of investor sentiment in the stock pricing process in response to the 
announcement of dividend changes. This study focuses on the importance of investor 
sentiment as a determinant of stock price movements around dividend change 
announcements. Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Chau et al. (2016) argue that stock price 
variation could be better explained by incorporating behavioural models that allow for 
investors’ emotional biases. Investor sentiment is helpful for explaining stock price 
movements, particularly for hard to value firms and difficult to arbitrage firms which are more 
prone to subjective valuation and mispricing (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). Investor sentiment could also be helpful for understanding stock 
price variation around the announcement of negative events such as a dividend cut. 
Kahneman and Tversky (2013) note that loss aversion leads to an asymmetric response to 
good news and bad news. Given that stock prices respond significantly to changes in dividends 
and investor sentiment is an important determinant of stock price variation, this chapter aims 
to fill the gap in the literature by examining the impact of investors’ behavioural biases on 
stock price responses to the announcement of dividend changes. This study evaluates the 
behavioural aspect of investors’ perception of risk associated with new dividend information 
and proposes that investor sentiment towards individual firms, firm-specific investor 
sentiment, has a significant impact on investors’ response to the announcement of dividend 
changes.  
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This research first empirically tests the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in stock 
price formation around changes in dividends. The dividend literature argues that an 
announcement of a decrease (increase) in dividend payout is an indication of negative 
(positive) future prospects of a firm. It documents that abnormal stock returns are associated 
with changes in dividend payout (e.g., Charest (1978), Eades (1982), and Denis et al. (1994)). 
The investor sentiment literature establishes that investor sentiment has a significant impact 
on stock price responses to firm-specific events (e.g., Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) 
and Danbolt et al. (2015)). Furthermore, prospect theory suggests that losses and gains are 
valued differently, investors are loss-averse, and their response to news is asymmetric, with 
bad news having a greater impact than good news (Kahneman and Tversky (2013)). Moreover, 
earlier investigation of the impact of investor sentiment on stock price responses to earnings 
surprises illustrates that investor sentiment has a greater impact on investors’ reaction to 
negative earnings news compared to positive earnings news. Building on these findings, this 
study first examines the hypothesis that the impact of investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to dividend changes should be more pronounced for negative dividend changes 
than positive dividend changes. This hypothesis investigates the question whether investor 
sentiment, bullish or bearish, has an impact on investors’ response to negative dividend 
changes, and whether this is greater than the impact for positive dividend changes.  
Second, this chapter examines the mechanisms by which investor sentiment affects 
stock prices by considering uncertainty in valuation and limits to arbitrage. The investor 
sentiment literature establishes that the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices is more 
pronounced for hard to value firms and difficult to arbitrage firms (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 
(2006), Joseph et al. (2011), and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). This study tests the 
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prediction of the investor sentiment literature in the context of a dividend change 
announcement, suggesting the hypothesis that the impact of investor sentiment on stock 
price responses to negative dividend changes should be more pronounced for firms that face 
greater uncertainty in valuation and limits to arbitrage. 
Finally, this chapter examines sentiment driven mispricing and subsequent return 
reversals in the period following the announcement of negative dividend changes. The 
investor sentiment literature suggests that investor sentiment leads to an irrational 
component of price formation causing temporary mispricing in the market, with the following 
period’s stock returns showing signs of mean reversion as prices return to fundamental values 
(e.g., Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2007), and Danbolt et al. (2015)). This 
chapter tests this argument by examining the hypothesis that the impact of investor 
sentiment on stock price responses to negative dividend changes should reverse over time. 
The relationship between investor sentiment and post-dividend change abnormal returns is 
investigated to find out whether the abnormal returns could be predicted by investor 
sentiment.  
Using a sample of ordinary cash dividends announced by companies listed on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX markets over the period from 2011 to 2016, I explore the effect of 
bullish and bearish firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price reactions to the 
announcement of dividend changes and find evidence of a significant impact of bullish 
investor sentiment on stock price formation on the announcement of negative dividend 
changes. The results illustrate that bullish investor sentiment moderates the negative price 
impact of a decline in dividends. It leads to higher abnormal returns on the announcement of 
a negative dividend change. The results also show that the impact of bullish investor 
 109 
 
sentiment on stock price responses to negative dividend changes is most marked for small 
firms, growth firms, and firms with a low level of institutional ownership. These firms face a 
greater level of uncertainty and limits to arbitrage in the market. Furthermore, the findings 
confirm temporary mispricing due to the impact of investor sentiment around dividend 
change announcements. The results illustrate that the impact of bullish investor sentiment 
on stock price responses to negative dividend changes reverses during the period following 
the announcement of dividend changes.  
This research makes contributions to the existing literature in several areas. It 
contributes to the understanding of stock price movements around the announcement of 
dividend changes beyond the effect of changes in dividends themselves. The results extend 
the work on the impact of dividend change announcements on stock prices by Pettit (1972), 
Aharony and Swary (1980), Woolridge (1982), and Denis et al. (1994), among others, 
highlighting the price impact of investor sentiment. Additionally, this work expands the 
research on the role of investor sentiment in stock price formation around firm-specific 
events by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) and Danbolt et al. (2015), by illustrating a 
significant impact of bullish investor sentiment on stock prices around a different firm-specific 
event, an announcement of dividend changes. Furthermore, this study expands the work on 
the heterogeneity in the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices by providing evidence 
of the differential price impact of bullish investor sentiment across firms. This is in line with 
the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006), Joseph et al. (2011), and Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012), among others. Finally, this study extends the work on temporary 
sentiment driven mispricing and errors in valuation in the stock market by Brown and Cliff 
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(2005), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), Da et al. (2015), and Danbolt et 
al. (2015). 
The reminder of this chapter is presented as follows: Section 4.2 identifies the sample 
and data. Section 4.3 represents the methodology. The empirical findings are presented in 
Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2. Sample and Data 
The sample consists of announcements of dividend changes by companies listed on 
the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX markets during the period from January 1, 2011 through 
December 31, 2016. The dividend announcement data is obtained from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. The data comprises ordinary quarterly cash 
dividends announced during the sample period. The start date of the sample is driven by the 
availability of the data for the sentiment variables used in the empirical analysis.29 The 
primary requirement of the sample is that the dividend announcement data from CRSP can 
be cross-referenced with a sample of firms covered by PsychSignal, a commercial provider of 
sentiment data to traders based on textual analysis of content posted on two microblogging 
forums; Twitter and StockTwits.30 The sample consists of 4,132 dividend change events 
including both positive and negative dividend changes over the period 2011-2016.   
                                                          
29 The start date of the sample, January 1, 2011, is driven by the availability of the sentiment data from 
PsychSignal. 
30 I use the daily data feed from PsychSignal which is based on social media feeds for the days prior to the 
dividend change announcements. See Appendix B in Chapter 3 for further information about PsychSignal data.  
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The data for other variables used in the empirical analysis is obtained from the 
following databases; stock price and index return data is from the CRSP database, accounting 
data is from Compustat, and institutional ownership records are from Thomson Reuters.  
 
4.2.1. Investor Sentiment Measures 
The sentiment data required to measure firm-specific investor sentiment is obtained 
from PsychSignal. PsychSignal analyses the content of messages posted on Twitter and 
StockTwits using a Natural Language Processing (NLP) engine and provides public mood data 
towards specific firms. PsychSignal’s bullish intensity and bearish intensity measures, which 
represent the strength of the bullishness and bearishness revealed in the tweets about the 
firms in the sample, are used in this study. These two measures are combined to generate a 
net measure of firm-specific investor sentiment. Following Antweiler and Frank (2004), the 
cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment index (CSI) is measured as:  
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) = ∑ 𝐿𝑛
(1+𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡)
(1+𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡)
−1
𝑡=−2                                                                               (4.1) 
 
CSIi,(-2,-1) represents investor sentiment towards firm i over a two-day window, from 
two days before until one day before the dividend change announcement date.  
To capture the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to 
dividend changes, two indicator variables, CSIHIGH and CSILOW, are defined based on the 
value of the CSI(-2,-1) variable. CSIHIGH represents high (bullish) investor sentiment firms. This 
variable takes the value of 1 if firms fall in the highest CSI(-2,-1) tercile and 0 otherwise. CSILOW 
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represents low (bearish) investor sentiment firms and takes the value of 1 if firms fall in the 
lowest CSI(-2,-1) tercile and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.2.2. Dividend Measure 
The dividend announcement data used in this study is ordinary quarterly cash 
dividends announced during the sample period. Dividend announcements with a distribution 
code that is different from their previous announcement are excluded from the sample. 
Additionally, as firms may make earnings and dividend announcements simultaneously or 
within a few days of one another, to eliminate the confounding effect from earnings 
announcements, dividend announcements that are made within three days of earnings 
announcements are excluded from the sample in accordance with Tsai and Wu (2015). 
Following Tsai and Wu (2015), a dividend expectation model is used to determine dividend 
changes. It is assumed that the unbiased estimate of dividends to be paid in the current 
quarter is equal to the amount of dividends paid in the previous quarter. Therefore, the 
percentage change in dividends for firm i at time t is defined as: 
𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
                                                                                                                                                                         (4.2) 
 
Where Di, t is the amount of dividends paid by firm i at time t and Di, t-1 is the estimated 
amount of dividends, the amount of dividends paid in the previous period.  
 113 
 
An indicator variable, NEG, is introduced to represent dividend changes. The variable 
NEG presents negative dividend changes and it takes the value of 1 for negative dividend 
changes and 0 for positive dividend changes. 
 
4.2.3. Stock Return Measure 
The market model Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around the announcement of 
dividend changes is the dependent variable in this study. This variable is measured over a 
three-day event window starting on the day of the announcement by subtracting the 
expected stock return, E(Ri,t), from the actual stock return, Ri,t, as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 ))
+2
𝑡=0                                                                                                      (4.3) 
 
The expected return (E(Ri,t)) is calculated as (αi + βiRm,t) using the market model 
parameters estimated over the period between 300 and 46 days prior to the dividend 
announcement. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return (Rm,t). It should 
be noted that βi is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of Ri,t to the market index. It is 
also important to highlight that the firm-specific investor sentiment variable is measured over 
a window prior to the abnormal stock return variable. CSI is measured over the window (-2,-
1) and CAR is measured over the window (0,+2). This design is applied to establish a causal 
relation from investor sentiment to abnormal stock returns and mitigate any reverse causality 
issues. 
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4.2.4. Other Variables 
To examine whether the impact of investor sentiment on stock price reactions to 
dividend changes varies across firms, three proxies for uncertainty in valuation and limits to 
arbitrage are used. Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), 
and Lam and Wei (2011), size, stock style, and the level of institutional ownership are used to 
identify hard to value and difficult to arbitrage firms. Size (SIZE), which is defined as the 
natural logarithm of share price times shares outstanding in the year prior to the dividend 
announcement, is used as a proxy for uncertainty because larger firms tend to have more 
informational transparency due to higher levels of public awareness, disclosure, and analysts’ 
coverage compared to smaller firms. Book-to-market ratio (BM) is used to account for the 
effect of stock style. BM reflects growth and value characteristics of firms. This variable, which 
is measured as the book value of equity dividend by the market value of equity in the year 
prior to the dividend announcement, is used as a proxy for uncertainty because growth firms 
(with lower BM) are generally considered more difficult to analyse than value firms. The level 
of institutional ownership (INSTOWNER) is used as a proxy for limits to arbitrage because this 
variable can indicate the level of shareholders’ sophistication and it can reflect the risk of 
arbitrage (Ali et al. (2003)). A high level of institutional ownership has implications for easier 
stock lending and more arbitrage opportunities relative to a low level of institutional 
ownership. The institutional ownership proxy is measured as the number of institutional 
shareholders holding a firm’s shares at the year-end prior to the dividend announcement. The 
proxies SIZE, BM, and INSTOWNER are used to break down the sample into six sub-samples 
of small and large firms, growth and value firms, and firms with low and high levels of 
institutional ownership. Firms are in the small, growth, and low level of institutional 
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ownership sub-samples if they fall in the lowest tercile of these proxies and they are in the 
large, value, and high level of institutional ownership sub-samples if they fall in the highest 
tercile of these proxies.   
Additionally, this study controls for a number of firm characteristic variables including 
loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets 
(ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)). These control variables may exert an impact 
on stock price responses to dividend changes. Therefore, applying these variables in the 
empirical analysis helps to test the independence of the results from their effects. 
 
4.2.5. Sample Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the overall sample and further partitions the 
sample by the sign of dividend changes, dividend announcement year, listing exchange, and 
sector. The sample consists of 4,132 dividend changes. There are more announcements that 
have dividend increases than those that have dividend decreases. Out of 4,132 events, 3,519 
events are positive dividend change announcements (85.16% of the sample) and 613 events 
are negative dividend change announcements (14.84% of the sample). This breakdown is 
unsurprising as firms generally wish to increase dividends to signal that their business outlook 
remains favourable whilst they are reluctant to cut dividends which signals difficult business 
conditions. The greatest number of events comes from 2016, 964 observations (23.33% of 
the sample). Breaking down the sample based on stock exchange illustrates that firms listed 
on NYSE account for 72.60% of the sample (3,000 observations), firms listed on NASDAQ 
account for 26.52% of the sample (1,096 observations), and firms listed on AMEX account for  
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Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics by Dividend Changes, Announcement Year, Stock Exchange, and Sector 
This table presents summary statistics by dividend changes, announcement year, market, and sector. Positive (negative) 
dividend changes consist of dividends that are higher (lower) than the amount of dividends paid in the previous period. 
Announcement year is dividend announcement calendar year. Stock exchange is the market that stocks are traded on and 
sector is classified based on Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the 
variables. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016.  
  No of Obs Percent     No of Obs Percent 
       
No of Obs 4,132 100.00%  Stock Exchange   
    NYSE 3,000 72.60% 
    NASDAQ 1,096 26.52% 
    AMEX 36 0.87% 
Positive & Negative Dividend Changes     
Positive 3,519 85.16%  Sector   
Negative 613 14.84%  Energy 767 18.56% 
    Materials 263 6.36% 
    Industrials 476 11.52% 
    Consumer discretionary 405 9.80% 
Announcement Year    Consumer Staples 222 5.37% 
2011 330 7.99%  Health Care 144 3.48% 
2012 585 14.16%  Financials 993 24.03% 
2013 728 17.62%  Information Technology 193 4.67% 
2014 692 16.75%  Communication Services 71 1.72% 
2015 833 20.16%  Utilities 236 5.71% 
2016 964 23.33%  Real Estate 362 8.76% 
              
 
the remaining 0.87% of the sample (36 observations). According to Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS), the greatest number of observations is from the financials 
sector, 993 observations (24.03% of the sample) and the lowest number of observations is 
from the communication services sector, 71 observations (1.72% of the sample). 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for the key variables. The variables SIZE and 
INSTOWNER are log transformed, LEVERAGE is winsorized at the high end (99%) of its 
distribution, and all remaining non-binary variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their 
respective distributions to mitigate the impact of outliers. Table 4.2 shows that the mean of 
three-day abnormal stock returns CAR(0,+2) is a positive 0.0049. It is not surprising to find a 
positive average for stock price responses to dividend changes as the sample is dominated by  
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics: Key Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the key variables in this study; cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), bullish 
firm-specific investor sentiment (CSIHIGH), bearish firm-specific investor sentiment (CSILOW), dividend changes (NEG), loss 
(LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), stock price momentum (CAR(-
202,-3)), and the number of institutional shareholders (INSTOWNER). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. 
Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Dividend, stock price, and index return data comes from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. Institutional ownership records 
come from Thomson Reuters. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 
2011-2016. 
Variable No of Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
CAR(0,+2) 4,132 0.0049 0.0033 0.0330 -0.1078 0.1216 
CSIHIGH 4,132 0.3287 0.0000 0.4698 0.0000 1.0000 
CSILOW 4,132 0.3521 0.0000 0.4777 0.0000 1.0000 
NEG 4,132 0.1484 0.0000 0.3555 0.0000 1.0000 
LOSS 4,125 0.0606 0.0000 0.2386 0.0000 1.0000 
BM 4,126 0.5529 0.4721 0.3830 -0.0251 1.8655 
SIZE 4,131 8.2172 8.2403 1.8357 2.1138 12.9916 
LEVERAGE 4,117 0.2861 0.2622 0.2110 0.0000 0.8678 
ROA 4,125 0.0610 0.0436 0.0741 -0.0893 0.4639 
CAR(-202,-3) 4,075 -0.0174 -0.0070 0.2677 -0.9221 0.6793 
INSTOWNER 3,784 5.3637 5.4139 1.0906 0.0000 7.7363 
              
 
positive dividend changes. The average of the investor sentiment variables CSIHIGH and 
CSILOW are 0.3287 and 0.3521 respectively, suggesting on average commentators were 
highly optimistic about 32.87% of the firms in the sample and they were highly pessimistic 
about 35.21% of the firms in the sample. The average of the dividend change variable NEG is 
0.1484 meaning 14.84% of the firms in the sample experienced negative dividend changes. 
Table 4.3 displays the correlations of the variables. There is a positive correlation 
between CAR(0,+2) and CSIHIGH and a negative correlation between CAR(0,+2) and CSILOW, 
suggesting positive (negative) abnormal stock returns are associated with bullish (bearish) 
investor sentiment. Additionally, CAR(0,+2) is negatively correlated with NEG, suggesting 
abnormal stock returns are lower for firms experiencing negative dividend changes. The 
negative correlation between NEG and CSIHIGH and the positive correlation between NEG 
and CSILOW suggest that negative dividend changes are associated with bearish investor  
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Table 4.3 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlations of the variables; cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), bullish firm-specific investor sentiment (CSIHIGH), bearish firm-specific investor sentiment (CSILOW), 
dividend changes (NEG), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), and the number of institutional 
shareholders (INSTOWNER). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Dividend, stock price, and index return data 
comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. Institutional ownership records come from Thomson Reuters. The sample includes 
stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
(1) CAR(0,+2) 1.0000           
(2) CSIHIGH 0.0414 1.0000          
(3) CSILOW -0.0297 -0.5158 1.0000         
(4) NEG -0.0859 -0.0152 0.0216 1.0000        
(5) LOSS 0.0260 -0.0004 0.0063 0.1169 1.0000       
(6) BM 0.0296 -0.0133 0.0323 0.1521 0.1669 1.0000      
(7) SIZE -0.0322 0.0086 -0.0617 -0.1012 -0.1310 -0.3382 1.0000     
(8) LEVERAGE -0.0086 -0.0034 0.0126 0.0733 0.1404 -0.0874 0.0639 1.0000    
(9) ROA 0.0119 -0.0145 0.0010 0.0254 -0.3218 -0.4762 0.0687 -0.2193 1.0000   
(10) CAR(-202,-3) -0.0729 0.0413 -0.0298 -0.0445 0.0247 0.0772 -0.0336 -0.0629 -0.0755 1.0000  
(11) INSTOWNER -0.0206 0.0146 -0.0677 -0.1177 -0.0815 -0.2987 0.8529 0.0557 0.0327 -0.0168 1.0000 
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sentiment. Despite the correlations between the variables, there is no issue of collinearity in 
this study. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests are conducted and the results show that there 
is no multicollinearity problem as the VIF values are lower than 10. 
 
4.3. Methodology 
This section explains the methodology and models applied to examine the impact of 
firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to the announcement of dividend 
changes. In order to answer the research questions an event study methodology is followed 
which helps to identify stock price movements due to investor sentiment around dividend 
announcement dates.  
 
4.3.1. The Price Impact of Investor Sentiment 
To evaluate stock price movements around the announcement of dividend changes, I 
first study the asymmetric response of stock prices to dividend announcements with respect 
to the sign of dividend changes and investor sentiment. In order to do this, the sample is 
categorized into four groups and stock price movements over a window of 10 trading days 
either side of the dividend announcement date are examined. The four groups of firms are: 
(1) positive dividend changes with high investor sentiment, (2) positive dividend changes with 
low investor sentiment, (3) negative dividend changes with high investor sentiment, and (4) 
negative dividend changes with low investor sentiment. Cumulative abnormal returns for 
these sub-samples are presented from day -10 through day +10, where day 0 is the day of the 
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dividend announcement. The comparison of the CAR plots shows whether the stock price 
reaction to dividend changes is conditional on the sign of dividend changes and investor 
sentiment.  
The following OLS regression models are used to examine the systematic differences 
in the impact of investor sentiment on stock price reactions to negative and positive dividend 
changes: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀 +
𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖 (4.4) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀 +
𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖 (4.5) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, NEG: Negative Dividend Change Indicator Variable, CSIHIGH: 
High Investor Sentiment Indicator Variable, CSILOW: Low Investor Sentiment Indicator Variable, LOSS: Firm Loss, 
BM: Book-to-Market Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, ROA: Return on Assets, CARi,(-202,-3): Long 
Run Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
 
These models examine whether investor sentiment has a significant impact on stock 
price movements on the announcement of dividend changes. The dependent variable in both 
models is CAR(0,+2), which measures the sensitivity of stock prices to firm-specific investor 
sentiment (CSIHIGH and CSILOW) and dividend changes (NEG). This variable, CAR(0,+2), is 
measured in a short event window at the time of dividend announcements, therefore the 
results of the regression analysis indicate stock price responses that occur with the arrival of 
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new dividend information and the impact of investor sentiment in the run up to the release 
of this new information. 
 Models 4.4 and 4.5 include indicator variables representing dividend changes (NEG) 
and firm-specific investor sentiment (CSIHIGH and CSILOW). Including these variables in the 
models helps to examine the individual effect of bullish and bearish investor sentiment and 
negative dividend changes on the stock pricing process. Additionally, the regression models 
include interaction variables between the dividend change variable and the investor 
sentiment variables (NEG*CSIHIGH and NEG*CSILOW). The coefficients of these variables 
show whether bullish and bearish investor sentiment adjusts the impact of negative dividend 
changes on stock prices; whether bullish (bearish) investor sentiment moderates (reinforces) 
the impact of negative dividend changes on stock prices.  
Models 4.4 and 4.5 also include firm characteristic variables as control variables in 
order to disentangle the impact of bullish and bearish firm-specific investor sentiment from 
other effects. Furthermore, the regression models include year and sector fixed effects to 
control for the broad characteristics that may affect the relationship between the main 
variables in this study. Moreover, standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm 
clustering are used.  
 
4.3.2. Hard to Value and Difficult to Arbitrage Firms 
In order to investigate whether the price impact of investor sentiment around 
dividend changes is different across firms, three proxies of size, stock style, and the level of 
institutional ownership are used to split the sample into sub-samples of hard to value firms 
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and difficult to arbitrage firms. The regression models are then run for each sub-sample of 
small and large firms, growth and value firms, and firms with low and high levels of 
institutional ownership. The main variables of interest are the interaction variables between 
the dividend change and investor sentiment variables. It is expected to find statistically 
significant coefficients for the interaction variables in the sub-samples of hard to value and 
difficult to arbitrage firms and less significant or insignificant coefficients in the other sub-
samples. This is due to a higher degree of uncertainty and limits to arbitrage associated with 
the first groups of firms. Additionally, the coefficients of the dividend change variable and the 
investor sentiment variables may be stronger for the first groups of firms too.  
 
4.3.3. Return Reversals 
In order to examine whether the impact of investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to dividend changes is due to temporary mispricing which reverses during the post-
dividend announcement period, the relationship between investor sentiment and post-
dividend change abnormal returns is investigated by undertaking regression analysis. Post-
announcement period abnormal stock returns are measured over the windows (+3,+5), 
(+3,+15), and (+3,+25), where day 0 is the day of the dividend announcement. The regression 
model including CAR(+3,+5) as the dependent variable and NEG and CSIHIGH as the  
independent variables takes the following form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(+3,+5) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) +
𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                      (4.6) 
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where; CARi,(+3,+5): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, NEG: Negative Dividend Change Indicator Variable, CSIHIGH: 
High Investor Sentiment Indicator Variable, CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns,  LOSS: Firm Loss, BM: Book-
to-Market Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, ROA: Return on Assets, CARi,(-202,-3): Long Run 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
 
Model 4.6 is re-estimated using the variables CAR(+3,+15) and CAR(+3,+25) as the 
dependent variables. In addition to the control variables defined earlier, the regression 
models include the CAR(0,+2) variable. This variable is incorporated into the regression models 
to control for the impact of abnormal stock returns at the arrival of new dividend information 
on post-announcement abnormal returns. The predictive ability of the firm-specific investor 
sentiment variables is examined by using one-tailed statistics31 as behavioural finance theory 
proposes an opposite relationship between investor sentiment and future abnormal returns. 
It is predicted that if investor sentiment causes temporary mispricing on the announcement 
of dividend changes, then the following periods’ abnormal returns should show signs of mean 
reversion. Stock prices should return to fundamental values and a change in the direction of 
stock prices should occur. 
 
4.4. Empirical Findings 
This section examines the results from the multivariate analysis undertaken in order 
to identify the impact of investor sentiment on stock price responses to the announcement 
of dividend changes.  
                                                          
31 See Inoue and Kilian (2005) and Huang et al. (2015) for further details about the use of one-tailed statistics.  
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4.4.1. The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Dividend Changes 
The first research question addresses the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in 
stock price formation around dividend changes; whether investor sentiment, bullish or 
bearish, has an impact on investors’ response to dividend changes. To answer this question, I 
first evaluate the asymmetric impact of investor sentiment on stock price reactions to positive 
and negative dividend changes in Figure 4.1. This figure gives a graphical overview of the run 
up to the dividend change announcements and the reactions to the announcements for a 
window of 10 days either side of the announcements. The figure graphically presents the CAR 
for four firm sub-samples of (1) the portfolio of firms with positive dividend changes and high 
investor sentiment (1,167 observations), (2) the portfolio of firms with positive dividend 
changes and low investor sentiment (1,224 observations), (3) the portfolio of firms with 
negative dividend changes and high investor sentiment (191 observations), and (4) the 
portfolio of firms with negative dividend changes and low investor sentiment (231 
observations).  
The comparison of the CAR plots indicates that the stock price reaction to negative 
dividend changes is conditional on investor sentiment while there is no similar conditional 
reaction for positive dividend changes. Firms with negative dividend changes and low investor 
sentiment experience a decline in CAR from a few days before the announcement until one 
day after the announcement. The CAR for this group of firms stays negative over the window 
(-10,+10). By comparison, firms with negative dividend changes and high investor sentiment 
experience an increase in CAR from a few days before the announcement until one day after  
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Figure 4.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Dividend Changes and Investor Sentiment 
 
 
 
the announcement. The CAR for this group of firms stays positive over the window (-10,+10). 
The plots clearly suggest that the price impact of investor sentiment on the announcement of 
dividend changes is more marked for negative dividend changes. They show that abnormal 
stock returns for negative dividend changes vary with investor sentiment.  
Regression analysis is undertaken to examine further the conditional price impact of 
firm-specific investor sentiment on the announcement of dividend changes. The results from 
Models 4.4 and 4.5 are provided in Table 4.4. The regression model in column (1) includes the 
indicator variable NEG for dividend changes and the indicator variable CSIHIGH for bullish  
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Table 4.4 
The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Dividend Changes 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of bullish and bearish firm-specific investor 
sentiment (CSIHIGH and CSILOW) on announcement period abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)). The dependent variable in all 
regressions is CAR(0,+2). Other variables included in the analysis are dividend changes (NEG), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)). See Appendix A for 
detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Dividend, stock price, 
and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from 
Compustat. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All 
regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Variable (1) (2) 
   
NEG*CSIHIGH [a] 0.0061*                 
 (1.80)                 
NEG*CSILOW [a]  -0.0048 
  (-1.20) 
CSIHIGH [b] 0.0021**                 
 (2.03)                 
CSILOW [b]  -0.0016 
  (-1.48) 
NEG -0.0119*** -0.0082*** 
 (-5.39) (-3.85) 
LOSS 0.0053 0.0051 
 (1.48) (1.44) 
BM 0.0066** 0.0064**  
 (2.58) (2.52) 
SIZE -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (-1.29) (-1.37) 
LEVERAGE -0.0004 -0.0006 
 (-0.12) (-0.20) 
ROA 0.0244* 0.0237*   
 (1.72) (1.68) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0102*** -0.0103*** 
 (-3.92) (-3.91) 
CONSTANT 0.0029 0.0047 
 (0.67) (1.08) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 4057 4057 
Adjusted R2 0.0198 0.0187 
   
Test [a+b]=0 5.10 2.53 
p-value 0.0031 0.0399 
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firm-specific investor sentiment. The coefficient of the interaction variable NEG*CSIHIGH is 
positive and significant at the 10% level and the coefficient of CSIHIGH alone is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. The estimated coefficients of NEG*CSIHIGH and CSIHIGH suggest 
that bullish investor sentiment has a positive effect on stock prices on the announcement of 
both negative and positive dividend changes, and more importantly, it moderates the 
negative price impact of negative dividend changes. The results show that the impact of 
bullish investor sentiment is more pronounced for negative dividend changes and that bullish 
investor sentiment leads to higher abnormal stock returns when negative dividend changes 
are announced. The result of the Wald test, presented at the bottom of Table 4.4, also 
confirms the significant impact of bullish investor sentiment on stock prices. The one-tailed 
p-value of the Wald test for the combined effect of bullish investor sentiment for negative 
and positive dividend changes is highly significant. It confirms that the coefficients of the 
variables are jointly different from zero at the 1% level.  
 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Aharony and Swary (1980) and Woolridge (1982)) 
abnormal stock returns are negatively related to negative dividend changes. The coefficient 
of the NEG variable is negative and significant at the 1% level when measured separately. 
Regarding the impact of the control variables, BM, ROA, and CAR(-202,-3) have a significant 
effect on announcement-period abnormal returns. The coefficients of the variables BM and 
ROA are positive and statistically significant (at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively) while the 
coefficient of the variable CAR(-202,-3) is negative and significant at the 1% level.  
The regression model in column (2) includes the indicator variable for negative 
dividend changes NEG and the indicator variable for bearish firm-specific investor sentiment 
CSILOW. The coefficients of the interaction variable NEG*CSILOW and the CSILOW variable 
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alone are not significant, although the coefficients of these two variables are jointly significant 
at the 5% level (the p-value of the Wald test is 0.0399). The insignificant coefficients of the 
variables NEG*CSILOW and CSILOW in the regression model suggest that bearish investor 
sentiment does not have a significant impact on abnormal stock returns at the announcement 
of dividend changes and it does not reinforce the negative price impact of negative dividend 
changes. Consistent with the findings in the literature, stock prices react negatively to 
dividend decreases as the coefficient of the variable NEG is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Regarding the impact of the other variables, results are similar to the results in column 
(1); BM, ROA, and CAR(-202,-3) have a significant impact on abnormal stock returns on the 
announcement of dividend changes. The coefficients of the variables BM, ROA, and CAR(-202,-
3) are statistically significant at the 5%, 10%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
The results of the regression models in columns (1) and (2) clearly indicate that bullish 
investor sentiment is a powerful predictor of stock returns on the announcement of a change 
in dividend. The results suggest that bullish investor sentiment has a significant positive 
impact on stock price responses to dividend changes, however, bearish investor sentiment 
does not have a significant price impact when dividend changes are announced. More 
importantly, the empirical analysis establishes that bullish investor sentiment moderates the 
negative price impact of a decline in dividends. When investor sentiment is bullish, prevailing 
optimism causes underreaction to negative dividend changes and results in overpriced stocks. 
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4.4.2. Investor Sentiment and Hard to Value and Difficult to Arbitrage Firms 
The second research question asks whether the impact of investor sentiment on stock 
price responses to dividend changes is more pronounced for hard to value firms and difficult 
to arbitrage firms. As the results of the previous section illustrate that bearish investor 
sentiment does not play a significant role in the stock pricing process on the announcement 
of dividend changes, in this section I focus on the stock price impact of bullish investor 
sentiment. Model 4.4 is used to address the heterogeneity in the effect of bullish investor 
sentiment on announcement period abnormal returns for sub-samples of firms classified 
according to the selected proxies for uncertainty in valuation and limits to arbitrage. The 
regression model is run for sub-samples of small and large firms, growth and value firms, and 
firms with low and high levels of institutional ownership. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 4.5. The price impact patterns are similar to those suggested by the 
investor sentiment literature (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012)); the impact of bullish investor sentiment on stock prices is most 
marked for hard to value firms and difficult to arbitrage firms.  
For hard to value and difficult to arbitrage firms, small firms, growth firms, and firms 
with a small number of institutional shareholders (columns (1), (3), and (5)), the coefficient of 
the interaction variable NEG*CSIHIGH is positive and highly significant (at the 1% level), 
meaning bullish investor sentiment moderates the negative price impact of dividend 
decreases and leads to higher abnormal stock returns when negative dividend changes are 
announced for these groups of firms. For the sub-samples of large firms, value firms, and firms 
with a large number of institutional shareholders (columns (2), (4), and (6)), the coefficient of 
the interaction variable NEG*CSIHIGH is statistically insignificant, suggesting bullish investor  
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Table 4.5 
Heterogeneity in the Impact of Investor Sentiment 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on bullish firm-specific investor 
sentiment (CSIHIGH) for difficult/easy to value firms and high/low limits to arbitrage firms. Size, stock style (BM), and 
institutional ownership are the proxies for hard to value and difficult to arbitrage firms. Firms are in the small (large), growth 
(value), and low (high) level of institutional ownership sub-samples if they fall in the lowest (highest) tercile of the proxies. 
Small and growth firms are considered as hard to value firms and firms with a low level of institutional ownership are 
considered as difficult to arbitrage firms. Other variables included in the analysis are dividend changes (NEG), loss (LOSS), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-
3)). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. 
Dividend, stock price, and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data 
is taken from Compustat. Institutional ownership records come from Thomson Reuters. The sample includes stocks that are 
traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects 
whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock 
clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Size Stock Style Institutional Ownership 
  Small Large Growth Value Low High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
NEG*CSIHIGH [a] 0.0155*** -0.0038 0.0195*** 0.0030 0.0183*** -0.0063 
 (2.61) (-0.77) (3.38) (0.53) (2.96) (-1.06) 
CSIHIGH [b] 0.0014 0.0015 0.0003 0.0022 0.0020 0.0027*   
 (0.61) (1.02) (0.15) (1.09) (0.82) (1.88) 
NEG -0.0219*** -0.0010 -0.0226*** -0.0097*** -0.0220*** 0.0006 
 (-6.24) (-0.30) (-6.14) (-2.94) (-6.02) (0.13) 
LOSS 0.0030 0.0031 0.0015 0.0065 0.0057 -0.0036 
 (0.60) (0.53) (0.18) (1.32) (0.90) (-0.49) 
BM 0.0066 0.0008 0.0043 0.0034 0.0085* 0.0013 
 (1.45) (0.20) (0.40) (0.74) (1.76) (0.30) 
SIZE -0.0023* -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0009 
 (-1.72) (-1.09) (-0.70) (-0.39) (-1.55) (-1.25) 
LEVERAGE 0.0054 -0.0110** -0.0108* 0.0048 0.0077 -0.0036 
 (1.09) (-2.12) (-1.77) (1.03) (1.39) (-0.73) 
ROA 0.0322 -0.0453** 0.0080 0.0396 0.0440** -0.0481**  
 (1.47) (-2.19) (0.46) (1.05) (2.15) (-2.17) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0134*** -0.0090** -0.0047 -0.0163*** -0.0112*** -0.0086*   
 (-3.15) (-2.24) (-1.10) (-3.55) (-2.61) (-1.90) 
CONSTANT 0.0209* 0.0195* 0.0065 0.0061 0.0055 0.0191*   
 (1.78) (1.78) (0.76) (0.79) (0.55) (1.87) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 1339 1368 1343 1356 1220 1252 
Adjusted R2 0.0367 0.0096 0.0511 0.0328 0.0382 0.0054 
       
Test [a+b]=0 5.04 0.68 6.14 1.06 6.14 2.04 
p-value 0.0034 0.2547 0.0012 0.1745 0.0012 0.0657 
       
Test High[a+b]=Low[a+b] 7.12 3.72 8.56 
p-value 0.0038 0.0270 0.0017 
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sentiment has no moderating impact on abnormal stock returns on the announcement of 
negative dividend changes for firms with a low level of uncertainty in valuation and which are 
not difficult to arbitrage. The coefficient of the CSIHIGH variable alone is only significant in 
column (6) (at the 10% level), illustrating for firms with a high level of institutional ownership, 
bullish investor sentiment has a significant positive impact on abnormal stock returns on the 
announcement of both negative and positive dividend changes. The results of the Wald tests 
also confirm the findings based on the coefficients of the variables in the regression models. 
The coefficients of the variables NEG*CSIHIGH and CSIHIGH are jointly significant, different 
from zero, in columns (1), (3), and (5) (at the 1% level) and column (6) (at the 10% level). 
Additionally, the differences in the effect of bullish investor sentiment across related sub-
samples are consistent with the results of the Wald tests. The results for the differences 
between the NEG*CSIHIGH and CSIHIGH coefficients across the sub-samples are significant at 
the 1% level for the size and institutional ownership sub-groups and significant at the 5% level 
for the stock style sub-groups. Regarding the impact of dividend decreases, the coefficient of 
the variable NEG is statistically significant in columns (1), (3), (4), and (5) (in all columns at the 
1% level), indicating the stock price of small firms, growth firms, value forms, and firms with 
a small number of institutional shareholders reacts negatively to the announcement of a 
decline in dividends.  
The results presented in Table 4.5 clearly confirm the mechanisms by which investor 
sentiment affects stock prices. The results show that the price impact of bullish investor 
sentiment is strongly dependent on the level of uncertainty in valuation and difficulty to 
arbitrage of firms. Hard to value firms and difficult to arbitrage firms are highly sensitive to 
the impact of bullish investor sentiment, therefore they are more prone to mispricing.    
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4.4.3. Investor Sentiment and Return Reversals 
In the first section of this empirical analysis, it is documented that bullish investor 
sentiment moderates the negative price impact of a decline in dividends. In this section, I 
investigate whether the relationship between bullish investor sentiment and announcement-
period abnormal returns is the result of a short-term market underreaction to negative 
dividend changes. If bullish investor sentiment causes temporary mispricing and errors in 
valuation on the announcement of negative dividend changes, then it is expected that stock 
prices return to fundamental values in the period following the announcement. In other 
words, it is expected that stock returns show signs of mean reversion. To investigate this 
expectation, regression analysis is undertaken to relate bullish investor sentiment to post-
announcement abnormal returns. The regression models presented in Table 4.6 are 
estimated by using CAR over the windows (+3,+5), (+3,+15), and (+3, +25) as the dependent 
variables. The coefficient of the interaction variable NEG*CSIHIGH is negative and significant 
in column (1) (at the 5% level) and column (3) (at the 10% level) which relates bullish investor 
sentiment to post-dividend change abnormal returns over the windows (+3,+5) and (+3,+25). 
The estimated coefficients confirm that post-dividend change abnormal returns could be 
predicted well by bullish investor sentiment. These results show that the initial positive 
impact of bullish investor sentiment on stock price responses to negative dividend changes 
reverses over the post-announcement period. Importantly, the magnitude of the correction 
is comparable with the initial impact presented in Table 4.4. The Wald test is used to examine 
the significance of the coefficients of NEG*CSIHIGH and CSIHIGH jointly. The results presented  
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Table 4.6 
Post-Dividend Change Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of post-announcement abnormal returns (CAR(+3,+5), CAR(+3,+15), and 
CAR(+3,+25)) on bullish firm-specific investor sentiment (CSIHIGH). Other variables included in the analysis are dividend changes 
(NEG), announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), loss (LOSS), book-to-market ratio (BM), size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), and stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)). See Appendix A for detailed definitions 
of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Dividend, stock price, and index return data 
comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The sample includes 
stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and 
sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The p-values are reported in parentheses. For the variables 
NEG*CSIHIGH and CSIHIGH, one-tailed p-values are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable CAR(+3,+5) CAR(+3,+15) CAR(+3,+25) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
NEG*CSIHIGH [a] -0.0049** -0.0037 -0.0125* 
 (0.0428) (0.2670) (0.0551) 
CSIHIGH [b] 0.0005 0.0022 0.0034 
 (0.6931) (0.8952) (0.9267) 
NEG 0.0003 -0.0037 0.0018 
 (0.8626) (0.3184) (0.6921) 
CAR(0,+2) -0.0058 -0.0479 -0.0068 
 (0.7767) (0.1549) (0.8726) 
LOSS -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0002 
 (0.5131) (0.6046) (0.9771) 
BM 0.0069*** 0.0157*** 0.0154*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
SIZE -0.0005** -0.0005 -0.0009 
 (0.0486) (0.2663) (0.1324) 
LEVERAGE -0.0007 -0.0135*** -0.0176*** 
 (0.7808) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
ROA -0.0008 -0.0217 -0.0416**  
 (0.9246) (0.1976) (0.0397) 
CAR(-202,-3) -0.0063*** -0.0175*** -0.0336*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CONSTANT 0.0007 -0.0107 -0.0055 
 (0.8461) (0.1076) (0.5162) 
    
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 4057 4054 4053 
Adjusted R2 0.0087 0.0234 0.0351 
    
Test [a+b]=0 1.48 0.83 1.84 
p-value 0.1140 0.2178 0.0799 
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at the bottom of Table 4.6 illustrate that the combined effect of these variables is marginally 
significant at the 10% level in column (1) and it is significant at the 10% level in column (3).  
In summary, the results of the regression analysis in this section confirm temporary 
sentiment driven mispricing and subsequent return reversals around the announcement of 
negative dividend changes. Bullish investor sentiment leads to underreactions to a negative 
dividend change, it moderates the negative stock price impact of a decline in dividends, and 
it leads to higher abnormal stock returns on the announcement. However, stock prices show 
signs of mean reversion during the period after the announcement, therefore subsequent 
abnormal stock returns are lower.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provides new evidence on the relationship between firm-specific investor 
sentiment and abnormal stock returns around the announcement of dividend changes. More 
specifically, it offers empirical support for the role of bullish investor sentiment in stock price 
adjustment when a dividend cut is announced. This research contributes to the literature on 
investor sentiment and dividend changes by measuring the effect of investor sentiment on 
the negative reaction of stock prices to a decrease in dividends. The results of the empirical 
analysis establish that bullish investor sentiment is a key determinant of stock price variation 
around negative dividend changes. When investors are optimistic, they underreact to 
negative dividend changes. Bullish investor sentiment moderates the negative price impact 
of dividend decreases and leads to higher abnormal returns when a negative dividend change 
is announced. The results also suggest that the moderating impact of bullish investor 
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sentiment is more pronounced for firms that face greater uncertainty in valuation and limits 
to arbitrage; small firms, growth firms, and firms with a low level of institutional ownership. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that stock mispricing due to bullish investor sentiment is 
short-term, a temporary error in valuation that reverses in the period after the 
announcement. These results add to the literature on dividend announcements and investor 
sentiment as they provide evidence of a relationship between investor sentiment and stock 
prices in the context of dividend changes. Additionally, the findings of this chapter suggest 
that stock returns could be forecasted well using investor sentiment, therefore incorporating 
investor sentiment measures into investment analysis and trading models could be highly 
beneficial. 
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Appendices for Chapter 4 
Appendix A. Variables Definition 
Variable  Definition 
 
CAR(0,+2) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns over the 3-day event window (0,+2), where 0 is the dividend announcement 
date. Abnormal returns are estimated by subtracting the expected stock return from the actual stock return. 
The expected returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over the period between 
300 and 46 days prior to the dividend announcement. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the market 
return. 
 
CSIHIGH An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms having the largest CSI(-2,-1) tercile and 0 otherwise. CSI(-2,-1) is calculated 
as the sum of sentiment index (SI) over a two-day window from 2 days before the dividend announcement 
date until 1 day before the date of the announcement. SI is measured as the natural logarithm of (1+bullish 
intensity)/(1+bearish intensity). 
 
CSILOW An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms having the lowest CSI(-2,-1) tercile and 0 otherwise. CSI(-2,-1) is calculated 
as the sum of sentiment index (SI) over a two-day window from 2 days before the dividend announcement 
date until 1 day before the date of the announcement. SI is measured as the natural logarithm of (1+bullish 
intensity)/(1+bearish intensity). 
 
NEG An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms having negative dividend changes and 0 for firms having positive 
dividend changes. 
 
NEG*CSIHIGH An interaction variable between the dividend change indicator variable (NEG) and the high firm-specific 
investor sentiment variable (CSIHIGH). Both variables are defined above. 
 
NEG*CSILOW An interaction variable between the dividend change indicator variable (NEG) and the low firm-specific 
investor sentiment variable (CSILOW). Both variables are defined above. 
 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms reporting negative net income in the year prior to the dividend 
announcement. 
 
BM The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity in the year prior to the dividend 
announcement. 
 
SIZE The natural logarithm of share price times shares outstanding in the year prior to the dividend announcement. 
 
LEVERAGE The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets in the year prior to the 
dividend announcement. 
 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets in the year prior to the dividend announcement. 
 
CAR(-202,-3) Cumulative abnormal returns relative to value-weighted market returns over the (-202,-3) day interval prior 
to the dividend announcement. 
 
INSTOWNER The natural logarithm of the number of institutional shareholders holding a firm’s shares at the year-end prior 
to the dividend announcement. 
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5. Credit Rating Changes and Stock Price Reactions: The Impact of Investor Sentiment  
5.1. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies provide information on the creditworthiness of corporate 
entities and their financial obligations. They analyse information related to issuers of credit 
and their business and based on this analysis provide credit ratings. The ratings which are 
letter grades measure the creditworthiness of a firm and are considered as the opinion of 
credit rating agencies regarding the likelihood that the firm will be able to meet its financial 
obligations when they become due. The credit ratings contain information that can be used 
for credit approval, monitoring, risk provision, and pricing purposes. The importance of credit 
ratings and their effects on stock prices have been long investigated with existing research on 
the impact of rating changes on stock prices showing significant negative stock price 
responses to rating downgrades and insignificant stock price reactions to rating upgrades 
(e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Hand et al. (1992)). The purpose of this chapter is 
to expand on the findings of the credit rating literature by incorporating the impact of investor 
sentiment towards specific firms on stock price reactions to credit rating changes. This 
research aims to determine the price impact of investor sentiment beyond the impact of 
credit information provided in new ratings. As the credit rating literature suggests 
insignificant stock price effects from rating upgrades, this study mainly focuses on the role of 
investor sentiment in the stock pricing process around rating downgrades.  
Rating downgrades convey valuable information about a firm’s credit quality to the 
stock market. For the firm whose debt is downgraded, this is critical since it affects the cost 
of future borrowing. It may also have an impact on the eligibility of the firm’s debt to be held 
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as investment-grade debt. For the debt holders or prospective debt holders, new ratings 
contain information that can be used for the firm’s credit quality evaluation, risk assessment, 
and pricing purposes. Therefore, the announcement of a rating downgrade is an important 
event in the market. While much evidence for the stock price impact of rating downgrades 
has been provided (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), and Jorion and 
Zhang (2010)), no study, to my knowledge, has examined specifically the impact of investor 
sentiment on stock price reactions to rating downgrades. In fact, the literature is silent on the 
behavioural aspect of stock price responses to the announcement of rating changes. Prior 
research does not take into account the effect of investor sentiment on investors’ perception 
of risk associated with new credit rating information. The investor sentiment literature 
establishes that investor sentiment plays a critical role in the stock pricing process (e.g., Baker 
and Wurgler (2006), Da et al. (2011), and Sprenger et al. (2014)). The literature suggests that 
stock price variation could be better explained by incorporating behavioural models that 
allow for investors’ emotional biases (Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Chau et al. (2016)). The 
importance of investor sentiment as a determinant of stock price variation raises important 
questions in relation to stock price movements around rating downgrades. Does investor 
sentiment have an impact on stock price reactions to credit rating downgrades? If so, how 
does the impact of investor sentiment differ across firms? 
Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence on this subject, this chapter aims to fill 
the gap in the literature by clarifying the impact of investors’ behavioural biases on stock price 
responses to credit rating changes. This study investigates whether investor sentiment 
towards individual firms, firm-specific investor sentiment, plays a significant role in stock price 
formation around rating downgrades. It combines and builds on the findings of the literature 
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on credit ratings and investor sentiment to form four hypotheses regarding the impact of 
investor sentiment on stock price movements around credit rating changes which are listed 
below. 
First, the credit rating literature establishes that the stock price response to rating 
changes is asymmetric, with rating downgrades having a greater impact than rating upgrades 
on stock returns (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), Bannier and Hirsch 
(2010), and Chung et al. (2012)). Additionally, prospect theory argues that investors are loss-
averse and their response to news is asymmetric, with bad news having a greater impact than 
good news (Kahneman and Tversky (2013)). Furthermore, the investor sentiment literature 
suggests that investor sentiment has a significant impact on the stock price reaction to a firm-
specific event (e.g., Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). These strands of the literature are 
combined to form the first hypothesis; the impact of investor sentiment on the stock price 
response to rating changes should be more pronounced for rating downgrades than rating 
upgrades. This hypothesis addresses the question whether greater emotional biases are 
associated with investors’ reactions to rating downgrades compared to rating upgrades.  
Second, the credit rating literature reveals that the stock price reaction to rating 
changes is stronger for low-rated firms than  high-rated firms (e.g., Goh and Ederington (1999) 
and Jorion and Zhang (2010)). The investor sentiment literature argues that the impact of 
investor sentiment is more pronounced for firms that are subject to greater uncertainty in 
valuation and limits to arbitrage (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006), Joseph et al. (2011), and 
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)). These two strands of the literature are combined to 
form the second hypothesis; the impact of investor sentiment on the stock price response to 
rating downgrades should be more pronounced for speculative-grade firms than investment-
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grade firms. This hypothesis investigates whether the impact of investor sentiment is driven 
by uncertainty and the risks associated with speculative-grade firms.  
Third, the credit rating literature argues that the stock price reaction to rating changes 
is differentiated, with stronger reactions to direct rating changes than watch-preceded rating 
changes (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Chung et al. (2012)). The investor 
sentiment literature reveals that the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices is more 
pronounced for firms that are subject to greater uncertainty and information asymmetry 
(e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006), Edmans et al. (2007), and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 
(2012)). The third hypothesis is formed based on the findings of these two strands of the 
literature as the impact of investor sentiment on the stock price response to rating 
downgrades should be more pronounced for direct rating downgrades than watch-preceded 
rating downgrades. This hypothesis addresses the point that credit watch reviews convey 
valuable information to the market, reduce uncertainty, and enhance investors’ abilities to 
analyse and predict firms’ financial values.  
Finally, the investor sentiment literature argues that if investor sentiment leads to 
temporary mispricing in the stock market, the following period stock returns should show 
signs of mean reversion as stock prices should return to fundamental values (e.g., Baker and 
Wurgler (2007), Da et al. (2015), and Danbolt et al. (2015)). Based on this argument, the last 
hypothesis is formed as the impact of investor sentiment on the stock price response to rating 
downgrades should reverse over time. This hypothesis addresses the question whether post-
rating change abnormal returns could be predicted well by investor sentiment. 
This study uses a sample of credit rating change announcements from one of the 
major rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), over the period from 2011 to 2016 and finds 
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that investor sentiment towards individual firms plays a significant role in stock price 
formation around negative rating changes. Specifically, this research presents four main 
findings. First, the results confirm that rating downgrades are important informational events 
in the stock market and establish that the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment on the 
stock price reaction to rating changes is most pronounced in the presence of rating 
downgrades. Second, the empirical analysis confirms the importance of the prior rating level 
assigned to a firm’s debt and specifies that the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on 
the stock price response to rating downgrades is most marked for speculative-grade firms. 
Third, the analysis of the informational content of credit watch reviews shows that the effect 
of firm-specific investor sentiment on the stock price reaction to rating downgrades is greater 
for firms where the downgrades come largely as a surprise rather than those that are 
anticipated. Fourth, the empirical analysis indicates that the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on the stock price response to rating downgrades reverses during the post-rating 
change announcement period. 
This research makes several important contributions to the literature. This study 
extends the work on the informational content of credit rating announcements and their 
impact on stock prices by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), Goh and 
Ederington (1999), and Jorion and Zhang (2010), among others, highlighting the importance 
of investor sentiment as a determinant of stock price variation around rating downgrades. 
Additionally, it expands the work on the role of investor sentiment in the stock market; 
specifically, the work on the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices around firm-specific 
events by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) and Danbolt et al. (2015). This research 
establishes the critical role of investor sentiment around a different firm-specific event, a 
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rating downgrade. Furthermore, this research contributes to the earlier studies on different 
price effects of rating downgrades between low-rated firms and high-rated firms such as Goh 
and Ederington (1999) and Jorion and Zhang (2010) by illustrating speculative-grade firms 
with distress attributes are highly sensitive to new rating information and investor sentiment. 
Moreover, this empirical analysis extends the work on differential responses of stock prices 
to unanticipated and anticipated rating changes by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and 
Followill and Martell (1997), proposing a significant effect of investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to direct rating downgrades due to greater uncertainty associated with these rating 
changes. The different price impact of investor sentiment across firms in the context of rating 
downgrades is also in line with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006), Edmans et al. (2007), 
Joseph et al. (2011), and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), among others, who document 
that the price impact of investor sentiment is stronger for firms that face greater uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and limits to arbitrage. Finally, this work extends the studies by 
Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), Da et al. (2015), 
and Danbolt et al. (2015), by validating the fact that investor sentiment leads to temporary 
mispricing and errors in valuation around rating downgrades. 
The reminder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 describes the sample 
and data and defines the variables. Section 5.3 presents the methodology. Section 5.4 
provides the empirical results and lastly, Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.  
 
5.2. Sample and Data 
The sample of credit rating changes consists of long-term credit rating changes 
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announced by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) for U.S. issuers listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX 
markets between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2016, obtained from Capital IQ. The start 
date of the sample is driven by the availability of the data for the sentiment variable used in 
the empirical analysis.32 The primary requirement of the sample is that the data on credit 
rating changes from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) can be cross-referenced with a sample of firms 
covered by PsychSignal, a commercial provider of sentiment data to traders based on textual 
analysis of content posted on Twitter and StockTwits.33 By cross-referencing the data from 
PsychSignal and the data on rating changes, a sample of 1,214 rating change events including 
both downgrades and upgrades over the period 2011-2016 is obtained. 
The data for other variables used in the empirical analysis is collected from the 
following databases; stock price and index return data is from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), accounting data is from Compustat, and the CBOE S&P500 Volatility 
Index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).  
 
5.2.1. Investor Sentiment Measure 
The daily sentiment data required to measure firms-specific investor sentiment is 
obtained from PsychSignal, a commercial organization that provides public mood data by 
analysing the content of messages posted on Twitter and StockTwits using a Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) engine. PsychSignal’s bullish intensity and bearish intensity measures are 
used in this study. These two measures, which represent the strength of the bullishness and 
                                                          
32 This is due to availability of the sentiment data from PsychSignal.  
33 I use the daily data feed from PsychSignal which is based on social media feeds for the days prior to the rating 
change announcements. See Appendix B in Chapter 3 for further information about PsychSignal data.   
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bearishness revealed in the tweets about the firms in the sample, are combined to generate 
a net measure of firm-specific investor sentiment. Following Antweiler and Frank (2004), the 
cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment index (CSI) is calculated as: 
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) = ∑ 𝐿𝑛
(1+𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡)
(1+𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡)
−1
𝑡=−2                                                                               (5.1) 
 
CSIi,(-2,-1) represents public mood towards firm i over a two-day window, from two days 
before until one day before the rating change announcement date. When investor sentiment 
about a firm is bullish, CSIi,(-2,-1) has a positive value and when investor sentiment about a firm 
is bearish, CSIi,(-2,-1) has a negative value. 
 
5.2.2. Credit Rating Measures 
The credit rating data used in this study is Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term issuer 
credit ratings. AAA is the highest credit quality and SD and D are the lowest credit quality. The 
credit ratings are converted from an alphabetical scale, AAA to D, to a numerical scale, 22 to 
1, where 22 is AAA and 1 is SD and D. Credit rating changes are measured as the current rating 
level minus the lagged rating level. An indicator variable, DOWN, is defined to represent credit 
rating changes. The variable DOWN takes the value of 1 for rating downgrades and 0 for rating 
upgrades. 
Two variables, SPECULATIVE and RATEDAYS, are defined based on Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) data. As the credit rating literature suggests a differential impact of rating changes for 
firms with low-rated debt and high-rated debt (e.g., Goh and Ederington (1999) and Jorion 
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and Zhang (2010)), the variable SPECULATIVE is defined to represent firms’ pre-event rating 
levels. SPECULATIVE is an indicator variable equal to 1 for speculative-grade firms and 0 for 
investment-grade firms. Firms with a rating of BBB- or above are investment-grade firms 
whilst firms with a rating of BB+ or below are speculative-grade firms. In line with Bannier and 
Hirsch (2010), the impact of the number of days since the previous rating announcement on 
abnormal stock returns is controlled. The variable RATEDAYS is the natural logarithm of the 
number of days between current rating date and previous rating date.  
In order to differentiate between direct rating changes and watch-preceded rating 
changes, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit watch announcement data is used in this research. 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit watch data is categorized as positive, negative or developing. 
The credit watch data is matched for three periods prior to a rating change; 90 days (when a 
firm is placed on a watch list from 1 to 90 days prior to a rating change), 180 days (when a 
firm is placed on a watch list from 1 to 180 days prior to a rating change), and 365 days (when 
a firm is placed on a watch list from 1 to 365 days prior to a rating change). A direct rating 
change is a rating change which is not preceded by addition to a credit watch list. In contrast, 
a watch-preceded rating change is a rating change which is preceded by addition to a credit 
watch list. 
 
5.2.3. Stock Return Measure 
The cumulative abnormal return around credit rating changes is the dependent 
variable in this analysis. The market adjusted model Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
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variable is measured over a three-day event window starting on the day of the announcement 
by subtracting the CRSP value-weighted index return, Rm,t, from the stock return, Ri,t:34 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
+2
𝑡=0                                                                                                      (5.2) 
 
It is important to highlight that firm-specific investor sentiment is measured over a 
window prior to abnormal stock returns. CSI is measured over the window (-2,-1) and CAR is 
measured over the window (0,+2). This design is applied in order to establish a causal relation 
from investor sentiment to abnormal stock returns and mitigate any reverse causality issues. 
 
5.2.4. Other Variables 
This study controls for a number of rating, firm, and market characteristic variables, 
with definition of all variables presented in Appendix A. With regard to the rating 
characteristic variables, as explained earlier, firms’ pre-event rating level (SPECULATIVE) and 
the number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS) are used. At the firm level, 
loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price 
momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of 
debt (COSTDEBT), and cash holdings (CASHHOLDING) are controlled. At the market level, the 
VIX volatility index (VIX) is applied. These control variables may exert an impact on the stock 
                                                          
34 In addition to the market adjusted model cumulative abnormal returns, the market model cumulative 
abnormal returns are employed in this study. 
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price reaction to credit rating information. Therefore, applying these variables in the empirical 
analysis helps to examine the independence of the results from their effects. 
 
5.2.5. Sample Statistics 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the overall sample and is further partitioned by the 
type of rating changes, magnitude of rating changes, credit rating announcement year, listing 
exchange, and sector. The sample consists of 1,214 rating changes; 569 rating downgrades 
(46.87% of the sample) and 645 rating upgrades (53.13% of the sample). Rating changes are 
generally one notch up and down; 431 one notch rating downgrades and 580 one notch rating 
upgrades, but 8 firms experience a rating downgrade of more than five notches and 12 firms 
experience a rating upgrade of more than five notches. The greatest number of observations 
is in 2016; 338 observations (27.84% of the sample). Firms listed on NYSE account for 74.30% 
of the sample (902 observations), firms listed on NASDAQ account for 24.71% of the sample 
(300 observations), and firms listed on AMEX account for the remaining 0.99% of the sample 
(12 observations). According to Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), the greatest 
number of observations is from the energy sector; 259 observations (21.33% of the sample). 
The lowest number of observations is from the communication services sector; 19 
observations (1.57% of the sample).  
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. The variables RATEDAYS 
and SIZE are log transformed, LEVERAGE, CONVERTIBLEDEBT, COSTDEBT, and CASHHOLDING 
are winsorized at the high end (99%) of their distributions and all remaining non-binary 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their respective distributions to mitigate the impact 
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Table 5.1 
Summary Statistics by Rating Changes, Announcement Year, Stock Exchange, and Sector 
This table presents summary statistics by rating changes, announcement year, market, and sector. Downgrade (upgrade) 
rating changes consist of Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings that are lower (higher) than the lagged rating 
levels. The magnitude of credit rating changes is specified based on the rating levels of AAA-D. Announcement year is credit 
rating change announcement year. Stock exchange is the market that stocks are traded on and sector is classified based on 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. The sample includes 
stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016.  
  No of Obs Percent     No of Obs Percent 
       
No of Obs 1,214 100.00%  Announcement Year   
    2011 124 10.21% 
    2012 136 11.20% 
Rating Changes    2013 189 15.57% 
Downgrades 569 46.87%  2014 186 15.32% 
Upgrades 645 53.13%  2015 241 19.85% 
    2016 338 27.84% 
       
    Stock Exchange   
Rating Downgrades by Absolute Magnitude   NYSE 902 74.30% 
1 431 35.50%  NASDAQ 300 24.71% 
2 103 8.48%  AMEX 12 0.99% 
3 10 0.82%     
4 7 0.58%  Sector   
5 10 0.82%  Energy 259 21.33% 
>5 8 0.66%  Materials 89 7.33% 
    Industrials 146 12.03% 
    Consumer Discretionary 232 19.11% 
Rating Upgrades by Magnitude   Consumer Staples 62 5.11% 
1 580 47.78%  Health Care 64 5.27% 
2 33 2.72%  Financials 119 9.80% 
3 7 0.58%  Information Technology 101 8.32% 
4 4 0.33%  Communication Services 19 1.57% 
5 9 0.74%  Utilities 43 3.54% 
>5 12 0.99%  Real Estate 80 6.59% 
              
 
of outliers. Here, in Table 5.2, is the first evidence that the stock price reaction is more marked 
for rating downgrades than rating upgrades. The average of CAR(0,+2) is -0.0043, despite the 
fact that there are more positive events than negative events in the sample. The average of 
the two-day firm-specific investor sentiment index (CSI(-2,-1)) is 0.4590 suggesting that on 
average commentators were optimistic about the firms in the sample.  
Table 5.3 presents the correlations of the variables. As expected, there is a positive 
 
 149 
 
Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics: Key Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the key variables in this study; cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), credit 
rating changes (DOWN), cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)), pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the 
number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability 
(PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of 
debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions 
of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes 
from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting 
data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). 
The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016.  
Variable No of Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
CAR(0,+2) 1,214 -0.0043 0.0001 0.0656 -0.2893 0.2031 
DOWN 1,214 0.4687 0.0000 0.4992 0.0000 1.0000 
CSI(-2,-1) 1,214 0.4590 0.1586 0.9551 -1.9988 2.5734 
SPECULATIVE 1,214 0.6474 1.0000 0.4780 0.0000 1.0000 
RATEDAYS 1,214 6.4738 6.6561 1.2969 0.6931 9.2537 
LOSS 1,214 0.2801 0.0000 0.4492 0.0000 1.0000 
MB 1,208 2.5419 1.8146 6.0340 -27.4919 31.9605 
SIZE 1,214 8.1036 8.0842 1.6326 3.1976 13.3480 
PROFITABILITY 1,161 0.0753 0.1062 0.2052 -0.9278 0.3808 
CAR(-202,-3) 1,201 -0.0887 -0.0057 0.4409 -1.5074 0.9517 
LEVERAGE 1,211 0.3989 0.3714 0.2439 0.0000 1.2988 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT 1,167 0.0146 0.0000 0.0426 0.0000 0.2209 
COSTDEBT 1,158 0.0608 0.0578 0.0248 0.0028 0.1539 
CASHHOLDING 1,202 0.5283 0.1804 1.0149 0.0000 6.5569 
VIX 1,214 16.9293 15.4700 4.3639 12.2964 32.8291 
              
 
correlation between CAR(0,+2) and CSI(-2,-1) suggesting that positive (negative) abnormal stock 
returns are associated with bullish (bearish) investor sentiment. CAR(0,+2) is negatively 
correlated with DOWN and SPECULATIVE suggesting that CAR(0,+2) is lower for downgraded 
firms and speculative-grade firms. The correlation between DOWN and CSI(-2,-1) is negative 
suggesting that rating downgrades are associated with bearish investor sentiment. Despite 
the correlation between some of the variables, there is no issue of collinearity in this study. 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests are conducted and the results show that there is no 
multicollinearity problem as the VIF values are lower than 10. 
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Table 5.3 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlations of the variables; cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), credit rating changes (DOWN), cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)), pre-event 
rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price 
momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix 
A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return 
data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE). The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
                
(1) CAR(0,+2) 1.0000               
(2) DOWN -0.1367 1.0000              
(3) CSI(-2,-1) 0.0656 -0.1284 1.0000             
(4) SPECULATIVE -0.0632 -0.0394 0.0180 1.0000            
(5) RATEDAYS 0.0843 -0.1070 0.0700 -0.3647 1.0000           
(6) LOSS -0.1420 0.3259 -0.0665 0.2990 -0.3379 1.0000          
(7) MB 0.0443 -0.0785 0.0319 -0.1048 0.1073 -0.1244 1.0000         
(8) SIZE 0.0816 -0.1831 -0.0058 -0.5929 0.3990 -0.4452 0.1982 1.0000        
(9) PROFITABILITY 0.1343 -0.1857 0.0911 -0.1838 0.3581 -0.4833 0.2013 0.2994 1.0000       
(10) CAR(-202,-3) 0.1422 -0.4534 0.1173 -0.0996 0.1960 -0.2490 0.0609 0.2254 0.1808 1.0000      
(11) LEVERAGE -0.0194 0.1745 -0.0215 0.3461 -0.3004 0.3372 -0.0764 -0.4554 -0.3302 -0.2055 1.0000     
(12) CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0593 -0.0505 -0.0157 0.1544 -0.0831 0.0862 -0.0757 -0.1002 -0.1521 0.0003 0.0068 1.0000    
(13) COSTDEBT -0.0749 -0.0628 -0.0354 0.3815 -0.2400 0.2437 -0.0696 -0.4394 -0.1449 -0.0644 0.0962 0.1052 1.0000   
(14) CASHHOLDING 0.0419 -0.1215 0.0078 -0.1625 0.1247 -0.1853 0.0443 0.2075 0.1480 0.1050 -0.4669 0.0305 0.0983 1.0000  
(15) VIX -0.0052 0.2182 0.0163 -0.0314 -0.0088 0.0599 -0.0045 -0.0004 -0.0775 -0.2330 -0.0278 -0.0105 0.0625 -0.0066 1.0000 
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5.3. Methodology 
This section presents the methodology and models used to investigate the price effect 
of firm-specific investor sentiment around credit rating changes. A standard event study 
methodology is followed to answer the research questions. This methodology is followed to 
identify stock price movements due to investor sentiment at the time of credit rating change 
announcements. 
 
5.3.1. The Price Impact of Investor Sentiment 
In order to investigate the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in the stock pricing 
process around credit rating changes, stock price movements are graphically presented over 
a window of 10 trading days either side of the announcement. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are presented for four firm sub-samples based on the type of rating changes 
(downgrades and upgrades) and the type of investor sentiment (positive and negative). The 
comparison of the CAR plots shows whether stock price responses to rating changes are 
conditional on the type of rating changes and investor sentiment. 
 OLS regressions are used to further test the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment 
on stock price responses to rating changes. The regression models control for rating, firm, and 
market characteristics that may have an effect on stock prices around credit rating changes. 
The first regression model, which only controls for rating characteristics, takes the following 
form: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) +
𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜀                                          (5.3) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, DOWN: Rating Downgrade Indicator Variable, CSIi,(-2,-1): 
Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, SPECULATIVE: Speculative-Grade Firm (Pre-Event Rating 
Level) Indicator Variable, RATEDAYS: Number of Days since the Previous Rating Action. 
 
The second regression model incorporating the full list of variables takes the following 
form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) +
𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +
𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 +
𝛽14𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽15𝑉𝐼𝑋 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                         (5.4) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, DOWN: Rating Downgrade Indicator Variable, CSIi,(-2,-1): 
Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, SPECULATIVE: Speculative-Grade Firm (Pre-Event Rating 
Level) Indicator Variable, RATEDAYS: Number of Days since the Previous Rating Action, LOSS: Firm Loss, MB: 
Market-to-Book Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, PROFITABILITY: Profitability Ratio, CARi,(-202,-3): Long Run Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, CONVERTIBLEDEBT: Convertible Debt, COSTDEBT: Cost of Debt, 
CASHHOLDING: Cash Holdings, VIX: VIX Volatility Index. 
 
 
In order to test whether the price impact of investor sentiment is more pronounced 
for rating downgrades than  rating upgrades, an interaction variable between DOWN and CSI(-
2,-1) (DOWN*CSI(-2,-1)) is created. This variable measures the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on the announcement of rating downgrades. It is expected to find a positive and 
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statistically significant coefficient for this variable. If the variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is statistically 
significant, then the result confirms that the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices 
around rating changes is greater for rating downgrades. Additionally, the regression models 
test the individual price impact of firm-specific investor sentiment by incorporating the 
variable CSI(-2,-1). If the coefficient of the variable CSI(-2,-1) turns out to be significant when it is 
considered separately, then the result shows that investor sentiment is a significant 
determinant of abnormal stock returns around rating downgrades and upgrades. 
Furthermore, the regression models test the impact of rating downgrades (DOWN) and firms’ 
pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE) on abnormal stock returns. Considering the findings in 
the literature, one would expect to observe a significant negative coefficient for the variable 
DOWN. A rating downgrade conveys new information to the market, raises the firm’s future 
debt financing costs, and hence, is expected to lower the firm’s market value. It could also be 
expected to find a negative coefficient for the variable SPECULATIVE as speculative-grade 
firms impose higher risks and face major uncertainties in the market. The number of days 
since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS) is also controlled in the regression models. A 
negative or a positive coefficient for this variable may be conceivable. Additional control 
variables are incorporated into the second regression model in order to disentangle the effect 
of firm-specific investor sentiment from other effects. All regression models in this research 
include year and sector fixed effects to control for the broad characteristics that may affect 
the relationship between the main variables. Additionally, standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and firm clustering are used. 
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5.3.2. Speculative-Grade and Investment-Grade Firms 
In order to test whether the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price 
responses to rating downgrades is differentiated, with a stronger impact for speculative-
grade firms compared to investment-grade firms, a graphical representation of CAR 
movements over the window of (-10,+10) is provided. The CAR plots are presented for four 
sub-samples of downgraded firms partitioned based on the pre-event rating level 
(speculative-grade and investment-grade) and the type of investor sentiment (positive and 
negative). The comparison of the CAR plots illustrates whether stock price responses to rating 
downgrades are conditional on the pre-event rating level and investor sentiment. 
To further investigate the impact of investor sentiment for speculative-grade and 
investment-grade firms OLS regressions are used. The sample is split into speculative-grade 
firm and investment-grade firm sub-samples and the regression model below is run for each 
sub-sample. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 +
𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽14𝑉𝐼𝑋 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖                                                                                                     (5.5) 
 
where; CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, DOWN: Rating Downgrade Indicator Variable, CSIi,(-2,-1): 
Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, RATEDAYS: Number of Days since the Previous Rating Action, 
LOSS: Firm Loss, MB: Market-to-Book Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, PROFITABILITY: Profitability Ratio, CARi,(-202,-3): Long 
Run Cumulative Abnormal Returns, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, CONVERTIBLEDEBT: Convertible Debt, 
COSTDEBT: Cost of Debt, CASHHOLDING: Cash Holdings, VIX: VIX Volatility Index. 
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The main variable of interest is the interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1). It could be 
expected to find a statistically significant coefficient for this variable in the speculative-grade 
sub-sample and insignificant or less significant coefficient in the investment-grade sub-
sample. It could also be expected to have stronger coefficients for the variables DOWN and 
CSI(-2,-1) in the sub-sample of speculative-grade firms due to a higher degree of uncertainty, 
limits to arbitrage, and financing risks associated with these firms. 
 
5.3.3. Direct and Watch-Preceded Rating Changes 
In order to examine whether the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock 
price responses to rating downgrades is differentiated, with a stranger response to direct 
rating changes compared to watch-preceded rating changes, first the CAR plots over the 
window (-10,+10) for four sub-samples of downgraded firms are presented. The firm sub-
samples are broken down based on the type of rating downgrades (direct and watch-
preceded) and the type of investor sentiment (positive and negative). The rating downgrades 
are classified based on Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit watch reviews within a 90-day timeframe prior 
to the rating changes. The comparison of the CAR plots shows whether stock price responses to 
rating downgrades are conditional on the type of rating downgrades and investor sentiment. 
To investigate the price impact of investor sentiment for direct rating downgrades and 
watch-preceded rating downgrades further the sample is sub-divided into direct rating 
changes and watch-preceded rating changes and Model 5.4 is run for each sub-sample. The 
timescale between the addition to Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit watch list and the rating 
changes over a 90-day, 180-day, and 365-day period is controlled for. The main variable of 
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interest in this regression is the interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1). A statistically significant 
coefficient is expected for this variable in the direct rating change sub-samples and 
insignificant or less significant coefficient in the watch-preceded rating change sub-samples. 
Insignificant or less significant coefficients are also expected for the variables DOWN and CSI(-
2,-1) in the sub-samples of watch-preceded rating changes. The credit watch signals a change 
in a firm’s credit quality significant enough that it might trigger a rating change. As a result, 
the subsequent rating change should be anticipated, and the announcement of the rating 
change should only be a confirmation of information already priced in the market. 
 
5.3.4. Return Reversals 
OLS regressions are used to examine whether the price impact of investor sentiment 
around rating changes reverses over the post-announcement period. The regression models 
test the relation of firm-specific investor sentiment, CSI(-2,-1), to post-rating change abnormal 
returns over the windows (+3,+10), (+3,+20), and (+3,+30). The first regression model 
employing CAR(+3,+10) as the dependent variable takes the following form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(+3,+10) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽2𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖,(−2,−1) + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(0,+2) +
𝛽5𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽10𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−202,−3) + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 +
𝛽14𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽15𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽16𝑉𝐼𝑋 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐹. 𝐸. +𝜖         (5.6) 
 
where; CARi,(+3,+10): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, DOWN: Rating Downgrade Indicator Variable, CSIi,(-2,-1): 
Cumulative Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment Index, CARi,(0,+2): Cumulative Abnormal Returns, SPECULATIVE: 
Speculative-Grade Firm (Pre-Event Rating Level) Indicator Variable, RATEDAYS: Number of Days since the 
Previous Rating Action, LOSS: Firm Loss, MB: Market-to-Book Ratio, SIZE: Firm Size, PROFITABILITY: Profitability 
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Ratio, CARi,(-202,-3): Long Run Cumulative Abnormal Returns, LEVERAGE: Leverage Ratio, CONVERTIBLEDEBT: 
Convertible Debt, COSTDEBT: Cost of Debt, CASHHOLDING: Cash Holdings, VIX: VIX Volatility Index. 
 
Model 5.6 is re-estimated using the variables CAR(+3,+20) and CAR(+3,+30) as the 
dependent variables. The variable CAR(0,+2) is included in the regression models in order to 
control for the impact of abnormal returns in a short period after the credit rating changes on 
post-rating change abnormal returns. Since behavioural finance theory proposes an opposite 
relationship between investor sentiment, as evidence by mispricing, and future stock returns, 
the predictive ability of the firm-specific investor sentiment variables, DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) and 
CSI(-2,-1), is examined by using one-tailed statistics.35 It could be expected to find a negative 
relationship between investor sentiment variables and post-rating change abnormal returns 
because if firm-specific investor sentiment causes temporary mispricing in the short period 
after rating downgrades, then the following periods’ stock abnormal returns should show 
signs of mean reversion. A change in the price direction of stocks should occur as stock prices 
should return to fundamental values. 
 
5.4. Empirical Findings 
This section provides the results of the empirical analysis to identify the role of firm-
specific investor sentiment in stock price variation around credit rating changes. 
 
                                                          
35 See Inoue and Kilian (2005) and Huang et al. (2015) for further details about the use of one-tailed statistics. 
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5.4.1. The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Rating Changes 
The first hypothesis addresses the question whether the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating changes is more pronounced for rating 
downgrades compared to rating upgrades. As an initial investigation, the CAR for four firm 
sub-samples over a 21-day window around the rating change announcements are graphically 
presented in Figure 5.1. The four firm sub-samples are: (1) the portfolio of firms with rating 
downgrades and positive investor sentiment (315 observations), (2) the portfolio of firms with 
rating downgrades and negative investor sentiment (199 observations), (3) the portfolio of 
firms with rating upgrades and positive investor sentiment (390 observations), and (4) the 
portfolio of firms with rating upgrades and negative investor sentiment (165 observations). 
These four sub-samples of firms cover 88.06% of the total sample. For the purpose of clarity, 
the CAR for two additional firm sub-samples, firms with rating downgrades and zero investor 
sentiment (55 observations) and firms with rating upgrades and zero investor sentiment (90 
observations), is not reported. 
The comparison of the CAR plots suggests that stock price responses to rating changes 
are conditional on the type of rating change and investor sentiment. Firms with rating 
downgrades and negative investor sentiment experience a large decline in CAR while the 
firms in the other sub-samples do not experience any similarly large reaction. These plots 
suggest that the price impact of investor sentiment is stronger for rating downgrades and that 
stock price reactions to rating downgrades are conditional on firm-specific investor 
sentiment. 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the regression analysis on the conditional price 
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Figure 5.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Rating Changes and Investor Sentiment 
 
 
impact of firm-specific investor sentiment around credit rating changes. The regression model 
in column (1) controls only for the rating characteristics. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is positive and significant at the 10% level, illustrating positive 
(negative) investor sentiment leads to higher (lower) abnormal returns on the announcement 
of rating downgrades. Consistent with prior studies, the price response to rating downgrades 
is significant and negative as the variable DOWN is negative and significant at the 1% level 
when measured separately. The variable CSI(-2,-1), which measures the effect of firm-specific 
investor sentiment for all rating changes, is insignificant when measured separately. This 
suggests that investor sentiment does not play any significant role in stock price formation 
around rating upgrades. The variable SPECULATIVE is negative and significant at the 5% level,  
-0.100
-0.090
-0.080
-0.070
-0.060
-0.050
-0.040
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C
A
R
Days
Downgrades / Positive Sentiment Firms Downgrades / Negative Sentiment Firms
Upgrades / Positive Sentiment Firms Upgrades / Negative Sentiment Firms
 160 
 
Table 5.4 
The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Rating Changes 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) on 
announcement period abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)). The dependent variable in all regressions is CAR(0,+2). Other variables 
included in the analysis are credit rating changes (DOWN), pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the number of days since 
the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock 
price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash 
holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-
specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock 
price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from 
Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The sample includes 
stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and 
sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) 
   
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0084* 0.0100**  
 (1.91) (2.09) 
DOWN -0.0204*** -0.0176*** 
 (-4.40) (-3.19) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0005 -0.0025 
 (-0.33) (-1.42) 
SPECULATIVE -0.0090** -0.0059 
 (-2.49) (-1.17) 
RATEDAYS 0.0020 0.0012 
 (0.98) (0.62) 
LOSS  -0.0091 
  (-1.23) 
MB  0.0000 
  (0.13) 
SIZE  -0.0011 
  (-0.57) 
PROFITABILITY  0.0258 
  (1.39) 
CAR(-202,-3)  0.0137**  
  (2.27) 
LEVERAGE  0.0304**  
  (2.21) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT  -0.0628 
  (-0.70) 
COSTDEBT  -0.1260 
  (-1.46) 
CASHHOLDING  0.0035**  
  (2.03) 
VIX  0.0008 
  (1.35) 
CONSTANT -0.0071 -0.0107 
 (-0.49) (-0.42) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 1214 1078 
Adjusted R2 0.0253 0.0392 
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showing announcement period abnormal returns are lower for speculative-grade firms. The 
variable RATEDAYS, in contrast, turns out not to be significant. The regression model in 
column (2) controls for the rating, firm, and market characteristics. The coefficient of the 
interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is positive and significant at the 5% level, the coefficient 
of the variable DOWN is negative and significant at the 1% level, and the coefficient of the 
variable CSI(-2,-1) is insignificant. After including the other control variables, the coefficient of 
the variable SPECULATIVE shows the expected negative sign but loses its statistical 
significance. The coefficient of the variable RATEDAYS remains insignificant. Regarding the 
other control variables, CAR(-202,-3), LEVERAGE, and CASHHOLDING are statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The results in column (2) confirms the results in column (1) and provides 
further support to the first hypothesis. The results clearly illustrate that firm-specific investor 
sentiment has a significant impact on downgraded firms’ abnormal returns. When investors’ 
sentiment is bullish, prevailing optimism causes underestimation of the underlying risks 
associated with downgraded firms and results in overpriced stocks. In contrast, when 
investors’ sentiment is bearish, investors overestimate the underlying risks associated with 
downgraded firms and underprice stocks. 
 
5.4.2. Investor Sentiment and Speculative-Grade and Investment-Grade Firms 
The second hypothesis addresses the question whether the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating downgrades is more marked for 
speculative-grade firms compared to investment-grade firms. As an initial investigation, the 
CAR for four downgraded firm sub-samples is graphically presented over the window (-10, 
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Figure 5.2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Rating Downgrades by Rating Grades and Investor Sentiment 
 
 
+10) in Figure 5.2. The four firm sub-samples are: (1) downgraded speculative-grade firms 
with positive investor sentiment (187 observations), (2) downgraded speculative-grade firms 
with negative investor sentiment (134 observations), (3) downgraded investment-grade firms 
with positive investor sentiment (128 observations), and (4) downgraded investment-grade 
firms with negative investor sentiment (65 observations). 
The comparison of the CAR plots suggests that stock price reactions to rating 
downgrades are conditional on pre-event rating levels and investor sentiment. Speculative-
grade firms with negative investor sentiment experience a large decline in CAR while firms in 
the other sub-samples do not experience a similarly large decrease in their CAR. This suggests  
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Table 5.5 
The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Speculative/Investment-Grade Firms  
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) for speculative/investment-grade firms. Speculative-grade and investment-grade firms are 
defined based on the pre-event rating levels. Other variables included in the analysis are credit rating changes (DOWN), the 
number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability 
(PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of 
debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions 
of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes 
from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting 
data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). 
The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions 
control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable Speculative Investment 
  (1) (2) 
   
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0133** 0.0055 
 (1.99) (0.87) 
DOWN -0.0222*** -0.0077 
 (-2.85) (-1.01) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0035 -0.0015 
 (-1.49) (-0.65) 
RATEDAYS 0.0016 -0.0014 
 (0.62) (-0.65) 
LOSS -0.0148* 0.0106 
 (-1.76) (0.85) 
MB 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.55) (0.03) 
SIZE -0.0025 0.0032 
 (-1.00) (1.49) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0305 -0.0275 
 (1.48) (-1.20) 
CAR(-202,-3) 0.0165** -0.0199 
 (2.38) (-1.32) 
LEVERAGE 0.0430*** -0.0048 
 (2.74) (-0.20) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0779 0.0612 
 (-0.78) (1.25) 
COSTDEBT -0.1557 -0.0301 
 (-1.43) (-0.24) 
CASHHOLDING 0.0062*** 0.0011 
 (2.67) (0.50) 
VIX 0.0006 0.0006 
 (0.70) (0.76) 
CONSTANT 0.0019 -0.0321 
 (0.06) (-0.86) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 723 355 
Adjusted R2 0.0524 0.0168 
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that the impact of investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating downgrades is more 
pronounced for speculative-grade firms.  
Table 5.5 represents the results of the regression analysis on the cross-sectional 
differences in stock price responses to rating downgrades. This analysis demonstrates how 
stock prices react to rating downgrades involving speculative-grade borrowers and 
investment-grade borrowers. Separate regressions are run for speculative-grade firms and 
investment-grade firms. Column (1) presents the results for speculative-grade firms. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, suggesting positive (negative) investor sentiment leads to higher (lower) abnormal 
returns during rating downgrades for speculative-grade firms. The coefficient of the variable 
DOWN is negative and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient of the variable CSI(-2,-
1), which measures the effect of investor sentiment for all rating changes, is insignificant. The 
control variables LOSS, CAR(-202,-3), LEVERAGE, and CASHHOLDING are statistically significant. 
Column (2) presents the results for investment-grade firms. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is statistically insignificant, suggesting positive (negative) investor 
sentiment has no effect on abnormal returns on the announcement of rating downgrades for 
firms with high ratings. The coefficients of the variables DOWN and CSI(-2,-1) are both 
insignificant.  
The results presented in Table 5.5 show that the main variables in the regression 
models are only relevant to explain abnormal stock returns of speculative-grade firms. This 
result provides support for the second hypothesis. It clearly illustrates that the price impact 
of firm-specific investor sentiment is strongly dependent on downgraded firms’ pre-event 
ratings. Speculative-grade firms, with distress attributes, are more prone to subjective 
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valuation and limits to arbitrage, therefore they are highly sensitive to the impact of investor 
sentiment. 
 
5.4.3. Investor Sentiment and Direct and Watch-Preceded Rating Changes 
The third hypothesis addresses the question whether the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating downgrades is more pronounced for 
direct (unanticipated) rating downgrades than watch-preceded (anticipated) rating 
downgrades. This hypothesis focuses on the information content of direct rating downgrades 
relative to watch-preceded rating downgrades and the role played by investor sentiment in 
this context. Figure 5.3 illustrates the CAR for four firm sub-samples over a 21-day window 
around the rating downgrade announcements. The four firm sub-samples are: (1) firms with 
direct downgrades and positive investor sentiment (275 observations), (2) firms with direct 
downgrades and negative investor sentiment (173 observations), (3) firms with watch-
preceded downgrades and positive investor sentiment (40 observations), and (4) firms with 
watch-preceded downgrades and negative investor sentiment (26 observations). 
The comparison of the CAR plots suggests that stock price responses to rating 
downgrades are conditional on the type of rating downgrades and investor sentiment. Firms 
with direct rating downgrades and negative investor sentiment experience the sharpest 
decline in CAR. By comparison, firms with watch-preceded downgrades and negative investor 
sentiment experience a gradual decline in CAR a few days before the rating downgrade 
announcement, which is consistent with a market anticipation effect. The CAR plots in Figure 
5.3 suggest that the price impact of investor sentiment is more pronounced for direct credit  
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Figure 5.3 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Rating Downgrades by Credit Watch List Placements and Investor 
Sentiment 
 
 
rating downgrades. 
Regression analysis is undertaken to investigate further the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment on direct rating downgrades and watch-preceded rating downgrades. 
Table 5.6 provides an overview of the sample partitioned by credit watch placements prior to 
rating changes. The summary statistics in Table 5.6 show that the majority of the rating 
changes in the sample are direct; they were not added to a watch list prior to the rating 
changes. Additionally, the majority of the credit watch placements in the sample take place 
within 90 days prior to the rating change announcements. Table 5.7 presents the results of 
the regression analysis. Separate regressions are run for direct rating changes and watch- 
-0.100
-0.090
-0.080
-0.070
-0.060
-0.050
-0.040
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C
A
R
Days
Direct Downgrades / Positive Sentiment Firms
Direct Downgrades /Negative Sentiment Firms
Watch-Preceded Downgrades / Positive Sentiment Firms
Watch-Preceded Downgrade / Negative Sentiment Firms
 167 
 
Table 5.6 
Summary Statistics by Credit Watch Placements 
This table presents summary statistics by credit watch placements prior to rating changes. Downgrade (upgrade) rating 
changes consist of Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings that are lower (higher) than the lagged rating levels. 
Rating changes are classified based on Standard & Poor’s CreditWatch reviews within a 90-day/180-day/365-day timeframe 
prior to rating changes. Direct rating changes are rating changes which are not preceded by addition to credit watch lists. 
Watch-preceded rating changes are rating changes which are preceded by addition to credit watch lists. See Appendix A for 
detailed definitions of the variables. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. The sample includes stocks 
that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. 
  No of Obs Percent     No of obs Percent 
       
No of Obs 1,214 100.00%     
       
CreditWatch within 90 Days prior to the Rating Change     
Direct Downgrades 493 40.61%  Direct Upgrades 568 46.79% 
Watch-Preceded Downgrades 76 6.26%  Watch-Preceded Upgrades 77 6.34% 
       
CreditWatch within 180 Days prior to the Rating Change     
Direct Downgrades 459 37.81%  Direct Upgrades 550 45.30% 
Watch-Preceded Downgrades 110 9.06%  Watch-Preceded Upgrades 95 7.83% 
       
CreditWatch within 365 Days prior to the Rating Change     
Direct Downgrades 430 35.42%  Direct Upgrades 529 43.57% 
Watch-Preceded Downgrades 139 11.45%  Watch-Preceded Upgrades 116 9.56% 
              
 
preceded rating changes. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the results for direct rating 
changes. In all columns the coefficient of the interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is positive 
and significant, significant at the 5% level in column (1) and significant at the 10% level in 
columns (3) and (5), indicating positive (negative) investor sentiment leads to higher (lower) 
abnormal returns on the announcement of direct rating downgrades. Columns (2), (4), and 
(6) present the results for watch-preceded rating changes. In all columns the coefficient of 
the interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is statistically insignificant, suggesting positive 
(negative) investor sentiment has no effect on abnormal returns on the announcement of 
watch-preceded (anticipated) rating downgrades. Furthermore, the coefficient of the variable 
DOWN is only significant for the direct rating change sub-samples, significant at the 1% level 
in all models, confirming unanticipated and anticipated rating downgrades result in different  
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Table 5.7 
The Impact of Investor Sentiment for Direct/Watch-Preceded Rating Changes 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) for sub-samples of direct/watch-preceded rating changes. Rating changes are classified based 
on Standard & Poor’s CreditWatch reviews within a 90-day/180-day/365-day timeframe prior to rating changes. Direct rating 
changes are rating changes which are not preceded by addition to credit watch lists. Watch-preceded rating changes are 
rating changes which are preceded by addition to credit watch lists. Other variables included in the analysis are credit rating 
changes (DOWN), pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), 
loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX 
volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes 
from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility 
index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
CreditWatch within 90 Days 
prior to the Rating Change 
CreditWatch within 180 Days 
prior to the Rating Change 
CreditWatch within 365 Days 
prior to the Rating Change 
  Direct Watch Direct Watch Direct Watch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0116** 0.0019 0.0110* 0.0039 0.0106* 0.0070 
 (2.16) (0.22) (1.92) (0.53) (1.77) (1.01) 
DOWN -0.0203*** 0.0032 -0.0208*** -0.0034 -0.0218*** -0.0050 
 (-3.19) (0.29) (-3.14) (-0.36) (-3.10) (-0.50) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0021 -0.0038 
 (-1.33) (-0.24) (-1.18) (-0.25) (-1.04) (-1.08) 
SPECULATIVE -0.0063 -0.0016 -0.0067 -0.0066 -0.0045 -0.0124 
 (-1.09) (-0.14) (-1.12) (-0.58) (-0.74) (-1.21) 
RATEDAYS 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0002 0.0045 -0.0011 0.0045 
 (0.30) (0.40) (-0.08) (1.25) (-0.44) (1.35) 
LOSS -0.0105 -0.0033 -0.0109 -0.0006 -0.0077 -0.0144 
 (-1.25) (-0.19) (-1.28) (-0.04) (-0.87) (-0.84) 
MB 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.41) (0.46) (0.63) (-0.76) (0.62) (-0.30) 
SIZE -0.0012 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0023 
 (-0.55) (-0.01) (-0.39) (-0.82) (-0.30) (-0.70) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0249 -0.0092 0.0247 0.0396 0.0237 0.0486 
 (1.27) (-0.25) (1.24) (0.98) (1.18) (1.19) 
CAR(-202,-3) 0.0110 0.0256 0.0095 0.0254* 0.0063 0.0345*** 
 (1.59) (1.55) (1.31) (1.94) (0.85) (2.84) 
LEVERAGE 0.0286* 0.0402 0.0273* 0.0350 0.0223 0.0576**  
 (1.91) (1.33) (1.83) (1.23) (1.45) (2.16) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0668 0.0001 -0.0680 0.0085 -0.0913 0.0815 
 (-0.66) (0.00) (-0.66) (0.08) (-0.86) (1.02) 
COSTDEBT -0.1937* 0.2962 -0.1698* 0.0593 -0.1937* 0.1390 
 (-1.96) (1.27) (-1.68) (0.38) (-1.87) (1.00) 
CASHHOLDING 0.0041** 0.0013 0.0036* 0.0030 0.0036* 0.0035 
 (2.15) (0.30) (1.85) (0.68) (1.83) (0.98) 
VIX 0.0011* -0.0045* 0.0012* -0.0019 0.0012* -0.0015 
 (1.79) (-1.83) (1.82) (-1.24) (1.70) (-1.17) 
CONSTANT -0.0056 0.0282 -0.0016 0.0008 0.0054 -0.0174 
 (-0.20) (0.36) (-0.06) (0.01) (0.19) (-0.32) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 939 139 891 187 847 231 
Adjusted R2 0.0424 -0.0054 0.0396 0.0095 0.0311 0.1074 
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stock price reactions. The control variables CAR(-202,-3), LEVERAGE, COSTDEBT, CASHHOLDING, 
and VIX are statistically significant in some of the columns.36 These results provide support 
for the third hypothesis and confirm the informational effect of credit watch lists on stock 
prices. Credit reviews contain valuable information that is useful for estimating the probability 
of an actual rating change. The level of uncertainty for watch-preceded rating changes is low 
since investors have time to assess rationally the risks of the upcoming rating changes and 
this makes them less vulnerable to behavioural biases which causes stock mispricing. In 
contrast, for direct rating changes, investors do not have time to assess rationally the risks of 
the rating change ahead of the announcement and this makes them more vulnerable to 
behavioural biases. 
 
5.4.4. Investor Sentiment and Return Reversals 
In the first section of the empirical findings, a significant positive impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating downgrades is documented. In 
this section, I examine whether this relationship is associated with short-term mispricing and 
errors in valuation. To this end, results should establish a significant negative relationship 
between firm-specific investor sentiment and future abnormal stock returns. In other words, 
future abnormal stock returns should be predicted well by investor sentiment. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 CAR(-202,-3) is significant in columns (4) and (6), LEVERAGE is significant in columns (1), (3) and (6), COSTDEBT is 
significant in columns (1), (3), and (5), CASHHOLDING is significant in columns (1), (3), and (5), and VIX is 
significant in columns (1), (2), (3), and (5). 
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Table 5.8 
Post-Rating Change Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of post-rating change abnormal returns (CAR(+3,+10), CAR(+3,+20), and 
CAR(+3,+30)) on cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)). Other variables included in the analysis are credit rating 
changes (DOWN), announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(0,+2)), pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the 
number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability 
(PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of 
debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions 
of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes 
from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting 
data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).  
The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions 
control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The p-values are reported in parentheses. For 
the variables DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1) one-tailed p-values are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable CAR(+3,+10) CAR(+3,+20) CAR(+3,+30) 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
    
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0023 -0.0134* -0.0165* 
 (0.6355) (0.0656) (0.0677) 
DOWN 0.0049 -0.0040 0.0044 
 (0.4717) (0.6650) (0.6857) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0016 -0.0042 -0.0031 
 (0.2177) (0.1398) (0.2638) 
CAR(0,+2) 0.1182* -0.1593* -0.1833 
 (0.0588) (0.0943) (0.1430) 
SPECULATIVE 0.0043 0.0071 0.0008 
 (0.5345) (0.4612) (0.9502) 
RATEDAYS -0.0073** 0.0043 0.0020 
 (0.0239) (0.4247) (0.7744) 
LOSS -0.0206** -0.0025 -0.0151 
 (0.0151) (0.8530) (0.3834) 
MB 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.9988) (0.5211) (0.4141) 
SIZE -0.0008 -0.0130*** -0.0101*   
 (0.7743) (0.0030) (0.0711) 
PROFITABILITY -0.0113 -0.0307 -0.0999**  
 (0.6778) (0.5366) (0.0308) 
CAR(-202,-3) 0.0108 -0.0097 -0.0146 
 (0.3079) (0.5795) (0.5070) 
LEVERAGE -0.0241 -0.0571* -0.0364 
 (0.2128) (0.0588) (0.2441) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0336 -0.0031 -0.0364 
 (0.6077) (0.9811) (0.7372) 
COSTDEBT -0.0201 -0.6079*** -0.7056*** 
 (0.8806) (0.0056) (0.0058) 
CASHHOLDING -0.0032 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.1480) (0.9619) (0.9784) 
VIX 0.0003 0.0043*** 0.0038**  
 (0.7563) (0.0012) (0.0361) 
CONSTANT 0.0374 0.0344 0.0350 
 (0.3951) (0.5946) (0.7137) 
    
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 1075 1071 1064 
Adjusted R2 0.0153 0.0593 0.0702 
        
 
 171 
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.8. The main variable of interest is 
the interaction variable DOWN*CSI(-2,-1). The coefficient of DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) is negative and 
significant in columns (2) and (3) (at the 10% level). The regression models in these two 
columns test the relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and future abnormal 
stock returns over the windows (+3,+20) and (+3,+30). Interestingly, the magnitude of the 
corrections is comparable with the initial reactions presented in Table 5.4. This result shows 
that the initial impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock price responses to rating 
downgrades reverses over the post-rating change period. Overall, the results of the regression 
analysis in this section and Section 5.4.1, provide evidence of sentiment driven mispricing and 
subsequent return reversals. Consistent with expectations, positive (negative) investor 
sentiment leads to lower (higher) abnormal stock returns during the post-rating downgrade 
period as mispricing is unwound. As price responses to rating downgrades are associated with 
investor sentiment, when investor sentiment is bullish (bearish), it moderates (reinforces) the 
negative stock price impact of a ratings downgrade and leads to higher (lower) abnormal stock 
returns on the announcement of rating downgrades. Stock prices show signs of mean 
reversion during the following period, therefore future abnormal stock returns will be lower 
(higher). 
 
5.4.5. Robustness Tests 
Robustness tests are undertaken in order to examine whether the main findings of 
this chapter remain valid when a different measure of abnormal stock returns is employed. 
In the main body of the analysis, abnormal stock returns are measured using the market 
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adjusted model parameters. In this section, abnormal stock returns are calculated using the 
market model parameters.37 Using new CAR variables, the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on stock price responses to rating changes is examined in the same manner as 
previous analysis.38 The results of the analysis are presented in Appendix B-E. When the 
regression models are re-estimated using the market model CAR variables, the results are 
similar to the results presented in the main body of analysis, a finding which suggests that the 
method of estimating abnormal stock returns does not affected the robustness of the 
relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and stocks’ returns around rating 
changes. The significant effect of investor sentiment on stock price reactions to rating 
downgrades (Appendix B), the greater price impact of investor sentiment for speculative-
grade firms than investment-grade firms (Appendix C), the stronger price impact of investor 
sentiment for firms experiencing direct rating changes than watch-preceded rating changes 
(Appendix D), and return reversals over the days following a rating change (Appendix E) 
continues to hold when abnormal stock returns are measured using the market model 
parameters. 
 
                                                          
37 Using the market model parameters, the cumulative abnormal returns are estimated by subtracting the 
expected stock return from the actual stock return. The expected stock return is defined as; E(Ri,t)=αi+βiRm,t. The 
CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return (Rm,t). 
38 Using the market model CAR variables, I re-examine the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock 
price responses to rating changes (re-estimating Models 5.3 and 5.4), the price impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment for speculative-grade firms and investment-grade firms (re-estimating Model 5.5 for sub-samples of 
speculative-grade firms and investment-grade firms), the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock 
price responses to direct rating changes and watch-preceded rating changes (re-estimating Model 5.4 for sub-
samples of direct rating changes and watch-preceded rating changes), and the relation of firm-specific investor 
sentiment to post-rating change abnormal returns (re-estimating Model 5.6 using CAR over the windows 
(+3,+10), (+3,+20), and (+3,+30)). 
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5.5. Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in this chapter provides evidence of the impact of firm-specific 
investor sentiment, based on content posted on Twitter and StockTwits, on stock price 
reactions to the announcement of credit rating changes. Specifically, it offers empirical 
confirmation of the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in stock price formation around 
rating downgrades. The findings confirm the following; the stock price response to a credit 
rating downgrade is greater than a rating upgrade, the price reaction is greater for a 
speculative-grade firm than an investment-grade firm, and the stock price impact is greater 
for a direct (unanticipated) rating change than for a rating change preceded by addition to a 
credit watch list. The contributions to the literature stem from the investigation of the role of 
firm-specific investor sentiment in the context of these issues. First, the results show that 
firm-specific investor sentiment has a significant impact on the stock price reaction to rating 
downgrades; when investor sentiment is positive, it moderates the stock price impact of a 
ratings downgrade and when it is negative, it amplifies the stock price impact of a rating 
downgrade. The second contribution is the finding that the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on stock prices is stronger for speculative-grade firms than for investment-grade 
firms when credit ratings are downgraded. This is related to information asymmetry and 
illiquidity of more risky stocks. The third contribution is the finding that when stock prices 
react negatively to direct (unanticipated) rating downgrades, investor sentiment has a 
significant price impact in a short period around those rating changes. This is consistent with 
the process of assimilating new information, which is a shock rather than the process of 
assessment, which may take place when a firm has been previously placed on a credit watch 
list. The final contribution is the finding that mispricing caused by the effect of firm-specific 
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investor sentiment on the stock price response to rating downgrades reverses over the post-
rating downgrade period. Overall, this analysis provides important insights into the 
relationship between investor sentiment and stock price formation in the context of a credit 
rating downgrade, and highlights the possible benefits of incorporating investor sentiment 
measures into investment analysis and trading models. 
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Appendices for Chapter 5  
Appendix A. Variable Definition 
Variable  Definition 
 
CAR(0,+2) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns over the 3-day event window (0,+2), where 0 is the rating announcement date. 
Abnormal returns are estimated by subtracting the market return from the stock return. The CRSP value-
weighted index return is the market return.  
 
DOWN An indicator variable equal to 1 for rating downgrades and 0 for rating upgrades. 
 
CSI(-2,-1) Cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment index over a two-day window from 2 days before the rating 
announcement date until 1 day before the date of the announcement, where sentiment index (SI) is measured 
as the natural logarithm of (1+bullish intensity)/(1+bearish intensity). 
 
DOWN* CSI(-2,-1) An interaction variable between the rating change indicator variable (DOWN) and the cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment variable (CSI(-2,-1)). Both variables are defined above. 
 
SPECULATIVE An indicator variable equal to 1 for speculative-grade firms and 0 for investment-grade firms. Grades are 
defined based on pre-event ratings. 
 
RATEDAYS The natural logarithm of the number of days between current rating date and lagged rating date. 
 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms reporting negative net income in the year prior to the rating 
announcement. 
 
MB  The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in the year prior to the rating announcement. 
 
SIZE The natural logarithm of share price times shares outstanding in the year prior to the rating announcement. 
 
PROFITABILITY The ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization to total assets in the year prior to 
the rating announcement. 
 
CAR(-202,-3) Cumulative abnormal returns relative to value-weighted market returns over the (-202,-3) day interval prior 
to the rating announcement. 
 
LEVERAGE The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets in the year prior to the rating 
announcement. 
 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT Convertible debt divided by total assets in the year prior to the rating announcement. 
 
COSTDEBT Interest expenses divided by the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities in the year prior to the 
rating announcement.  
 
CASHHOLDING Cash and short-term investments divided by the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities in the 
year prior to the rating announcement. 
 
VIX The average of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) in the month prior to the rating announcement. 
 
Direct/Watch-Preceded 
Rating Changes 
Rating change classification based on S&P CreditWatch reviews within a 90-day/180-day/365-day timeframe 
prior to rating changes. 
 
MM CAR Cumulative abnormal returns calculated using the market model parameters. Abnormal returns are estimated 
by subtracting the expected stock return from the actual stock return. The expected stock return is measured 
relative to the market return. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return.  
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Appendix B. MM CAR and Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) on 
announcement period abnormal returns (MM CAR(0,+2)). The dependent variable in all regressions is MM CAR(0,+2). The returns 
are calculated using the market model parameters. Other variables included in the analysis are credit rating changes (DOWN), 
pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-
to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (MM CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), 
convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index 
(VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. 
Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX 
over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The 
t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1)  (2) 
   
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0080* 0.0097**  
 (1.96) (2.18) 
DOWN -0.0168*** -0.0184*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.51) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0008 -0.0025 
 (-0.55) (-1.42) 
SPECULATIVE -0.0098*** -0.0071 
 (-2.76) (-1.41) 
RATEDAYS 0.0005 0.0001 
 (0.22) (0.04) 
LOSS  -0.0081 
  (-1.13) 
MB  -0.0000 
  (-0.19) 
SIZE  -0.0007 
  (-0.36) 
PROFITABILITY  0.0242 
  (1.31) 
MM CAR(-202,-3)  0.0037 
  (0.74) 
LEVERAGE  0.0285**  
  (2.21) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT  -0.0718 
  (-0.80) 
COSTDEBT  -0.1075 
  (-1.27) 
CASHHOLDING  0.0030*   
  (1.72) 
VIX  0.0007 
  (1.17) 
CONSTANT 0.0078 0.0012 
 (0.54) (0.05) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 1214 1078 
Adjusted R2 0.0117 0.0207 
      
 
 
 177 
 
Appendix C. MM CAR and Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment for Speculative/Investment-
Grade Firms  
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (MM CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) for speculative/investment-grade firms. The returns are calculated using the market model 
parameters. Speculative-grade and investment-grade firms are defined based on the pre-event rating levels. Other variables 
included in the analysis are credit rating changes (DOWN), the number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), 
loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (MM CAR(-202,-3)), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and 
the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data 
comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility 
index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Speculative Investment 
  (1) (2) 
   
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0128** 0.0039 
 (2.07) (0.65) 
DOWN -0.0249*** -0.0014 
 (-3.47) (-0.20) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0034 -0.0018 
 (-1.43) (-0.77) 
RATEDAYS 0.0004 -0.0023 
 (0.17) (-1.09) 
LOSS -0.0132 0.0187 
 (-1.63) (1.42) 
MB 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.29) (-0.28) 
SIZE -0.0022 0.0032 
 (-0.88) (1.51) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0288 -0.0186 
 (1.40) (-0.80) 
MM CAR(-202,-3) 0.0047 -0.0051 
 (0.83) (-0.39) 
LEVERAGE 0.0395*** -0.0004 
 (2.68) (-0.02) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0900 0.0682 
 (-0.89) (1.31) 
COSTDEBT -0.1486 -0.0313 
 (-1.39) (-0.25) 
CASHHOLDING 0.0055** 0.0013 
 (2.40) (0.54) 
VIX 0.0003 0.0009 
 (0.40) (1.26) 
CONSTANT 0.0185 -0.0374 
 (0.63) (-1.01) 
   
Year F.E. Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes 
No of Obs 723 355 
Adjusted R2 0.0292 0.0114 
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Appendix D. MM CAR and Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment for Direct/Watch-Preceded 
Rating Changes 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (MM CAR(0,+2)) on cumulative firm-specific 
investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)) for sub-samples of direct/watch-preceded rating changes. The returns are calculated using the 
market model parameters. Rating changes are classified based on Standard & Poor’s CreditWatch reviews within a 90-
day/180-day/365-day timeframe prior to rating changes. Direct rating changes are rating changes which are not preceded 
by addition to credit watch lists. Watch-preceded rating changes are rating changes which are preceded by addition to credit 
watch lists. Other variables included in the analysis are credit rating changes (DOWN), pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), 
the number of days since the previous rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), 
profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price momentum (MM CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt 
(CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See 
Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard 
& Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the 
period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The t-statistics 
reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and stock clustering. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
CreditWatch within 90 Days 
prior to the Rating Change 
CreditWatch within 180 Days 
prior to the Rating Change 
CreditWatch within 365 Days 
prior to the Rating Change 
  Direct Watch Direct Watch Direct Watch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0111** 0.0036 0.0103* 0.0062 0.0097* 0.0088 
 (2.24) (0.45) (1.95) (0.89) (1.77) (1.33) 
DOWN -0.0208*** -0.0004 -0.0204*** -0.0115 -0.0207*** -0.0148 
 (-3.40) (-0.04) (-3.31) (-1.17) (-3.20) (-1.61) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0026 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0043 
 (-1.35) (-0.30) (-1.13) (-0.46) (-0.98) (-1.10) 
SPECULATIVE -0.0078 -0.0012 -0.0078 -0.0082 -0.0065 -0.0135 
 (-1.36) (-0.10) (-1.33) (-0.68) (-1.08) (-1.26) 
RATEDAYS -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0012 0.0042 -0.0020 0.0042 
 (-0.30) (0.34) (-0.53) (0.96) (-0.87) (1.07) 
LOSS -0.0090 -0.0073 -0.0091 -0.0028 -0.0051 -0.0192 
 (-1.13) (-0.44) (-1.12) (-0.17) (-0.61) (-1.15) 
MB 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.21) (0.31) (0.48) (-1.12) (0.39) (-0.52) 
SIZE -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0024 
 (-0.39) (0.20) (-0.22) (-0.81) (-0.11) (-0.75) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0223 0.0014 0.0218 0.0506 0.0213 0.0537 
 (1.17) (0.04) (1.12) (1.27) (1.10) (1.34) 
MM CAR(-202,-3) 0.0012 0.0182 0.0014 0.0101 -0.0002 0.0175 
 (0.23) (1.11) (0.27) (0.67) (-0.04) (1.24) 
LEVERAGE 0.0266* 0.0434 0.0259* 0.0342 0.0240* 0.0514*   
 (1.91) (1.39) (1.84) (1.15) (1.66) (1.92) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0788 0.0015 -0.0795 -0.0021 -0.1012 0.0791 
 (-0.79) (0.01) (-0.78) (-0.02) (-0.96) (0.89) 
COSTDEBT -0.1771* 0.3438 -0.1515 0.0809 -0.1663* 0.1038 
 (-1.85) (1.46) (-1.54) (0.54) (-1.65) (0.78) 
CASHHOLDING 0.0036* 0.0016 0.0031 0.0031 0.0034* 0.0020 
 (1.89) (0.42) (1.59) (0.81) (1.76) (0.58) 
VIX 0.0010* -0.0049* 0.0011* -0.0018 0.0011* -0.0017 
 (1.67) (-1.93) (1.67) (-1.18) (1.67) (-1.31) 
CONSTANT 0.0080 0.0295 0.0086 0.0110 0.0094 0.0144 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.31) (0.16) (0.34) (0.24) 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 939 139 891 187 847 231 
Adjusted R2 0.0246 -0.0252 0.0224 -0.0430 0.0173 0.0433 
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Appendix E. MM Post-Rating Change Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of post-rating change abnormal returns (MM CAR(+3,+10), MM CAR(+3,+20), 
and MM CAR(+3,+30)) on cumulative firm-specific investor sentiment (CSI(-2,-1)). The returns are calculated using the market 
model parameters. Other variables included in the analysis are credit rating changes (DOWN), announcement period 
cumulative abnormal returns (MM CAR(0,+2)), pre-event rating levels (SPECULATIVE), the number of days since the previous 
rating action (RATEDAYS), loss (LOSS), market-to-book ratio (MB), size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITABILITY), stock price 
momentum (MM CAR(-202,-3)), leverage (LEVERAGE), convertible debt (CONVERTIBLEDEBT), cost of debt (COSTDEBT), cash 
holdings (CASHHOLDING), and the VIX volatility index (VIX). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables. Firm-
specific investor sentiment data comes from PsychSignal. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data comes from Capital IQ. Stock 
price and index return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data is taken from 
Compustat. The CBOE S&P500 volatility index (VIX) is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The sample includes 
stocks that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX over the period 2011-2016. All regressions control for year and 
sector fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The p-values are reported in parentheses. For the variables 
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) and CSI(-2,-1) one-tailed p-values are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable MM CAR(+3,+10) MM CAR(+3,+20) MM CAR(+3,+30) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
DOWN*CSI(-2,-1) 0.0033 -0.0112* -0.0116 
 (0.6953) (0.0912) (0.1367) 
DOWN 0.0106* 0.0159* 0.0381*** 
 (0.0924) (0.0592) (0.0002) 
CSI(-2,-1) -0.0021 -0.0060* -0.0074* 
 (0.1606) (0.0591) (0.0673) 
MM CAR(0,+2) 0.1567** -0.0910 -0.1017 
 (0.0113) (0.3281) (0.4223) 
SPECULATIVE 0.0019 0.0005 -0.0076 
 (0.7929) (0.9567) (0.5638) 
RATEDAYS -0.0082** 0.0002 -0.0049 
 (0.0114) (0.9610) (0.4584) 
LOSS -0.0170** 0.0077 -0.0056 
 (0.0437) (0.5440) (0.7223) 
MB -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0001 
 (0.6345) (0.2046) (0.9029) 
SIZE -0.0009 -0.0156*** -0.0142**  
 (0.7703) (0.0003) (0.0125) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0115 -0.0103 -0.0816 
 (0.6732) (0.8422) (0.1188) 
MM CAR(-202,-3) 0.0031 -0.0319** -0.0423**  
 (0.6901) (0.0185) (0.0107) 
LEVERAGE -0.0226 -0.0556** -0.0270 
 (0.2623) (0.0462) (0.3818) 
CONVERTIBLEDEBT -0.0510 -0.0536 -0.0928 
 (0.4310) (0.6311) (0.3749) 
COSTDEBT 0.0306 -0.5709*** -0.7035*** 
 (0.8112) (0.0029) (0.0021) 
CASHHOLDING -0.0032 0.0011 0.0022 
 (0.1490) (0.7571) (0.5678) 
VIX -0.0004 0.0030** 0.0026 
 (0.6939) (0.0147) (0.1436) 
CONSTANT 0.0511 0.1041* 0.1400 
 (0.2448) (0.0805) (0.1194) 
    
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Sector F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 1075 1071 1064 
Adjusted R2 0.0243 0.0822 0.0996 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1. Empirical Findings 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment on stock prices, specifically the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock 
price responses to the following firm-specific events; earnings surprises, dividend changes, 
and credit rating changes. It is motivated by a review of the literature, in Chapter 2, that 
identifies a gap in the prior studies on the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in the stock 
pricing process around these events. 
To summarise the findings of this study, Chapter 3 investigates the effect of firm-
specific investor sentiment on stock price movements around earnings surprises which goes 
beyond the effect of market-wide investor sentiment and new earnings information. The 
empirical results demonstrate that firm-specific investor sentiment is a key determinant of 
price adjustment in the context of an earnings surprise and that the effect of firm-specific 
investor sentiment is not moderated by market-wide investor sentiment. The findings show 
that bullish (bearish) firm-specific investor sentiment leads to higher (lower) abnormal stock 
returns in a short period following the announcement of an earnings surprise. The results of 
this chapter provide support for prospect theory by indicating that the price impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment is greater for negative earnings surprises than positive earnings 
surprises. Furthermore, the results provide validation for the view that the impact of firm-
specific investor sentiment is stronger for firms that face greater uncertainty in valuation. 
Consistent with the predictions of behavioural finance theory, the results show that there is 
an opposite relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and future abnormal stock 
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returns. This finding validates the view that firm-specific investor sentiment causes temporary 
mispricing around earnings surprises.   
Chapter 4 examines the impact of firm-specific investor sentiment on stock prices 
around another important corporate event which is the announcement of dividends. The 
outcomes from this examination provide robust empirical confirmation of the important role 
of bullish investor sentiment in the stock pricing process around negative dividend changes. 
The results offer new evidence on the moderating impact of bullish investor sentiment on the 
announcement of a dividend cut. Bullish investor sentiment leads to underreaction to 
negative dividend changes and as a result leads to higher abnormal stock returns. The findings 
also show that the moderating impact of bullish investor sentiment is most marked for hard 
to value firms and difficult to arbitrage firms. In addition, the results show that the impact of 
bullish investor sentiment is temporary as stock prices return to fundamental values over the 
post-dividend change announcement period.  
Chapter 5 offers new evidence on the role of firm-specific investor sentiment in stock 
price variation around credit rating changes. It demonstrates that bullish investor sentiment 
moderates the negative stock price impact of rating downgrades and leads to higher 
abnormal stock returns on the announcement of a rating downgrade. Furthermore, bearish 
investor sentiment reinforces the negative stock price impact of ratings downgrades and 
leads to lower abnormal stock returns on the announcement of a rating downgrade. The 
findings of empirical analysis also demonstrate that the price impact of firm-specific investor 
sentiment around rating downgrades is most pronounced for speculative-grade firms. This 
finding is attributed to the fact that speculative-grade firms carry higher risks and face major 
uncertainties in the market. The results also determine that the impact of firm-specific 
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investor sentiment is most marked for firms experiencing direct rating downgrades due to 
greater uncertainty associated with these rating changes. Additionally, the results provide 
validation of temporary mispricing due to investor sentiment in the market, showing the price 
impact of firm-specific investor sentiment around rating downgrades reverses over the weeks 
following rating downgrades. 
While the way which firm-specific investor sentiment affects stock prices varies across 
the three events studied in this thesis, the general findings strongly support the role of firm-
specific investor sentiment in the stock pricing process around corporate events, which has 
been overlooked in prior studies. The results of the analysis presented in all empirical chapters 
confirm the predictions of behavioural finance theory regarding the impact of investor 
sentiment across firms and the predictions of prospect theory regarding investors’ value 
functions being asymmetrical and more prone to loss aversion.  
The findings of this thesis have important implications for traders and academic 
researchers. Traders that are seeking profitable investment strategies through high frequency 
trading should incorporate investor sentiment measures into their trading models. The results 
of this thesis show that stocks’ returns could be predicted well using firm-specific investor 
sentiment. For academics, the findings indicate that investors’ behavioural biases towards 
individual firms have a real short-term impact on stock prices even in the presence of new 
fundamental information, therefore further research on stock price movements around firm-
specific events should take into consideration the public mood towards individual firms. 
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6.2. Further Research 
The importance of firm-specific investor sentiment as a determinant of stock price 
variation around corporate events is highlighted through this thesis. In addition to the 
research presented in this study, two avenues for further research using Twitter and 
StockTwits and other forms of investor sentiment from social media platforms can be 
suggested. First, while a few prior studies use intraday investor sentiment data, further 
analysis could be conducted using intraday return and sentiment data. There might be times 
of day that provides more valuable sentiment information for a firm. Second, further research 
can be undertaken to understand how a specific group of users affects the flow of information 
through social media platforms and ultimately affects public mood towards individual firms. 
These potential areas of research could offer valuable insights for both traders and academics 
as they consider the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices in financial decisions and 
pricing models.  
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